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Community management of natural resources in 
Africa: Impacts, experiences and future directions
In many parts of Africa, local communities have depended on, 
and managed, wildlife as a key resource since the Stone Age. 
Over the last twenty years, this subsistence strategy has evolved 
into a development strategy that has become increasingly 
formalised as “community-based natural resource management” 
(CBNRM), combining rural development, local empowerment, 
and nature conservation.  
Led by new ideas about the merits of decentralized, collective 
resource governance regimes, and creative field experiments such 
as Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE, these community-based approaches 
evolved in a wide range of ecological, political, and social 
contexts across Africa. This review provides an unprecedented 
pan-African synthesis of CBNRM, drawing on multiple authors 
and a wide range of documented experiences from Southern, 
Eastern, Western and Central Africa. The review discusses the 
degree to which CBNRM has met poverty alleviation, economic 
development and nature conservation objectives. In its concluding 
chapter, the report suggests a way forward for strengthening 
CBNRM and addressing key challenges in the years ahead.
The views expressed in this study do not necessarily represent 
those of the institutions involved.
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Executive summary
Across sub-Saharan Africa, natural resources remain central to rural people’s 
livelihoods. Local norms and customs shape people’s everyday forms of  
resource use. In contrast, the commercial uses of natural resources often  
remain highly centralized, conditioned by government policies of the colonial 
and post-colonial eras.
During the past several decades, there has been a shift from this predominantly 
centralized natural resource management towards more devolved models known 
very broadly as Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM). 
CBNRM models work to strengthen locally accountable institutions for natural 
resource use and management, enabling local groups of people to make better 
decisions about the use of land and resources. Because it involves the transfer 
of authority over natural resources to local communities, including of potentially 
valuable resources such as wildlife and timber, CBNRM is often about major 
institutional reforms and fundamental changes in power.
This pan-African review of the impacts, challenges, and future directions of 
CBNRM highlights the diverse range of forms of community involvement in 
natural resource management that have emerged across the continent during 
the past twenty years. CBNRM means different things to different actors in 
different places across sub-Saharan Africa. In much of western and central 
Africa, CBNRM is interpreted by government authorities, donor agencies, and 
NGOs as benefit-sharing or outreach between national parks and adjacent 
communities. In such instances communities are not empowered as authorized 
local resource managers but are involved principally as passive recipients of 
benefits controlled elsewhere. This form of outreach and benefit-sharing is also 
a characteristic of some protected area management in East African countries. 
In Southern Africa, CBNRM is most clearly defined in terms of the devolution 
of rights to make management decisions, and capture benefits, in relation to 
resources located on communal lands. 
In all instances CBNRM involves some degree of co-management of resources 
between central authorities, local government, and local communities which 
share rights and responsibilities through diverse institutional arrangements. The 
various forms of CBNRM and their many locally-specific adaptations have greatly 
diversified approaches to natural resource governance in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Some notable ecological, economic, and institutional achievements have 
been documented. 
n In Namibia communal land conservancies have proliferated, and now cover 
more than 14% of the country, involve over 200,000 people and earn  
US$ 2.5 million per annum. Key wildlife resources have recovered and illegal 
use of wildlife has fallen.
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n In Zimbabwe, CAMPFIRE generated $20 million in revenues for local 
communities and district governments from 1989 to 2001, and also resulted 
in over 40,000 km2 of communal land being managed for wildlife production. 
More importantly, some stakeholders have adapted to the current economic 
and political crises by forming new types of relationships to maintain wildlife 
production systems on communal land.
n In Tanzania, more than 3.6 million hectares of forests and woodlands are now 
managed as Village Land Forest Reserves, entirely under the control of locally 
elected village governments, or as co-managed forests between villages and 
either local or central government. 
n In Kenya the development of community-level wildlife-based tourism ventures 
on communal and private land is making a major contribution to the total 
national conservation estate. 
n In Cameroon, revisions to forestry law have enabled community associations 
and cooperatives to acquire the exclusive rights to manage and exploit up 
to 5,000 ha of customary forest, under a 15-year contract, resulting in the 
creation of over 100 new Community Forests. 
n In Ghana, 200,000 hectares of forest have been demarcated under 
the Community Resource Management Area Policy of 2000. This gives 
participating communities full authority to control access and harvesting of 
resources within their management area. These changes are reducing the 
illegal activities in the areas under this type of management. 
Through its potential to develop more sustainable natural resource governance 
regimes and to enhance local economic benefits, CBNRM is an important 
strategy for pursuing the goals of various multilateral environmental treaties, 
such as the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the Convention to Combat 
Desertification (UNCCD) and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). Existing community based organisations for the management of 
land and natural resources, for example, provide immediate opportunities 
for establishing pilot projects for Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and 
Degradation (REDD) to test innovative international finance mechanisms linked 
to the UNFCCC. The direct and indirect benefits created by CBNRM programmes 
and projects are also supporting progress, albeit slow, towards the Millennium 
Development Goals and are an important stimulus  to more democratic forms of 
governance in sub-Saharan Africa.
Despite these notable local and national achievements, fundamental challenges 
to CBNRM remain. Overall, there remain relatively few cases of communities 
obtaining formal authority over lands and the natural resources found on those 
lands. Centralized control over natural resources persists despite the ubiquitous 
change in the rhetoric over land and resource management. In some cases, 
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trends point more towards central consolidation of the right to use and allocate 
valuable resources such as wildlife and timber. 
Conflicts between local groups and other more powerful actors, including 
both state agencies and private sector investors, remain widespread across the 
sub-continent and are often intensifying. There are strong political economic 
incentives for political elites and central bureaucracies to consolidate their control 
over natural resources. Foreign donors and international NGOs spearheading 
CBNRM efforts are often poorly positioned, in a political sense, to address 
these challenges. Further conflicts arise from differences in perceived priority 
management objective – the most appropriate scale at which to manage from 
an ecological perspective rarely tallies with the most appropriate scale from a 
social or economic perspective. 
Similar challenges apply at the local level, when local governance institutions 
are not downwardly accountable to the community and benefits are 
disproportionately captured by local elites. Tensions exist in some places 
between the development of locally accountable governance and traditional 
authorities. Often, CBNRM interventions are not accompanied by the type 
of long-term investments in capacity-building required to ensure broader 
participation and the accountability of local leaders to their community. The 
distribution of local benefits of CBNRM can also be influenced by the nature 
of benefits generated and how individuals are able to gain access to them. In 
some cases the principles that govern the distribution of benefits are built into 
CBNRM systems, as in Namibia. In different programmes, benefits are variously 
channeled through: employment; the sale of products; and though community 
construction projects in which the opportunities are more likely to be accessible 
to the well-skilled, wealthy and politically connected. Where CBNRM results in 
growing wildlife populations, it can be a victim of its own success by creating 
increased levels of human-wildlife conflict. 
In order to address these challenges and develop more resilient and sustainable 
models for CBNRM in its diverse and variable African contexts, the report 
highlights a number of key findings based on experiences of CBNRM to date. 
These are:
 CBNRM represents a spectrum of management from traditional to 
modern: There is a limit to the usefulness of distinguishing between ‘formal’, 
i.e. a state-supported, structured and funded programme, and ‘informal’ 
CBNRM, including ‘everyday use’. Whereas a legal framework may well be 
absent or only partially complete in the case of the former, local sanctions 
and traditional authority may effectively frame and bound CBNRM in the 
latter. Customary CBNRM regimes are generally high in internal legitimacy 
but low on external legitimacy while newer formal regimes tend to have 
higher external legitimacy but lower internal legitimacy. Moreover, informal 
CBNRM can function as well (or as badly) as any formal CBNRM arrangements. 
xThus CBNRM can be viewed as a continuum of management regimes from 
traditional to modern, informal through to formal. They may co-exist and they 
should inform each other.
 CBNRM should explicitly embrace development and conservation 
objectives: To date, CBNRM has been too focused on ‘conservation’ and a 
rather simplistic understanding of approaches to integrating conservation and 
development. Looking forward, it is important to deepen our understanding of 
CBNRM as a broad church of approaches that embrace wildlife conservation, 
protected area management, together with the broader land management and 
resource use issues related to agriculture, forestry and pastoralism. CBNRM 
must become a response as to how best to harness local resource exploitation 
to privilege local, but sustainable economic and social development. 
 Focus on demand driven collective management arrangements: The 
political challenges of devolving authority over valuable resources, should 
be given central attention. Local rights, authority and tenure over land and 
resources are central to CBNRM. Greater emphasis needs to be placed on 
supporting CBNRM in a ‘demand-driven’ fashion, rather than conventional 
centralized project models that attempt to implement CBNRM through 
central government agencies which may themselves be disinclined to give up 
authority over valuable resources. Emphasis should be placed on supporting 
local communities and civic organizations by building their capacity to engage 
in collective action that builds stronger political constituencies for resource 
governance reforms. More democratic forms of resource governance in sub-
Saharan countries are largely contingent on such collective action. 
 Tenure and rights do not guarantee conventional conservation 
outcomes: Integrated and community-driven CBNRM will increase the 
likelihood of fiscal, ecological and institutional sustainability by granting 
communities more options. For example, market-based opportunities such 
as wildlife tourism might be exploited alongside economically important 
traditional agro-pastoralism and more diversified production systems. Tenure 
and rights to make informed choices are extremely important here, as is the 
knowledge and information that informs such decisions over land use. It should 
not be assumed that stronger tenure and improved rights will automatically 
lead to a ‘conservation’ outcome per se. It may, for example, lead to a small-
scale irrigation scheme, if this is the most valued use of the land. However, 
underlying such a choice should be some measure of improved understanding 
of the institutional, economic and ecological issues that affect sustainability.
 Improved indicators and better monitoring by communities are 
needed. A major deficiency of formal CBNRM projects is the absence or 
paucity of quantitative and/or qualitative data on their social, economic and 
environmental impacts. There is a real need for good monitoring protocols to 
be in place and for measurements against baselines established at the outset 
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of the project or programme. Part of the problem lies with poor or incomplete 
design and a lack of understanding by project implementers of what it is that 
really should be measured. Most projects are good at reporting on activities 
and to an extent the project deliverables. Lacking are more meaningful 
outcomes. Part of the solution lies with community engagement in monitoring 
project successes (and failures). Imparting skills and knowledge in establishing 
baselines and subsequent monitoring is empowering for communities and 
instructive for project implementers. Properly designed and structured projects 
will provide for quantitative and qualitative self-assessments of project impacts 
by communities themselves long after the project has departed.
 Lessons and linkages between CBNRM and REDD: The lessons learned 
from CBNRM are a vital and rich resource for emerging payments for 
ecosystem services (PES) to draw on. For example, initiatives such as REDD and 
the voluntary carbon market have much to learn from CBNRM with respect 
to institutional design that creates effective local incentives for collective 
action under communal tenure arrangements. PES arrangements are not 
fundamentally different from CBNRM. The difference is the source of revenue 
and the way agreements are structured; PES approaches are basically a new 
way of financing natural resource management and conservation, but still 
rely on many of the same basic factors as CBNRM. In the communal lands 
where much of Africa’s forests and woodlands lie, operationalising approaches 
such as REDD will necessarily involve community-based frameworks for forest 
management and conservation.
A core conclusion of this report is that flourishing rural communities, that are 
sustainably managing their land and natural resources, will only be fostered 
only when CBNRM facilitation prioritizes local interests, agency, and capacity. 
Stakeholder roles need a fairly fundamental re-think in the way they support 
and engage with rural communities:
 Donors: Long-term, flexible and responsive: The standard donor model of 
centralised support will need to be changed over time to one in which there 
is greater flexibility, opportunities for innovation and emphasis on the resource 
managers. Support should not be intrusive but rather responsive to local need. 
Facilitation techniques such as scenario planning, the promotion of shared 
learning and technical workshops are critical aid components and deserve 
strong financial backing. 
 Civil society: Balancing civic duty with implementation: Civil society faces 
the challenge of balancing the different expectations of national governments 
and communities. Local NGOs that are grounded in the social, economic 
and ecological reality of their environments should lead the development 
of CBNRM working from the bottom up. International NGOs have a role in 
promoting the skills, management experience, and convening power, of local 
NGOs and being a conduit or coordinator for financial support. 
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 Governments: Key responsibilities and scarce resources: The functions 
of African government agencies are often constrained by weak processes 
of accountable governance, limited financial resources, and scarce capacity. 
Governments need to prioritise more support for implementation of existing 
laws and policies that often already promote devolved management and to 
work on harmonizing cross sectoral policy and legislation that affects the 
management of lands and natural resources.
 The private sector: A significant but potentially risky ally: The private 
sector often has a vital role to play in the ideas and markets needed to make 
CBNRM work, but the other stakeholder roles are crucial in making this work. 
The commoditization of resources must be accompanied by strategies to 
ensure local interests have the skills and tools to ensure sustained harvests 
and market rates of compensation. Private sector actors engaged in CBNRM 
processes need to develop codes of conduct that facilitate, long-term local 
rights and penalize inappropriate behavior. 
Experience with CBNRM over the last twenty years, has demonstrated a wide 
range of development pathways and opportunities tailored to local needs 
and conditions. It has shown that there are viable local alternatives to the 
centralized State control of resources and sets the stage for future devolution 
and diversification of management actions. It has also shown how partnerships 
with new actors, especially in the private sector, can improve cash flows to local 
communities giving them more autonomous development options. The CBNRM 
experience offers lessons for future processes of agrarian reform, as well as 
providing decentralized models of natural resource use that are of relevance in 
the context of adaptation to climate change, the fight against desertification and 
the conservation of bio-diversity.
Community management of natural resources in Africa
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Introduction
Background to this publication 
The Bio-Hub initiative is a French government funded collaborative project of 
the French Agricultural Research Centre for International Development (CIRAD), 
the International Foundation for Conservation of Wildlife (IGF), the International 
Conservation Union (IUCN) Regional Office for Southern Africa (IUCN-ROSA) and 
the WWF Southern Africa Regional Programme Office (WWF SARPO). Bio-Hub 
is intended to create a platform for debate and dialogue on issues relating to 
Natural Resource Management (NRM) and Community-Based Natural Resource 
Management (CBNRM) with a view to influencing national and regional policy. 
In March 2008 Bio-Hub organised a pan-African workshop ‘Regards 
Croisés sur la Tapoa’ in Niamey, Niger supported by CIRAD, Fonds Francais 
pour l’Environnement Mondial (FFEM), French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
French Cooperation, Direction Générale de la Coopération Internationale et 
Development (DgCID), European Union, IUCN  and Ecosystèmes protégés  
en Afrique Soudano-Sahélienne (ECOPAS).
Intended primarily as an exchange of experiences between Southern and West 
African countries on CBNRM and NRM, the meeting grew to include Central 
and East Africa. The exchange included participatory management of Protected 
Areas (PAs), management of peripheral or buffer zone areas around PAs 
and CBNRM. Participants numbering 74 in all at Tapoa included researchers, 
practitioners and decision makers from 11 African countries and 5 European 
countries, ensuring an important exchange and interaction between Anglo-and 
Francophone countries within Africa. 
This publication (which extends the regional coverage further to include  
East Africa) was commissioned from IIED as one of a number of follow-ups  
to the workshop.
This publication was requested to review, compare and contrast the different 
experiences of CBNRM in different regions of Africa in order to identify next 
steps on a ‘policy road map’ for CBNRM support agencies (donors, governments, 
NGOs). In contrast to the La Tapoa workshop, this publication was intended to 
expand the geographical coverage (to include East Africa) and to expand the 
focus from protected area buffer zones to cover a fuller range of collective land 
and natural resource management arrangements – namely, CBNRM. 
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Production of the publication and methodology limitations
This publication is based on a series of four regional reviews of CBNRM experience 
– covering Central, East, Southern and West Africa. The regional reviews were 
commissioned by IIED from regional experts. The reviewers were tasked with 
describing the different forms of local community involvement in NRM in 
each region and the factors affecting that – including the formal policy and 
institutional framework – as well as assessing the experience of CBNRM in terms 
of its social, environmental and economic impacts and achievements. A number 
of key themes were identified for exploration including: the role of the private 
sector, the role of donors, benefit sharing mechanisms, taxation mechanisms, 
CBNRM contributions to environmental improvements, and questions surrounding 
governance and policy reform.
Given severe constraints on the time and resources available, the regional reviews 
were based on an analysis of existing published information rather than primary 
research. The amount of information available for each region varied considerably 
and for some of the themes identified there was simply no information for some 
regions. In West and Central Africa in particular, reviewers found a dearth of 
written information – particularly any documentation of CBNRM impacts. The 
analysis in this publication, given its wide geographical scope, is thus constrained 
by the availability of information – and the representativeness of the often very 
context-specific reports and analyses that do exist.
Scope of this publication
We begin our analysis by describing how CBRNM has emerged and evolved in  
sub-Saharan Africa from the post-colonial era to the present day (Chapter 2).  
We recognise the centrality of natural resource use to local rural livelihoods and 
to ongoing political struggles, democratisation processes and broader governance 
changes in sub-Saharan Africa. In the global struggle to combat desertification, 
biodiversity loss and climate change we see new problems but similar challenges 
in terms of local governance, institutional adaptation and policy reform that 
CBNRM has struggled with in the last few decades. Getting these processes right is 
therefore not just critical to the long term success of CBNRM but is also part of the 
solution to these global challenges. 
In Chapter 3 we provide an overview of CBNRM in the different regions of Africa, 
looking at the socio-political circumstances that have shaped its development, the 
institutional, policy and governance barriers and opportunities that it faces. We 
characterise CBNRM in each region according to its focus (types of resources), 
scope (protected areas, co-management arrangements, communal lands, etc) 
and approach (from passive community involvement to fully devolved authority to 
defined local organisations). We summarise the chapter by trying to identify the 
broad regional trends that emerge – although recognising the main characteristic 
of CBNRM across the regions is its diversity of form and approach.
Community management of natural resources in Africa
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In Chapter 4 we explore what the main experiences of CBNRM have been in 
terms of its empowerment, economic and environmental conservation impacts. 
We recognise that these three pillars are inherently inter-connected in both the 
theory and practice of CBNRM – outcomes in one arena often influencing, or 
being influenced by, outcomes in another.
In Chapter 5 we review the provisions of the three ‘Rio Conventions’ – on 
biodiversity, desertification and climate change – in terms of their implications 
for CBNRM and the opportunities for CBNRM experiences to contribute to 
some of the planned approaches to tackling these issues – particularly initiatives 
around Payments for Environmental Services (PES) and Reduced Emissions from 
Deforestation and Degradation (REDD).
In Chapter 6 Russell Taylor and Marshall Murphree reflect on the analysis and 
identify the major challenges to enhancing the success of CBNRM – as well as 
the opportunities. Particular emphasis is given to the need to move on from the 
techno-interventionist model which has dominated modern formal CBNRM to 
approaches which better fit African rural ecological and aspirational realities. 
Finally, Chapter 7 – drafted by a Peer Review Group – seeks, on the basis of 
the analysis presented, to identify the policy steps needed if CBNRM is to fulfil 
its potential as a tool for improved local governance, rural development and 
resource conservation. 
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The origins and evolution of community-
based natural resource management  
in Africa
Introduction
Community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) is, quite simply, (and 
as its name suggests) a term to describe the management of resources such as 
land, forests, wildlife and water by collective, local institutions for local benefit. 
CBNRM takes many different forms in different locations and different socio-
political and bio-physical contexts. CBNRM may be based on commercial uses 
of natural resources, such as managing wildlife for local tourism or hunting 
enterprises, or it may be based on primarily subsistence uses of resources such as 
Non-Timber Forest Products (NTFP). 
CBNRM is not a new phenomenon. Local groups of people have managed the 
land on which they live and the natural resources with which they are surrounded 
for millennia. Indigenous African communities often developed elaborate resource 
management systems (Fabricius, 2004), as have local communities throughout 
the world (Ostrom, 1990; Borrini-Feyerabend et al., 2004). Today, local groups 
of pastoralists, farmers, and hunter-gatherers throughout Africa maintain many 
traditional systems of collective natural resource management which help to 
sustain the livelihoods and cultures of millions of people. 
In the last few decades, there has been a growing awareness of the importance 
of collective natural resource management practices and institutions, and a 
recognition of the ways that historic forces have disrupted local people’s ability 
to manage the lands and resources they depend upon. A wide range of policy 
makers and development and conservation practitioners have supported efforts 
to revive or bolster local natural resource management institutions in response 
to various economic, social, environmental and political pressures. Increasingly, 
debates over local communities’ ability to manage their lands and natural 
resources are a part and parcel of broader struggles over political and economic 
power and authority in African countries. This chapter briefly reviews the reasons 
for this return to local level management and the way in which CBNRM has been 
initiated, evolved, and ultimately constrained over time and from place to place.
Colonialism, post colonialism and the rise of the  
CBNRM paradigm 
Natural resource management policies in the colonial era were a central 
component of the project of extending European political control into rural 
African landscapes (Neumann, 1998). Colonisation by European powers in the 
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18th and 19th centuries, and the accompanying spread of conservation practice, 
did not bring with it this respect for traditional rights (Colchester, 1994). The 
model for nature conservation that was globally imposed by European nations 
was based on the American approach of pristine wild areas set aside for human 
enjoyment and fulfilment and was encouraged by concerns about the depletion 
of wildlife, timber, and other valuable resources (Adams, 2004). Ownership 
of land was gradually transferred from traditional local authority to the state 
domain in order to enable colonial authorities to exploit African lands, labour, and 
resources. Ultimately this shift in tenure became one of the key drivers of African 
independence movements seeking to recover entitlements to land and resources. 
Resources such as wildlife were progressively placed under central regulatory 
authority, with the rights of local people to utilize resources alienated over time. 
  
The newly independent African nations that emerged starting in the late 1950’s 
inherited colonially-derived political structures based on centralized control and 
exploitation (Mamdani, 1996). African states often maintained heavily centralized 
political economic institutions, as a result of socialist ideologies favouring state 
direction of the economy and ownership of valuable resources and the desire of 
elites in many emerging nations to build patronage networks essential for their 
own authority and political stability (Bates, 1981; Ake, 1996; van de Walle, 2001). 
As a result, for example, colonial land tenure institutions were generally retained, 
and in many instances central authority over lands and resources extended and 
local rights further alienated (Alden Wily, 2008). 
In the 1980s, a community-based counter-narrative began to emerge as a result 
of manifold trends, ideas, and crises which led to a broad rethinking of both 
development and conservation fields. The influences that led to the widespread 
support for CBNRM and that emerged during the 1990’s were both internally and 
externally derived. 
The emergence of CBNRM in southern and eastern Africa often had deep locally-
derived roots. In the late 1960’s, use rights over wildlife on freehold lands in 
Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Namibia – all then under the rule of contested 
white minority regimes – was, through a series of legislative reforms, devolved to 
landowners (Jones and Murphree, 2001). This dramatic shift away from strictly 
centralized governance of wildlife effectively changed wildlife’s status on private 
lands from an economic liability to an asset, and led to profound recoveries of 
wildlife on freehold lands and the growth of wildlife-based industries in all three 
countries (Bond, 2004). The reforms also laid the basis for extending the model 
of local management to communal lands after the enactment of majority rule in 
those countries, resulting in Zimbabwe’s iconic Communal Areas Management 
Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in the 1980’s, and Namibia’s 
Communal Conservancies in the 1990’s (Jones and Murphree, 2001). These 
local experiments in CBNRM provided new ideas and opportunities for adaptive 
learning; CAMPFIRE, for example, played a key role in shaping pilot initiatives 
in community-based wildlife management in neighbouring countries including 
Mozambique, Botswana, and Namibia. 
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Similar experiments were also occurring as early as the 1960s outside of southern 
Africa. In Kenya, local communities were able to earn income from lease fees 
paid by hunters in areas such as Kajiado District, where efforts to integrate the 
management of Amboseli National Park with local livelihood interests led to the 
crystallization of new ‘community-based’ conservation paradigms in the 1970’s 
(Western, 1994; Homewood et al., 2009). In contrast, many countries in Central 
and West Africa were gaining independence from French, English and Spanish 
colonial rule in the early 1960s. After independence, tenure rights for many 
countries became more, rather than less centralised (e.g. in Ghana (Alhassan & 
Manuh 2005), Mali (Hilhorst & Coulibaly, 1998) and Cote’Divoire (Stamm, 2000)). 
This delayed the emergence of community-based management models, which only 
started to appear in the 1980s and 1990s, with the introduction of decentralisation 
policies in many countries (e.g.the Gestion de terriors approach of Burkina Faso; 
Batterbury, 1998).
By the late 1980s there was a confluence of this type of local experimentation, 
changing global discourses on rural development and conservation, and changing 
political conditions across Africa. Development theory in the 1980s- particularly that 
oriented to rural development – began to emphasise decentralisation and local 
empowerment (Chambers 1983, 1987). In the natural resource management field, 
the emergence of an array of new studies documenting sustainable forms of 
collective resource management based on traditional rules and norms transformed 
thinking about communal property rights and institutions (Berkes, 1989; Ostrom, 
1990). This scholarship provided much of the conceptual basis for CBNRM, and in 
many ways was convergent with ideas emerging independently within Africa about 
local resource management regimes (e.g. Murphree, 1993), as well as with parallel 
experiments with Participatory Forest Management (PFM) in places like southern Asia.
Conservation efforts, meanwhile, were increasingly subject to concerns regarding 
the negative impact of protectionist approaches based on exclusion of local 
people. The Bali Action Plan, an outcome of the 3rd IUCN World Parks Congress 
in 1982, is seen by some as a turning point in conservation practice, through 
its encouragement of local participation and sustainable use (Wilshusen et al, 
2002). Just after this, in 1985, WWF launched its Wildlife and Human Needs 
Programme comprising some 20 projects that sought to combine conservation and 
development in developing countries. 
Alongside the emergence of new ideas and narratives about rural development 
and natural resource management were a range of shocks and crises that overtook 
Africa during the 1980s, which often created new political space for experiments 
with CBNRM. Africa’s share of global GDP decreased from 2.5% in 1980 to 1.1% 
in 1996, and African countries had a per capita Gross National Product in 1998 that 
was only 91% of what it was in 1970 (van de Walle, 2001). The fiscal insolvency 
of many states led to increasing reliance on external rescue packages and global 
financial institutions. By the 1980’s, a range of bailouts led by the International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank were being adopted, based on the new global 
economic prescriptions of ‘structural adjustment’ (Devarajan et al., 2001). These 
adjustment policies called for market-based measures, reduced government budget 
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deficits, and decentralized political economic structures that would promote 
investment. CBNRM, with its focus on local management and incentives and a 
reduced role of centralized state bureaucracies, fitted well with the broader suite 
of economic policies being promoted by donors across Africa during this period. 
For example, the World Bank published Living with Wildlife (Kiss 1990), while 
the UK Overseas Development Administration (now Department for International 
Development) commissioned a review of participatory approaches to wildlife 
management in order to inform its new African wildlife policy (IIED, 1994).
Finally, the end of the Cold War and collapse of communism in Eastern Europe 
contributed to a sudden resurgence of democratic governance in Africa in the 
late 1980’s and early 1990’s (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997). Culminating in 
the South African general elections in 1994 following the end of Apartheid, 
this ‘second liberation’ seemed to usher in a new era of popular participation 
Box 1. Definition and theory of CBNRM1
Community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) is a term that refers to local and 
collective resource governance arrangements and practices. CBNRM thus covers a wide range 
of resource use practices, given the great diversity of both human communities and resources. 
CBNRM can involve attempting to re-institute local resource governance measures, for example 
through community involvement in wildlife management following decades of progressive loss 
of local rights over wildlife due to colonial and post-colonial conservation policies. CBNRM 
equally applies to traditional resource management arrangements, such as the collective regimes 
governing rangelands and pastoralist grazing reserves, in-shore fisheries, or communally-
managed forests. CBNRM can thus be formal or informal, and often straddles both realms, 
particularly given the contemporary social and institutional transformations occurring across 
much of sub-Saharan Africa. 
CBNRM is based, at least in its underlying conceptual foundations if not always in its 
implementation, on scholarship on common property resources and resource governance (e.g. 
Ostrom, 1990; Agrawal, 2001). Some resources have traditionally been managed collectively or 
communally, rather than individually, because the resources are subject to shared uses and it 
would be too costly to individualize the resource. At the same time, if such resources are left 
entirely ungoverned (or ‘open access’) then the resource will be subject to depletion through a 
‘tragedy of the commons’ scenario whereby all users compete to access and utilize the resource. 
Sustainable collective resource governance arrangements are characterized by local groups of 
resource users (‘communities’) developing and agreeing to shared rules that limit and regulate 
resource uses. In this way, local communities can sustain and conserve valuable shared resources 
through their own self-governance arrangements. 
A vast body of literature, building off of work by Ostrom (1990), Murphree (1993) and 
other early scholars of common property resource theory, describes the characteristics of 
both human communities and resources that tend to lead to sustainable collective resource 
governance systems- i.e. successful CBNRM. These include having defined boundaries of the 
resource or land area and membership of the community, having rules which can be changed 
and adapted locally, and the existence of linkages across different institutional scales. It is also 
important, if communities are to invest in resource governance, that they are able to make 
decisions about how the resource is used, enforce rules governing use, and exclude outsiders 
from using their resources. 
1. The term “CBNRM” is not universally applied or commonly understood across the different regions of Africa. 
Chapter 3 describes the more common terms and understandings that are applied in different contexts
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in government decision-making. The promotion of local participatory and 
accountable institutions with authority over lands and resources seemed to be an 
essential component of such political reforms. Indeed, throughout sub-Saharan 
Africa reforms were adopted during the 1990s which called for decentralization 
of natural resources and land tenure institutions and greater participation by the 
public and local communities (Ribot, 2003). However, the widespread adoption 
of CBNRM in policy and legal reforms during the 1990s, as with the ‘second 
liberation’ more broadly, did not necessarily translate into radical changes in local 
rights or authority over natural resources in the years that followed (Nelson and 
Agrawal, 2008). 
Impacts, limitations, and backlash
The central assumption of CBNRM is that local people will be able to manage 
lands and natural resources through locally devised rules and procedures, as 
communal property (Ostrom, 1990). Murphree (1993) stated this fundamental 
principle clearly near the outset of southern African experiments with CBNRM in 
the early 1990s: 
“The evidence is that communities can become effective institutions for 
sustainable resource management, but only if they are granted genuine 
proprietorship, that is, the right to use resources, determine the modes 
of usage, benefit fully from their use, determine the distribution of such 
benefits and determine rules of access. Any policy which excludes these 
components will frustrate the goal of making communities effective 
institutions for resource management.”
While CBNRM is premised on the ability of local people to exercise a significant 
degree of authority over resources, in practice, as this review shows, many 
initiatives have focused on protected area outreach, where communities are 
involved largely as passive beneficiaries of benefits generated in areas that are 
not under their control, and collaborative management efforts where power is 
shared between state agencies and local people (Barrow and Murphree, 2001). 
In reality, even fully devolved CBNRM arrangements involve some degree of co-
management; local communities are rarely sovereign autonomous entities, and 
the enforcement of their rights over resources inherently demands a significant 
role for the state in underpinning local management systems (Murphree, 2000). 
As the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) aptly notes, what is needed 
to sustain natural resources are strong institutions across different scales- with 
central government providing an appropriate enabling framework for security of 
tenure and management authority at the local level (MA, 2005). 
Indeed, perhaps the core paradox of CBNRM is that it requires strong local rights 
over resources which must be conferred on local people by the state (Murphree, 
2000). As Gibson (1999) and others have highlighted, individuals and agencies 
within the heterogeneous fabric of the central state often possess strong 
disincentives to enacting such reforms. As with broader economic policies, the 
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design of natural resource governance institutions in sub-Saharan Africa are often 
driven not by considerations of technical efficiency but by an array of personal 
interests revolving around patronage networks and the exercise of political power 
(Chabal and Daloz, 1999; van de Walle, 2001; Nelson and Agrawal, 2008). 
Devolving or decentralising rights over valuable natural resources may conflict 
directly with such interests, and as a result many of the reforms called for by 
CBNRM initiatives have not been implemented. This story of reformist rhetoric not 
being reflected in the substantive content of institutional changes has been told 
over and over again, not only in sub-Saharan Africa but other parts of the world 
as well (Ribot, 2004; Shackleton et al., 2002). 
Box 2. Key definitions – decentralisation, devolution and CBNRM 
reforms
Because of the historical legacy throughout most of sub-Saharan Africa of extending central 
authority over lands and natural resources such as fisheries, forests, and wildlife, CBNRM 
is fundamentally a reformist undertaking premised on changing institutional arrangements 
governing lands and natural resources. Shifting rights and tenure over resources from the hands 
of central state bureaucratic agencies to local communities involves decentralisation of resource 
governance in one form or another. In practice the way these reforms have been designed across 
sub-Saharan Africa varies tremendously as a result of historical, political, and other factors. 
Decentralisation is most generally defined as “any act by which central government cedes powers 
to actors and institutions at lower levels in a political-administrative and territorial hierarchy” 
(Ribot, 2004). However, Ribot (2004) further distinguishes two different types of resource 
decentralisation. Deconcentration grants powers to local representatives of central government 
who are accountable not to a local constituency but to central authorities. By contrast, 
‘democratic decentralisation’ involves the transfer of powers to locally elected authorities that 
are by definition downwardly accountable (Ribot, 2004). According to this governance typology, 
CBNRM effectively requires democratic decentralisation rather than deconcentration, because 
in deconcentration local resource users are not granted authority over resource management 
decisions and uses. 
In much of sub-Saharan Africa, CBNRM operates largely based on the decentralisation of various 
rights and responsibilities over lands and resources to various local government bodies (Alden 
Wily and Mbaya, 2001). In southern Africa, though, CBNRM tends to focus on the devolution 
of resource governance. Murphree (2000) distinguishes devolution as “the creation of relatively 
autonomous realms of authority, responsibility and entitlement, with a primary accountability to 
their own constituencies.” In particular, in southern Africa there has been an emphasis on granting 
resource tenure to local non-governmental bodies, such as community conservancy committees 
in Namibia or local community-based trusts in Botswana, rather than to local government bodies. 
One reason for this is that in most of southern Africa there are not, or historically have not been, 
any local governance bodies at the village level which could serve as legally delegated proprietors 
over collectively managed resources (Murphree, 2005). 
These differences in preferred terminology can be confusing and obscure the key point that 
the core underlying basis for CBNRM is the establishment of secure rights over resources in 
the hands of local, downwardly accountable collective institutions, which Ribot (2004) and 
many international scholars term ‘democratic decentralisation’ and Murphree (2000) and many 
influential southern African scholars and practitioners refer to as ‘devolution’. Substantive 
disagreement and debate does exist, however, on whether it is better to transfer rights over 
resources to downwardly accountable local governance bodies or to autonomous local non-
governmental bodies (see Ribot, 2004). 
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The frequent failure of CBNRM reforms has had a number of important 
implications. One is that, as Jones and Murphree (2004) note, the performance 
of CBNRM initiatives has often been disappointing. Donors and other 
supporters have tempered their enthusiasm for CBNRM, as the realities of the 
challenging nature of these reformist approaches have set in, and often shifted 
their resources to new and more fashionable narratives such as transfrontier 
conservation areas and PES (Hutton et al., 2005). Conservationists, perceiving a 
failure of communities to protect resources even while continually being deprived 
the requisite authority to do so, have adopted a critical stance which often has 
been dismissive of CBNRM and called for reinforced protection of biodiversity 
through state protected areas (Kramer et al., 1997; Oates, 1999; Spinage, 1998; 
Terborgh, 1999).
Why take stock at this point?
Despite the many practical failures, reduced support, and critical backlash that 
CBNRM efforts have faced during the past two decades, issues surrounding local 
collective land and resource management remain central to any discussion of 
rural development and biodiversity conservation in sub-Saharan Africa. As Alden 
Wily (2006, 2008) notes, over 90% of Africa’s rural population accesses land 
through customary institutions, and a quarter of the continent’s land area- some 
740 million hectares- is made up of communal property such as forests and 
rangelands. From Africa’s growing tourism industry to the continued reliance 
of rural people on veld and forest products for food, medicine, and other uses, 
the sustainability of natural resources remains central to livelihoods and largely 
reliant on the governance of those resources through collective local institutions 
(Fabricius et al., 2004; Roe, 2008). Conservation is similarly reliant on local 
incentives to practice stewardship, and where resources such as wildlife have been 
sustained or increased across private and communal landholdings it has largely 
been due to effective reforms of the centralized colonial governance model 
(Child, 2004; Nelson, 2008; see Norton-Griffiths 2007 for a counterexample). 
CBNRM also remains central to ongoing political evolutions and struggles in sub-
Saharan Africa. The substance of political authority and democracy is reflected not 
so much in the ritual of national elections, but in the realities of resource control 
that fundamentally shape the power of different actors within society (Ribot, 
2003). The ways that debates and struggles over lands and natural resources 
influences people’s ability to manage their own lands and resources consequently 
has profound implications for broader democratic trends, as well as for the ability 
of African societies to avoid the violent conflicts that often revolve around those 
contested resources (Alden Wily, 2006). 
Even while new narratives such as PES attract a flurry of interest from donors, 
governments, and NGO’s, the foundations of these approaches rest on 
the familiar ground of local resource governance, tenure, and institutional 
performance. Climate change is dominating both environment and development 
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policy discourse. Global studies note that it is the poorest communities in the 
poorest countries who will likely be most impacted by new climatic patterns 
and oscillations – both as a result of their geographic location, their vulnerability 
to environmental hazards and their direct reliance on ecosystem services (IPCC 
2007). At the same time, land use change is responsible for 18% of greenhouse 
gas emissions, with this arising almost entirely from deforestation in the tropics 
(Stern, 2007). New proposed mechanisms for tackling climate change such as 
PES schemes termed Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation 
(REDD) are gaining widespread attention and funding given the urgency of 
the climate challenge. However, for such interventions to effectively reverse 
deforestation trends they will need to create incentives at the local level for 
communities to invest in forest conservation, given that most deforestation occurs 
on community lands due to insecure tenure and weak property rights (Sunderlin 
et al., 2008). Some observers have already noted with concern the potential 
for REDD interventions to stimulate a return to top-down state management of 
natural resources – to the detriment of local resource-dependent communities 
and ultimately to the likely detriment of efforts to effectively address existing 
deforestation trends (Griffiths 2008). Debates about how REDD funds are 
structured and benefits captured are not only debates about what technical 
strategies and institutional arrangements will be most effective in combating 
deforestation, but are interlaced with the inherently political contests over access 
to these new financial flows, and the power that access to capital confers to local 
and central actors in the context of Africa’s evolving governance institutions and 
democratic struggles. 
 
Thus narratives and acronyms may change but the fundamental issues of resource 
tenure, governance, and institutional reform remain the same. This review 
attempts to summarize and update the impacts and achievements of CBNRM 
across the different regions of sub-Saharan Africa, and to try and understand 
the underlying factors – including issues of governance, ecology, demography, 
market forces and so on – that have produced those outcomes. In doing so, 
it strives to not only synthesize the outcomes CBNRM has had in terms of 
environmental conservation, local capacity, and economic development, but 
also to raise key questions which must be better addressed in order to catalyze 
improved local resource management outcomes. What institutional arrangements 
and governance reforms have led to the most marked improvements in terms 
of conservation and developmental outcomes? What factors enable or disable 
CBNRM reforms? How can greater local resource rights and tenure be most 
effectively promoted? What role do central governments, foreign donors, the 
private sector, NGO’s, and local communities themselves play in the adoption of 
key reforms? In shedding light on the answers to these core questions, this pan-
African review will attempt to provide useful guidance for the next generation of 
efforts to support community-based natural resource management systems across 
sub-Saharan Africa.
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Community involvement in natural 
resources management in Africa –  
regional overviews
3.1 Introduction: Different understandings of, and 
approaches to, CBNRM in different regions
This review was commissioned to explore experience in CBNRM in the 
different regions of sub-Saharan Africa. What is immediately clear is not just 
that, as noted in the previous chapter, CBNRM takes many different forms 
in different locations and different socio-political and bio-physical contexts, 
but that the term itself is used and interpreted in many different ways. In 
Southern Africa, Jones (2004b) notes that the term refers very specifically 
to approaches where authority over natural resources (particularly wildlife 
and forests) has been devolved from the state to defined groups of resource 
users on communal land. Indeed, substantively speaking, CBNRM inherently 
means local groups of people (‘communities’) managing resources in an active 
manner and with some significant degree of formal (de jure) or informal  
(de facto) control or tenure over those resources (cf Ostrom, 1990; see also 
Box 1). Operationally, however, CBNRM is often used by governments, donors, 
and NGO’s engaged in development or conservation initiatives to subsume a 
much wider range of local level involvement, ranging from passive to active, in 
natural resource management. 
In Francophone Africa, for example, the term CBNRM is not in common, practical 
usage – although international NGOs and donors use the term CBNRM in the 
context of “CBNRM Zone” (Parnell, 2006)  or “CBNRM corridor” (Steel, 2008); 
in Equatorial Guinea a “CBNRM National Forest” has recently been declared 
(CI, 2006). These zones are predominantly co-managed for sustainable use 
(along the lines of protected area buffer zones) rather than being CBNRM in the 
substantive sense. The term “Community Conservation Zone” has been used 
by Conservation International to describe new community-managed protected 
areas in Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC; Mehlman et al, 2006). The 
more common language in West Africa tends to be about decentralised resource 
tenure and land management (“gestion de terroir”2), not specifically CBNRM. 
In Central Africa terms used most are community outreach (sensibilisation), 
and sustainable resource management (la gestion durable). Nevertheless, all 
conservation programmes or natural resources management programmes do use 
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the language of participatory approaches – but often without the accompanying 
transfer in tenure and authority implied in the Southern African definition. In East 
Africa, ‘CBNRM’ is not a commonly used term at all in an acronymic sense, even 
if community-based natural resource management is widely practiced across the 
region. East African countries tend to feature relatively sharp divisions between 
different resource sectors- forests, fisheries, and wildlife. In the wildlife sector, 
‘community-based conservation’ is the more common term for CBNRM, while 
in forestry ‘participatory forest management’ refers to community-based forest 
management where local people have secure devolved authority over forests as 
well as joint forest management where forests are co-managed between locals 
and state agencies. 
At a pan-African scale the diversity of terminology is highly confusing and 
means that one cannot possibly survey ‘CBNRM’ simply based on what different 
people in different places refer to as ‘CBNRM’. Operationally, CBNRM in practice 
may refer to a wide range of different modes of local involvement in natural 
resource management, including the passive receipt of benefits from protected 
areas or other instances where communities are not actually empowered to do 
much ‘management’ themselves. Substantively, however, we emphasize that for 
communities to manage and conserve natural resources, based on their own 
social and economic interests in the sustainable use of those resources, CBNRM 
requires that local people have a reasonable degree of tenurial control over lands 
and resources and can make decisions about resource use, access, and allocation. 
In the regional reviews presented in this report, we explicitly include the widest 
possible suite of activities considered CBNRM in an operational sense in different 
contexts and locales. However, we retain the necessary substantive definition of 
CBNRM required for useful analysis. 
We recognise that the level of community involvement in natural resource 
management varies hugely between and within regions – from protected area 
outreach – where communities are passive beneficiaries of natural resource 
management conducted by others, to community involvement in natural 
resource management – where communities participate through co-management 
agreements or other forms of involvement – to  natural resource management 
that is actually carried out by communities for local benefit (Table 1).
We also recognise that traditional, natural resource management practices 
have been carried out by communities for centuries and continue so. In many 
cases these traditional activities, based on local rules, norms, and knowledge, 
are functionally much more representative cases of CBNRM than many of the 
formal, externally-supported projects and programs that also define themselves 
as CBNRM. While we touch on these endogenous approaches in this review, 
the overall purpose of the review is to help inform approaches to ‘formal’, state-
backed (at least in policy if not always in practice) CBNRM, so that remains the 
major focus of this document. 
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Resource 
proprietor
Community role Level of local 
participation
Protected Area 
(PA) outreach 
and benefit-
sharing
State Receive benefits from PA 
managers; cooperate with 
PA managers in protecting 
PA resources
Weak; participation 
limited to largely 
passive actions
Co-management 
(or joint 
management)
State but may be 
decentralised or 
deconcentrated
Cooperate with state 
authorities in management 
of the PA or resource in 
question
Medium; depends 
on the rights and 
responsibilities granted 
to local communities 
in a given situation
CBNRM Local communities 
through collective 
representative body
Resource managers 
through either delegated 
usufruct rights (user rights) 
or outright proprietorship
High; communities 
as main proprietors, 
decision-makers, and 
beneficiaries.
Source: Adapted from Barrow and Murphree, 2001. 
Table 1. A spectrum of approaches to community involvement in 
natural resources management
In this chapter we provide a synthetic overview of the diverse operational forms 
of CBNRM within each region, and attempt to highlight some of the differences 
between regions. The policy and legislative framework alone varies hugely from 
country to country, region to region and the main provisions are included in  
Annex 1, while key trends are summarised following the regional overviews.  
We do not cover each region on a systematic country-by-country basis. We focus 
on countries for which information is readily available and for which some kind 
of community involvement in natural resources management is evident. Figure 1 
illustrates the extent of this coverage. 
3.2 Central Africa: Forest conservation, protected areas, buffer 
zones, regional coordination, international involvement
Centralisation constrains land and resources management
In Central Africa, land is state-owned and resource management is generally highly 
centralised. At a practical level however, traditional community land tenure systems 
have persisted due to poor infrastructure, weak central government authorities and 
small, dispersed rural settlements making awareness and enforcement of state law 
difficult (CBFP, 2006), although where areas are becoming more easily accessible, 
and regional government authorities exist, traditional systems are beginning to 
erode or change (Allebone-Webb, 2008; Coad, 2007; Colom, 2006; Gami, 2003). 
Customary land use rights are very dynamic, as they are established inside a 
perpetual negotiation process between different social groups and stakeholders 
(Binot and Joiris 2007; Delvingt 2001).
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Figure 1. Political map of Africa
In the last decade, policy and legislative reforms (often within the forest sector) 
in many countries are beginning to open up opportunities for state-backed, 
decentralised management. In some countries this legislation has been practically 
adopted (e.g. community forestry in Cameroon and Central African Republic 
(CAR)). In others, required legislation has not yet been passed, preventing 
potential projects from being initiated (e.g. Gabon’s new forest policy), or 
where passed has not been implemented (e.g. Equatorial Guinea’s potential 
for forest reserves; see Annex 1 for land tenure laws). Despite recent reforms, 
centralised land tenure legislation is still a significant constraint to CBNRM in the 
region (Roulet et al., 2008). Furthermore, decentralisation of valuable resources 
(particularly timber) is not occurring to any significant extent in many countries, 
and the decentralisation processes themselves  can often reproduce authoritarian 
forms of governance at the local level. 
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Figure 2. Eco-regional map of Africa
Real community management can be greatly restricted by a lack of supporting 
national policy, regardless of the amount of donor involvement and potential for 
community projects in the region. Attempts to set up community projects against 
the backdrop of legislation that does not allow for community management can 
cause conflicts between government organisations and project management, 
regardless of the extent to which land tenure laws are enforced (Gami, 2003, 
Sodiek, 1999). In turn, where legislation does exist for community management, 
this can strengthen project legitimacy (Roulet et al. 2008). The implementation 
of formal community-based programmes that provide real access to benefits for 
communities thus remains difficult, even though community-based initiatives are 
now systematically favoured by international donors.
A focus on conservation and protected area outreach
Formal or ‘projectised’ CBNRM in Central Africa tends to focus on PAs, including 
hunting areas, which are managed principally by the state. In part this is due to 
the established centralised approach to resource management, but also due to 
the high priority among global actors (such as international NGOs and donor 
agencies) traditionally afforded to conservation in the Congo Basin (especially 
preservation of forest habitat and associated biodiversity). Most recently, the 
international priority to conserve the forests of the Congo Basin has increased 
in response to recognition of the role of deforestation in climate change. New 
climate change policies, such as the proposed REDD projects, may provide 
funding for CBNRM. In the Republic of Congo preliminary studies have already 
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been carried out to investigate the size of carbon stocks, and whether funding 
of PA through carbon mechanisms will be successful in reducing emissions 
for deforestation (Brown, 2006). Similarly in Gabon, research funded by the 
Gabonese Government is underway to assess forest carbon stocks, and to inform 
government policy on REDD (Lee White, pers com.).
With high levels of biodiversity, and impressive forest habitats, the Congo Basin 
countries also have a strong potential product for community-based ecotourism 
projects. However, the current conditions in many countries (civil unrest, poor 
roads/ tourist infrastructure, poor local staff skills, high flight prices, difficult 
terrain, cryptic species) mean that the potential for ecotourism is currently unmet.
At one end of the community involvement spectrum, many government-donor 
initiatives focus on residents inside the buffer zones of state PAs and are focussed 
on reducing the bushmeat trade (Rieu et al. 2007; Box 3). Often these projects 
allow for sustainable resource extraction, where the creation of PAs has had 
the effect of limiting use, and they also provide community development and 
alternative livelihood opportunities through micro-projects (for example, the 
micro-development initiatives such as the Cane rat (Thryonomys swinderianus) 
farming micro-project in Lope reserve, Gabon, in the mid 1990s). 
In most cases, the conservation project offers support to the communities as 
a means of compensation for their losses in natural resource use, land tenure 
control etc. This does not conform to a substantive definition of CBNRM, given 
that the empowerment of communities is rarely part of the conservation project’s 
objectives, and limited or no transfer of authority over communal resources 
occurs during the course of these initiatives. The focus is more on community 
involvement or community awareness (Box 4). 
Some PA projects have gone further, setting up community conservation zones 
on the PA periphery (Parnell 2006). These zones are areas that either link a 
number of PAs in a broader landscape (e.g. the Zakouma National Park ecological 
corridors in south-east Chad (Binot et al, in press) or support community-based 
tourism activities (e.g. the Lossi Gorilla Sanctuary near Odzala National Park in 
Congo (Gami, 2003). Several countries in Central Africa have also experimented 
with community based hunting zones largely inspired by Southern African 
experiences – such as the village hunting  areas in northern CAR (Box 5). These 
community conservation zones have the potential to fulfil both conservation and 
development objectives creating ‘conservation corridors’ within a PA mosaic, 
while at the same time bringing in development aid, the formal recognition of 
community structure and rights, and protection against international logging 
companies for the communities within the community zone.
The formal recognition of community structure and rights in Central Africa is still, 
in most of the cases, not emerging from the civil society itself. Village committees 
and other forms of community based organisations are established by formal 
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Box 3. Bushmeat hunting in Central Africa
The term bushmeat means ‘the meat of any wild animal hunted for food’ (DEFRA, 2006), and 
refers to a wide range of species, from rodents to elephants. Bushmeat provides an important 
protein source for many rural communities for whom few other protein sources are available; 
estimates for the Congo Basin suggest that in rural communities 30 – 80% of protein, and 
almost all of the animal protein, is provided from bushmeat (Koppert et al, 1996). The sale of 
bushmeat can also provide a large proportion of incomes in rural areas; a recent study in rural 
Gabon reported that hunting accounted for between 15% to 72% of household incomes, with 
the proportion increasing for more remote communities (Starkey, 2004). Livelihood alternatives 
to hunting can be scarce in rural villages, and short-term and unpredictable where available 
(DFID, 2002).
Despite its importance for food security, legal bushmeat trade and management is not common 
at a local level, and it remains globally an “informal” sector, with trade illegal in most cases, 
and hunting laws and permits controlled at the central (Ministry) level (Schenk et al. 2006, 
Samndong 2005, De Merode et al. 2004). There have, however, been some experiments in local 
management of bushmeat in a number of Central African countries, including the use of PA 
buffer zones, small-scale rearing of bushmeat species as protein substitutes, and strengthening 
of local land tenure:
n Where bushmeat hunting is restricted by PA designation, hunted areas can be supplemented 
through dispersal of prey into buffer zones (Novaro et al., 2000). The practical advantages 
and disadvantages are currently being tested in the Congo, where the Projet Gestion des 
Ecosystèmes Périphériques au Parc National Nouabalé-Ndoki  (PROGEPP) buffer zone project 
has been running since 1998 (WCS Congo, 2009). The project works with local communities, 
logging companies, and park managers, and uses spatial management of bushmeat hunting 
to sustainably harvest bushmeat around the Nouabale-Ndoki National Park, through the 
rotation of hunting and no-take zones, and in conjunction with projects to reduce hunting 
by providing alternative protein sources. To date there have been no published data as to the 
success of failure of this project. 
n An alternative approach has been to develop alternative sources of protein through game-
ranching. A number of bushmeat rearing projects have been trialled in Central Africa 
with (Engamba, 2007; Houben, 1999; Jori et al., 1998), but to date there has been little 
success. In Gabon and Congo, for example, a cane-rat rearing project (Élevage de Petit 
Gibier implemented in 1995 showed the potential for profits under the right conditions, 
but research suggested that the potential of the project to produce enough cheap domestic 
meat to reduce demand for wild bushmeat was low (Jori et al, 1998). Mockrin et al (2005) 
suggest that while rearing projects are a useful commercial venture, supplying the urban rich 
with high quality meat, the meat that they produce is too expensive to be a substitute for 
wild meat for the larger urban middle-class and poor.
n Community conservation schemes have also attempted to reduce the open access nature 
of hunting in villages by strengthening community and household land rights. Even under a 
closed-access system, local communities must be small, impregnable to outside hunters, and 
must not discount the future at a high rate for sustainable management to occur (Becker and 
Ostrom, 1995).
conservation programmes, with sometimes low levels of local involvement and 
ownership (Joiris and Bigombe, 2008). Furthermore, the extent of recognition of 
community rights can often be limited to a passive validation process by “local 
populations”, represented by a coordination unit set up by the conservation 
project with the local authorities’ informal agreement. The Zakouma National 
Park in Chad, for example, shows how the PA’s management plan (including 
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the creation of ecological corridors) has been validated without preliminary local 
negotiation and is not representative of the local socioeconomic and socio-political 
situation (Binot et al., in press; Box 6). In other cases, community conservation 
zones have the effect of further restricting forest use in an already protected 
landscape; because they are classified as conservation areas they are legally under 
state control with no real devolution of authority to the community level. This can 
result in communities having little or no legal authority and power to restrict forest 
use, enforce conservation management plans, and prevent extraction by outsiders. 
A global analysis of the results of such experiences (Roulet 2007) shows that this 
model of decentralised PA management can bring considerable economic and 
socio-political constraints to local community rights. In most cases, CBNRM actions 
are designed and proposed by external stakeholders (the state, international 
community, conservation NGOs.) at a global level. The local political context 
(such as corruption, highly authoritarian structures, state control and a lack of 
effective decentralisation) or social context (lack of education, social structures 
dominated by local elites, limited democratic processes etc.) are rarely integrated 
in the projects’ strategies. Yet this integration is essential in order to “secure” 
CBNRM implementation. As a result, community involvement is limited to passive 
participation in committees and meetings driven by conservationists, rather than 
in any active decision-making power over how to manage their forest and the PA 
buffer zones. Resource use is often constrained for local people (for example with 
restrictions on slash and burn, hunting and gathering) and the benefits in most of 
the cases are monopolised by the elites and not valorised at the community level.
Box 4. Protected Area Outreach in Central Africa
The Dja Periphery Community Engagement Project (DPCEP) 
Dja is a 630,000 ha Biosphere reserve in the South of Cameroon. There are approximately 6000 
people living in the buffer and transition zone of the park, and research by Bristol zoo in 2003 
suggested that communities are unsupportive of the parks because they see no benefits for the local 
community, and there is no mechanism for participation in the development of policy. As a result of 
these findings, Living Earth, in partnership with Bristol Zoo Gardens, developed the Community 
Engagement Project (Living Earth, 2008). The aim of the project is to: ‘Assist local communities living 
around the Dja Biosphere Reserve (DBR) to engage more effectively with the government of 
Cameroon and biodiversity protection agencies, in order to foster enhanced understanding of each 
stakeholder’s concerns and thus to render more effective conservation activities.’
Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) Gabon Outreach Programme (WCS Gabon, 2008)
The Outreach Programme is an educational programme, focussing on environmental education, 
but also teaching basic educational skills (reading, writing and maths), and training in practical 
skills such as agricultural techniques, and palm and almond-oil making. 
The Mayumba CBNRZ and outreach programme (Parnell 2006; Sanders 2007) 
Mayumba National Park is a marine PA protecting sea turtle breeding grounds in the South-
West of Gabon. The beaches and sea protected by the park are used as fishing grounds by the 
town of Mayumba, located right next to the park, and Mayumba National Park has pursued a 
collaborative approach with the local community
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Box 5. Village Hunting Zones in Central African Republic
The Zones Cynégétiques Villageoises (ZCV) are community hunting reserves (co-managed with 
ECOFAC) which buffer two of the National Parks (Manovo-Gounda-Saint-Floris and Bamingui) 
in the North of CAR. Conservation in CAR has historically been government-owned and run, 
with little community involvement (Mbitikon 2005). However, with the introduction of the ZCV 
in 1992 communities have not been restricted to small game and/or NTFP harvesting, and have 
seen their rights regarding wildlife recognized (Roulet et al., 2008). 
The ZCV are co-managed rather than community-managed: activities are conducted by a 
management committee comprising community members from the area, and set up by the 
General Assembly. The project is based in a landscape of PAs and hunting zones, which buffer 
the PAs. Within these hunting zones, the management committee organises hunting safaris 
(aiming for sustainable use through quotas and anti-poaching measures), collect taxes and fees 
and distribute revenues, identify possible new hunting areas, and control illegal logging. There 
are now 10 hunting zones in existence, covering 80,000 km2 (ECOFAC, 2008; Mbikton, 2005).
Currently, the main revenues are produced from safari hunting, and incomes are produced from 
hunting and gun permits, hunting camp rental, and fees per animal hunted. Further details are 
given in the Economics section of Chapter 4.
A number of positive and negatives from the project have been reported by Mbitikon (2005) 
and ECOFAC (2008). For example, on the positive side villages are now voluntarily fighting 
poaching, hunting companies are starting to show support, and in 2000 six new areas 
requested to be part of the project. On the negative side, there is little national and local 
government support due to weak state regulation of land tenure laws, and lack of revenue 
from the wildlife sector compared to mining and logging, and there is no legal framework for 
the community management of the ZCV. 
Box 6. Efforts to foster community participation in protected areas 
management in Chad are flawed by lack of attention to pastoralists
In south-east Chad, the Zakouma National Park (3000 km²) is considered a sanctuary for 
Central and Western African biodiversity due to water availability throughout the year. During 
the wet season (June to November), some big mammals (mainly elephants, giraffes and 
antelope) range outside the park. The park’s surrounding area, with low demographic pressure 
except at the eastern edge, constitutes a major “reception” zone for wildlife during this season. 
As elsewhere in Africa, local communities (sedentary and nomadic) are highly dependent 
on natural resources for their subsistence needs. The main socioeconomic activities around 
Zakouma national park are agriculture, sedentary and nomadic livestock breeding and wild 
products gathering, except timber. 
A management plan developed for the park has identified agricultural area expansion for post-
flood sorghum as the major threat for wildlife conservation but the area is also very attractive for 
pastoral use, thanks to easy access to water and availability of good quality fodder (Binot et al. 
2007). It is critical, therefore, that any resource management plan for the park periphery should 
be developed in conjunction with pastoralists as well as sedentary communities. However, 
pastoralists have not been integrated into the negotiation process of the conservation project, 
which focuses on sedentary people. For example, there is no possibility of seasonal use rights 
inside natural savannahs and the future biological corridors, and no prior negotiation process 
has been planned with pastoral actors.
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At the other end of the spectrum, community-driven PAs (Community Conserved 
Areas – CCAs), are beginning to appear within the Central African landscape. 
Two forms of CCA currently exist: those set up by external agencies (donors/
government/NGOs) and co-managed with community management committees; 
and those set up by communities themselves (albeit in some cases with 
technical and financial support from external agencies see Box 7). Within donor-
driven projects, donors are increasingly incorporating traditional management 
structures and practices into management plans and reserve design (e.g. Lac 
Tele Community Reserve (WCS, 2006)). CCAs set up by communities bypass 
many of the problems of ‘outsider’ management, but seem to have sustainability 
issues, with many reporting the need for donor support and training to navigate 
legal requirements (Carrere, 2007; Gami, 2003). Although there is a growing 
grassroots demand for community management in some areas, in much of 
Central Africa colonial policies of state tenure, urbanisation and commodification 
have weakened community power structures (Portier, 1998). The result is a 
mismatch between donor conditions and practical possibilities on the ground. 
Examples of existing CCAs are described in Box 7.
Beyond protected areas
Several countries in Central Africa have recently reformed their forest policies to 
allow for the possibility of community management. Communities often require a 
large amount of support to establish and manage community forestry. However, 
in many Central African countries government agencies are unable to provide the 
necessary support. As a result the potential for community forestry has only been 
realised in the rare cases where external support agencies (both development 
cooperation agencies and international conservation NGOs) have stepped in to 
provide technical and financial support (e.g. the ZCV project in CAR; The Lossi 
Gorilla Sanctuary in the Republic of Congo (ROC)). One exception is Cameroon 
where many instances of on-the-ground community forestry programmes can 
be found (Box 8), although Bigombe (2002) reports that there are still some 
teething problems with the system; most management models are modest, 
and experience in the management of community forests is limited. Brown and 
Schreckenberg (2001) also point out that nowhere in the Cameroon legislation 
is there any attempt to define the nature of the “community” into whose hands 
the management of a “community forest” is to be placed.
Oyono (2004) goes further, analysing impacts of 10 years of forestry 
decentralisation through council and community forests implementation. 
His findings suggest that despite a theoretical transfer of powers to regional 
and local level stakeholders, the practical forestry management experiment 
reinforces strongly central stakeholders’ (bureaucrats and state authorities) 
power. Governance at local level is generally poor and characterized by lack of 
transparency and accountability. Technical assistance and support appears essential 
at this level – from the State or external actors (Yves Hausser pers comm.).
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Regional approaches and international support for forest conservation
A feature of resource management in Central Africa is the large number of 
international support programmes and regional approaches which have been 
adopted. Although all of these programmes include some form of community 
involvement they are in most of the cases conceived abroad (funding is 
predominantly from the European Union (EU) and United States of America (USA)), 
in collaboration with national authorities but disconnected from the local level. 
This gap between local context and the international frame of reference explains 
partially why CBNRM programs are so difficult to implement in the field (even if 
they are encouraged through donor support). Details of some of the major regional 
programmes in Central Africa are given in Table 2. 
Traditional management of natural resources
Much of Central Africa is characterised by centralised government ownership but 
weak control and management in practice, leaving de facto community regulation. 
In common with other regions of Africa, the nations of Central African have a 
diverse range of ethnic groups bringing a diversity of tenure systems. However, the 
main structure of tenure systems in the region seems to have a similar basis; village 
communities often have a patrilineal system of land tenure inheritance, governed 
by a group of ‘elites’ or village chiefs. Specific village areas are owned by clans, 
and within each clan, families also have tenure rights over delimited areas of land 
(Alexandre & Binet 1958; Joiris 1996; Van de Berg, 1998; Pourtier, 1989; Gami, 
2003; Colom, 2006; Coad, 2007; Van Vliet, 2008; Allebone-Web, 2008). Land 
sales are a relatively new idea, often introduced with commercial logging (e.g. in 
Cameroon; Van de Berg, 1998), and land may be lent to migrants to the village, 
for a specific time period such as a growing season or a lifetime, but land will stay 
within the family or clan. Often old village rules will outlaw certain areas or species 
from being harvested, and enforcement can be through village elites and/or magic. 
Box 7. Community Conserved Areas in the DRC
In the DRC, the 2002 forestry code recognises the rights of local communities to manage 
their traditional forests, on application to the relevant authorities (see Annex 1 for further 
information on forest laws for Central Africa). Under this legislation a number of CCAs have been 
established (Mehlman, 2006), although there is currently little published information on their 
management and outcomes. One example is the Tayna Reserve. This was instigated by Pierre 
Kakule Vwirasihikya – a chief warden at Virunga National Park – who approached the traditional 
Bamate and Batangi chiefs and persuaded them to establish a 900km2 gorilla reserve. The Tayna 
reserve places restrictions on bushmeat hunting, and monitors resource use within the park. The 
reserve was officially recognised by the government in 2002, and now serves as a model for 
the creation of other community-based reserves. On the back of this success, eight community-
based NGOs from the region formed a federation called the Union of Associations for Gorilla 
Conservation and Community Development in eastern DRC (UGADEC), to organise further 
conservation activities modelled on the Tayna Reserve (Mehlman et al., 2006). This area is called 
the Itombwe Massif Community Conserved Zone (IMCCZ). Logistical support for the IMCCZ is 
provided by Conservation International, with funding from Central African Regional Program for 
the Environment (CARPE), which has created a Sustainable Financing Plan for the Landscape, 
including a $4 million trust fund, and have provided health care, family planning, education and 
development micro-projects for communities involved in the project.
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In many areas these traditional land use laws persist despite a policy of 
regroupement, introduced by the French colonial government whereby dispersed 
nomadic communities have been settled along transport routes (Pourtier, 1989, 
Allebone-Webb, 2008). In Gabon, for example, regroupement villages are divided 
into quartiers, which represent the old villages and clans that were brought in 
from the forest to form the regroupement. The quartiers often retain their own 
hunting and agricultural areas, and their own clan chief (Pourtier, 1989; Starkey, 
2004; Coad, 2007), with one village chief holding overall authority within the 
village. Certain species are often protected under village law (for example, the 
Pouvi ethnic group protects leopards), and certain areas of the forest can be 
off-limits for extraction, or access, due to traditional beliefs and religions (Coad, 
2007). In Equatorial Guinea also, Kumpel (2006) reports the continued existence 
of traditional taboos or totems, which mean that certain species are ignored if 
encountered: great apes and chimps are seldom hunted due to similarity to man, 
and galagos (‘bush babies’) on Bioko Island, are avoided, as they are considered 
to be evil. 
In some cases erosion of traditional laws has been reported, for example where 
government laws have been introduced, or where new industry or development 
projects have resulted in a new power structure (e.g. in the case of community 
forestry in Cameroon, (Kenneth, 2006), and the construction of the Transgabonais 
railway (Angoue, 1999). 
Box 8. Examples of Community Forestry in Cameroon
Revisions to the Forestry laws in Cameroon in 2001 brought in the provision for local 
communities to acquire the exclusive rights to manage and exploit up to 5,000 ha of customary 
forest, under a 15-year contract (FAO, 2006; see Annex 1). Communities must have formed 
an association or cooperative in order to apply for a community forest contract, and must 
produce an annual management plan. The establishment of community forests has recently 
received great impetus, with local and international NGO’s helping local communities to submit 
applications and management plans. In 2006, 116 community forests had been granted by the 
Ministry of Environment and Forests (MINEF), with another 140 underway but not yet granted 
(Tchamou, 2006).
One example of a community forest in Cameroon is the Ngola-Achip Community Forest 
in East Cameroon. This was first initiated with the help of a local NGO, Enviroprotect. Four 
villages formed the ‘Association of Balagbo, Pa’a and Bamouh Families of Ngola-Achip’, and 
the community forest was legalised in 2001. The goal of the association is ‘to involve village 
inhabitants in the sustainable management of their forest to facilitate poverty alleviation’. 
(Kenneth, 2006). The formation of community forest associations, such as that at Ngola-Achip, 
show how much legal decentralisation of forest resources can impact at the community level; the 
association is making a profit, and in the first five year period, the community development fund 
has built new houses, provided school fees and emergency medical care, and bought a generator, 
satellite dish and two television sets for the village. However, it also highlights the need for local 
education, technical and financial support, and training, in order for decentralisation policies to 
become practically implemented (Kenneth, 2006).
Community management of natural resources in Africa

Programme name Programme details
Conservation et 
Utilisation Rationelle des 
ECOsystems Forestiers 
d’Afrique Centrale 
(ECOFAC)
An EU funded initiative established in 1992 to provide funding, 
infrastructure, capacity and training for the setup and management 
of PAs in seven Central African countries. Focuses on conservation 
through PAs and buffer zones, but has invested in development 
of micro-projects around Dja, Monte Alen, Odzala and Ngotto, 
is involved in the ZCV initiative in Central Africa Republic and 
community-based Lossi gorilla sanctuary in Odzala. 
The Central African 
Regional Program 
for the Environment 
(CARPE)
A United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
initiative, aiming to reduce the rate of forest degradation and loss 
of biodiversity in the Congo Basin by increasing local, national, and 
regional natural resource management capacity. Began in 1994, 
running to at least 2014. Projects organised on a ‘landscape’ basis, 
including: PAs, CBNRM zones, and extractive zones. 
The Commission for the 
Forests of Central Africa 
(COMIFAC)
Established soon after the first Yaounde summit (1999), COMIFAC 
is a caucus of the Environment ministries of the region, and the 
primary authority for decision-making and coordination of sub-
regional actions and initiatives pertaining to the conservation and 
sustainable management of the Congo Basin forests. Integral to 
recent changes in the forestry laws of many countires in the Congo 
Basin, which have often introduced new legal frameworks for 
community forestry. 
The Congo Basin Forest 
Partnership (CBFP)
A voluntary, non-binding partnership bringing together 29 
governmental and NGOs, including the 10 member states of the 
COMIFAC  and conservation and development organisations from 
the public, private and civil society sectors. The CBPF provides 
a mechanism for bringing stakeholders together, to aid the 
implementation of intergovernmental commitments
The Congo Basin Forest 
Fund (CBFF)
A multi-donor fund, launched in June 2008. Supports projects from 
governments, civil society and the private sector, to slow rates of 
deforestation through developing the capacity if the people and 
institutions in the countries (CBFF, 2009). One of CBFF’s overall 
objectives is to “reduce poverty amongst forest communities”.  
The CBFF is initially being financed through a grant of £100 million 
from the British and Norwegian Governments.
Table 2. Regional natural resource management initiatives in 
Central Africa
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3.3 East Africa: Protected areas, tourism, forest 
management, pastoralists, power struggles
Institutional, historical, and ecological context spawn different 
models of CBNRM 
In East Africa, governments and supporting donors and NGO’s have encouraged 
the development of diverse modes of local involvement in natural resource 
management since the 1990s (Barrow et al., 2000). In some locales, such as 
the Amboseli ecosystem in southern Kenya, experiments with CBNRM date 
back as far as the 1960s and 1970s (Western 1994). In countries such as 
Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda, the period of 1985-1995 witnessed 
major changes in political regimes and socioeconomic policies, which fostered 
widespread policy reform processes heavily backed by foreign donors. In this 
context of institutional reform and intensive foreign support, the increasingly 
popular CBNRM narrative was widely promoted and adopted. However, since the 
1990’s the political space for meaningful devolution or decentralisation of natural 
resources to local communities has generally waned, just as political authority has 
often been progressively re-centralised across much of the region since the initial 
reform moments of the 1990s (see for example Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; 
Mbaku and Ihonvbere, 2006). 
Although there are some commonalities to CBNRM practices and policies across 
the region, there are significant differences between East African countries. In 
Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda these differences are largely shaped by different 
land and resource governance policies and the physical location of valuable 
resources (wildlife and forests) inside or outside of state PAs. In Kenya, for 
example, wildlife management and tourism development are fundamentally 
shaped by the reality that an estimated 65% of Kenya’s wildlife (i.e. large 
mammals) is found outside the boundaries of state PAs (Western et al., 2006) 
on land that is individually or collectively owned through private or “group 
ranches”. Kenya affords private landowners more unambiguous control of their 
properties than is generally the case in most African countries, with a freehold 
tenure structure similar to that of private properties in parts of southern Africa. 
As a result of such land tenure provisions, communities are able to capture the 
benefits from wildlife on their land through non-consumptive (i.e. photographic) 
tourism – although a persistent protectionist wildlife  policy means that they 
have few or no rights to utilise the wildlife through hunting or other forms of 
consumptive utilisation (Norton-Griffiths, 2007). In Tanzania, although local 
communities do have some opportunities to benefit from hunting through 
CBNRM initiatives, weaker local land rights mean that the extent of vested 
interests in central government and the private sector are potentially able to 
undermine local opportunities to use communal land to generate benefits  
from non-consumptive tourism (TNRF, 2008). In Uganda, a much larger 
proportion of forests and wildlife remain within state PAs – partly because  
as a result of two decades of civil war, wildlife populations were seriously 
depleted and their limited recovery has been concentrated in PAs. As a  
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result, there has been a correspondingly stronger focus on collaborative 
management (or co-management) rather than the more devolved forms of 
community based management.
Ethiopia and Rwanda also present different situations, reflecting both political 
elements of resource management and demographic realities in those countries. 
Ethiopia has retained very centralised natural resource management policies 
– although moves are being made towards some participatory forms of forest 
management (see below) that, as in Uganda, focus on co-management or joint 
forest management. Meanwhile in Rwanda, the impact of the 1994 genocide and 
subsequent political trends extends to CBNRM. The breakdown of community 
institutions, combined with absence of external authority, resulted in rapid 
encroachment and clearance of formerly protected, forest land. The “rebuilding” 
of Rwandan institutions since the genocide has been characterised by increasing 
centralisation of authority over natural resources as state conservation agencies 
expand their powers and assume responsibility for almost all areas deemed 
significant for biodiversity and other ecosystem services. These trends are in 
line with what is effectively a state-based model of social reconstruction and 
economic development under Rwanda’s post-genocide ruling regime. This has 
had the effect of taking back some powers previously held and exercised at the 
local level, along with communities’ exclusion from some resource uses, although 
some new local opportunities are also emerging from growing levels of private 
investment in tourism and the recuperation of Rwanda’s PA system during the 
past decade. 
Reform or Retrenchment? 
Formal efforts to involve local communities in natural resource management 
and promote CBNRM and related approaches in East Africa have been diverse 
and have included wildlife, forestry, marine, and lake fisheries. East Africa is 
also characterized by the persistence of long-term community-based resource 
management systems used by resident communities, such as pastoralists in 
the Rift Valley from southern Ethiopia to northern Tanzania, and numerous 
examples of sustainable local forest management in Kenya and Tanzania 
(Blomley et al., 2008). Major investments have been made by donors during 
the past twenty years to promote PFM, which includes both joint forest 
management (co-management) and community-based forest management 
(CBNRM), in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and to a lesser degree Ethiopia. External 
donor support has played a major role in crafting natural resource reforms 
in some contexts, particularly where states are undergoing reconstruction 
following economic collapse or civil wars (see for example Hurst, 2004, on 
Tanzanian forestry reforms).
Although reform efforts and local projects designed to promote CBNRM have 
been widespread in East Africa for the past two decades (Barrow et al., 2000), 
the degree to which these efforts have translated into more decentralised 
natural resource management practices, or greater local rights and economic 
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opportunities, has often been more limited. As Nelson et al. (2007) describe 
in the case of Tanzania’s wildlife sector, natural resource governance changes 
in the region have sometimes worked to recentralize authority over valuable 
resources even while formal policy and donor rhetoric espouses devolution and 
decentralisation. Forest management has generally remained highly centralised 
– with the exception of Tanzania where real progress in community rights over 
forests (as opposed to joint or collaborative forest management) has been made. 
Following passage of the 1998 Forest Policy and 2002 Forest Act (Annex 1), 
Tanzanian villages, which are legally defined local government bodies managed 
by elected Village Councils, can establish Village Land Forest Reserves. Over 
the past decade or so, more than 1,100 villages have set aside communal land 
as protected forests in these locally-governed forests. However, villages have 
continued to face regulatory and bureaucratic barriers in terms of being able to 
generate commercial rents from valuable forest products, such as timber, which 
is widely used illegally by networks of politically and financially powerful outside 
interests (Blomley et al., in press; Milledge et al., 2007). 
In Kenya, natural resources (and particularly forest resources) were used as 
means to cement and control political power. Forest “excisions”, whereby large 
areas of forest reserves were de-gazetted and passed onto political allies and 
supporters, went relatively unchallenged until civil society organisations such 
as the Green Belt Movement and more recently the Kenya Forests Working 
Group began to demand greater accountability and benefit sharing at the local 
level, in line with broader democratisation of Kenyan politics in the late 1990s, 
leading up to the watershed 2002 general election. Community-based forest 
management has only recently been possible with the passing of the Forest 
Act in 2005 (Annex 1). Despite the opportunities this provides for forestry co-
management, communities are still limited in their ability to manage forests 
outside of state-controlled forest reserves because of weak provisions in Kenya’s 
land tenure framework for collective exercise of land rights in most communally-
managed areas, and the reality that high levels of deforestation mean that few 
forests remain on community lands outside state PAs.
As with Central Africa, East Africa generally presents more models of relatively 
passive community involvement in natural resource management rather than 
truly devolved authority over wildlife, forests, and fisheries. Barrow et al (2000) 
and  Awimbo et al. (2004) categorise these models as PA outreach, collaborative 
management and community-based management  (Table 3) – although as noted 
above the term CBNRM is rarely used in the East African context. 
Local communities and protected area management 
Community involvement in natural resource management in East Africa has 
often been promoted by PA management concerns. In the East African context, 
this includes well-established PA revenue sharing or benefit sharing schemes 
as well as educational programmes promoted by park managers designed to 
increase support for conservation. These outreach programmes are a well-
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Type of approach Examples
PA outreach Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA)’s Tourist Revenue Sharing programme 
has been in operation since the late 1990s, and provides support 
to a range of community projects such as schools, clinics and other 
infrastructure projects (Archabald and Naughton-Treves, 2001). 
Communities are more actively involved in PA benefits – albeit in a 
limited way – through involvement in community tourism initiatives such 
as the Buhoma Community Rest Camp in Bwindi National Park (Williams 
et al, 2001). Also Tanzania National Parks (TANAPA) and Kenya Wildlife 
Service (KWS) have shared park revenues with surrounding communities 
since late 1980s and early 1990s, respectively. 
In Rwanda, the government has recently embarked on supporting a 
programme of community conservation and PA revenue sharing, very 
much based on the models developed in Uganda in the late 1990s. 
Collaborative 
natural resources 
management
.
Tanzania’s 1998 Wildlife Policy calls for devolution of wildlife 
management to the community level through collaborative NRM 
(MNRT, 1998). This is operationalised through the creation of Wildlife 
Management Areas (WMAs) on village lands. However, under the current 
regulatory framework central government maintains wide discretionary 
authority over wildlife management decisions and benefit capture. 
Ultimately WMAs have evolved into a form of benefit-sharing, with local 
authority limited, rather than a mechanism for communities to actively 
manage wildlife on village lands (Nelson, 2007). 
The Uganda Wildlife Authority has operated a community conservation 
programme since the mid 90s, a central element of which has been to 
facilitate regulated access to state PAs for specific natural resources or 
uses by surrounding communities (Blomley, 2003; Chhetri et al, 2004; 
Namara, 2006; Scott, 1998)
Uganda has also been a leader in East Africa in advancing fisheries co-
management and over the past decade have scaled up pilots on Lake 
George and Kyoga to a national programme which is provided for 
under new fisheries legislation. Beach Management Units have been 
established across Uganda’s lakeshores and now play an important role 
in regulating and enforcing fishing effort and illegal activities
Within Ethiopia’s forest sector, there have been a number of donor 
supported initiatives that have implemented joint forest management 
across a range of highland forests under central government ownership. 
Restrictive agreements on the use and harvesting of these forests has 
meant that to date benefits at the local level have been somewhat 
limited. However, there have been a number of successful projects that 
have supported the harvest and marketing of wild coffee from within 
managed forest areas as well as other NTFPs such as bamboo. (Senbeta 
et al., 2007).
Tanzania and Kenya are also promoting joint forest management 
between state forest reserves and surrounding communities, through 
legislative reforms passed in 2002 and 2005, respectively. Joint forest 
management in Tanzania currently covers about 1.8 million ha of forest 
land.
Table 3. Different degrees of community involvement in natural 
resource management in East Africa
0
Natural Resource Issues No. 18
established element of PA management in virtually all East African countries, and 
are particularly important in the region given the high macro-economic returns 
generated from wildlife-based tourism focused on state-managed PAs across 
much of the region (e.g. $900 million in total tourism revenue and estimated 
$560 million from the northern safari circuit alone in Tanzania in 2008 – see 
Mitchell et al., 2008). However, with reference to Uganda but relevant elsewhere, 
Namara & Nsabagasani (2003) note “Community conservation and collaborative 
management as practiced around PAs in Uganda today do not achieve democratic 
governance of natural resources. This is because community participation under 
community conservation and collaborative management does not adequately and 
effectively translate into community empowerment and control over resources, 
especially concerning decision making.”
A key factor in Kenya and Tanzania is the ecological interconnections between 
PAs and surrounding private and communal lands due to the seasonal migration 
patterns of large mammals in these semi-arid ecosystems (Western, 1989). Some 
of Kenya’s first explicit efforts to develop ‘community-based’ approaches to 
conservation occurred in the Amboseli ecosystem in the early 1970’s (Western, 
1994). Following the creation of Amboseli National Park in 1974, which resulted 
in its transfer from control by the Kajiado County Council to national wildlife 
authorities, the government agreed to a range of benefit-sharing measures, 
including provision of water services and a proportion of park revenues to six 
surrounding Maasai group ranches (BurnSilver, 2009; Western, 1994). 
Tanzania also has a long history of linking PAs with community benefits 
– TANAPA’s ‘good neighbourliness’ (ujirani mwema) programme started in the late 
1980s and was designed to give communities a stake in parks, reduce conflicts 
between park management and local communities, and enhance local benefits 
(Bergin, 2001). This programme continues through a Support for Community 
Initiated Projects outreach programme which is integrated into TANAPA’s overall 
operations, and which is responsible for directing a significant amount of revenue 
to local communities around the country. In 2007, TANAPA invested 69 million 
Tshs (roughly $5.4 million) in these community initiatives, or about 1.8% of its 
total revenue that year (TNRF, 2008). While these revenues provide important 
forms of local benefits from PAs, such benefits are not linked or conditional on 
local actions supportive of conservation, and tend to be viewed as handouts. 
In addition, tensions between park managers and local communities, chiefly 
Community-based 
natural resources 
management
 
In Tanzania the 2002 Forest Act provides for the establishment of 
Village Land Forest Reserves which are entirely under the control 
of village governments. Villages are also entitled to 100% of the 
revenues from sale of forest products in these community-managed 
forest reserves, and develop their own management plans and by-laws 
governing local forest uses.
In both Kenya and Tanzania communities are able to realise the benefits 
of wildlife on their lands through contractual agreements and joint 
venture partnerships with private sector tourism operators.
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revolving around the use of resources in parks (e.g. grazing, water, bushmeat)  
and over boundaries continues to create conflicts that limit the impacts of 
benefit-sharing and outreach initiatives (Honey, 2008). 
Box 9. Private sector catalyzes increasing local economic benefits 
from wildlife in East Africa
As in Southern Africa, the development of community-based conservation initiatives in 
Kenya since the mid-1990s has been closely tied to commercial tourism ventures and new 
market opportunities. Some private landholders and tourism operators, such as Lewa Wildlife 
Conservancy3, a leading private wildlife/tourism ranch in Laikipia District, have played a central role 
in catalyzing the formation of a range of expanding community-managed tourism facilities and 
conservation areas in north-central Kenya (Honey, 2008; Kinoti, 2007). All these local initiatives 
are premised on developing tourism ventures, either entirely community-owned or jointly with 
private operators, in order to create new economic opportunities and revenue flows.
In Tanzania, a range of community-private tourism ventures have also emerged, starting in the 
early 1990s (Nelson, 2004). These ventures have emerged mainly in the northern part of the 
country, where tour operators have entered into legal contracts with Village Councils. These 
contracts generally provide for tour operators to be able to access village lands in exchange for 
set payments by the operator, and villages agreeing to set aside a concession area where they 
will not farm or settle. Such agreements serve to maintain natural vegetation and prevent land 
use changes in these ecotourism concessions, while villages maintain full land rights and authority 
over the areas (Sachedina and Nelson, in press). The direct benefits to communities in terms of 
wildlife-based tourism revenues from these ventures have been some of the most substantial 
natural resource-based earnings at the local level in Tanzania’s experiences. For example, seven 
villages in Loliondo Division, adjacent to the Serengeti National Park, earned over $300,000 
between them from such private-village tourism agreements by 2007 (TNRF, 2008). 
In Rwanda, a recent venture between a community group and the private sector was launched 
close to the base of Mount Sabyinyo on the edge of the Park National des Volcans which opened 
for business in 2007 (charging up to $700 USD per bed night). The lodge is owned by SACOLA 
(Sabyinyo Community Lodge Association) who have granted a 15 year lease to a private company 
to operate the business. The Kenyan company, Musiara Ltd (Governors’ Camp), is contracted 
to pay SACOLA a ‘bed-night fee’ of $50 plus 7.5% of income. Between August 2007 and 
February 2008, SACOLA received US$34,500. Other benefits include employment, with 70% of 
jobs currently filled by local people; the hotel buys local produce from the community and the 
potential for supplying further services and attractions to tourists (Martin, 2008).
3. NB in Kenya the term conservancy has no legal meaning unlike in Namibia where conservancies are clearly 
defined legal entities
Traditional Natural Resource Management
The typology in Table 3 is not intended to suggest that local communities did not 
actively manage natural resources in East Africa prior to these formal processes. 
There is a long tradition across all countries in the region, as elsewhere in Africa, 
for customary or traditional approaches to the management of natural resources. 
Local groups of people across the region possessed a wide array of indigenous 
resource management systems, most of which were never documented or 
recorded. Hundreds of years of external dislocations and ‘globalization’ of resource 
management – from the inland expansion of the slave and ivory trade in East 
Africa from the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries, to the imposition of 
European rule from the late 1890’s – have eroded many local resource governance 
institutions. Nevertheless many resilient local resource management systems and 
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conservation practices remain in place, and are a central element of CBNRM in 
practice across East Africa.
These include the sacred groves (khayas) found along the Kenyan coast, traditional 
forests in the Pare Mountains of Tanzania and traditional grazing areas managed 
through transhumant pastoralist land use systems by the Maasai, Samburu, 
Turkana and Oromo pastoralists (and others) of Tanzania, Kenya, and Ethiopia. A 
main focus of these management systems is protecting critical communal resources 
such as water sources and seasonally important grazing reserves. For example, 
Bassi (2006) describes the way that Borana communities in southern Ethiopia 
and northern Kenya protect key springs and montane forests through customary 
measures. Known (by the international conservation community) as CCAs, they 
are essentially areas where the communities are the primary managers of the 
resource, they have undertaken the protection and conservation of the resource 
on a voluntary basis (i.e. they are not paid to do so) and for objectives defined 
by themselves which range from basic livelihood needs to spiritual and religious 
concerns (Blomley et al, 2007).
In the region’s semi-arid lands, pastoralism is based on sophisticated systems 
of traditional or customary natural resources management – based on 
mobility – which were initiated and are maintained without external support, 
but which have evolved along different trajectories reflecting differences in the 
political and legal context between countries (Box 10). Importantly, and similar 
to the situation in West Africa (discussed below) traditional pastoralist resource 
management systems probably generate greater economic benefits for local 
communities and the region’s national economies than any ‘formal’ or centrally-
driven CBNRM processes or programs in East Africa. In Kenya, pastoralism is 
estimated to be worth about $800 million in milk, meat, and leather production 
to Kenya’s economy (Hesse and MacGregor, 2006) – roughly equivalent to 
the value of the national tourism industry. Although pastoralism in Kenya and 
Tanzania is oriented to livestock management, it also benefits wildlife as dry 
season grazing reserves are effectively un-used by people for extensive periods, 
and conservation of vegetation is an express local management objective. By 
enabling the maintenance of wildlife habitats outside state PAs, pastoralist land 
management practices provide important ecological services, estimated at in 
excess of $80 million annually, at the macro-economic level in northern Tanzania 
(Nelson, unpublished paper).
However, pastoralist resource management systems are under pressure 
throughout East Africa due to the high value of the wildlife and other natural 
resources that pastoralist lands support (Box 11). For example, in Kenya’s 
traditionally protected Loita Forest, local Maasai have struggled for much 
of the past twenty years to prevent the Narok County Council (district level 
government) from taking control over the forest to develop it for tourism 
(Karanja et al., 2002). This is a contrast to West Africa where the economic 
contribution of wildlife and tourism is less important.
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Box 10. The role of policy in determining land-use in the 
Serengeti/Mara ecosystem
Contrasting policy contexts on either side of national boundaries which cut through areas with 
broadly shared ecological and social characteristics can provide natural experiments to investigate 
the impact of policy differences. A good example is land-use in the Serengeti/Mara system which 
straddles the boundary between Tanzania and Kenya respectively. Using long-term satellite data 
on land use and large scale surveys of policy, demographic change and household economies, 
Homewood et al. (2001) explore the impact of contrasting policies on land use patterns. In Kenya, 
the policy environment has enabled the privatisation of communal group ranches, and their 
subsequent subdivision. This policy was in part intended to guard against the perceived negative 
environmental consequences of agropastoral systems. In contrast, in Tanzania privatisation 
opportunities have been more constrained, although the government shares the Kenyan belief 
that agropastoral systems are detrimental to soil, vegetation, and biodiversity conservation. 
The analysis reveals that in fact wildlife numbers have declined dramatically in Kenya, as a 
consequence of private landowners converting their ranches for mechanised cereal production. 
In contrast, wildlife numbers have not declined significantly in Tanzania over the same period. 
The analysis controls for changes in human population, uptake of cultivation by households, 
agropastoral land use and climate, suggesting the policy difference as an important driver of 
land-use change. Interestingly, in-depth research to explore the decision making processes 
underpinning these findings revealed that Kenyan landowners were reluctant to use their land 
for wildlife-based activities because of the selective capture of returns by local and national elites, 
making cultivation a more secure option. 
Source: Homewood et al (2001)
Box 11. Local collective resource management traditions and 
institutions under threat in East Africa
In Tanzania, CBNRM is at the centre of broad tensions amongst different actors regarding 
rights over land and natural resources, largely due to weaker local land rights than exist in 
neighbouring Kenya. Because of the value of wildlife resources for tourism and hunting (the 
latter banned in Kenya since 1977), pastoralist areas continue to be subject to intense pressures 
from central government and external investors. Central authorities have extended control over 
revenues generated by tourism ventures on community lands, thereby potentially reducing the 
revenues communities are able to capture from these enterprises and reducing local incentives 
for conservation (Nelson et al., 2007). Similarly, the narrative for reform as laid out in the 1998 
Wildlife Policy has not developed, and WMAs have been gradually transformed from a potential 
mechanism for devolved local management of wildlife on village lands, to a system of revenue-
sharing in exchange for communities to set aside large areas of their land for wildlife (TNRF, 
2008). The involvement of local communities with wildlife management and tourism benefits 
in Tanzania needs to be viewed within this context of complex political contests over valuable 
resources and the revenues they generate (Nelson and Agrawal, 2008). 
In Ethiopia, traditional pastoralist land management regimes cover much of the southern half of 
the country but are not formally recognised (Bassi, 2006; Tache and Irwin, 2003). Pastoralist lands 
in semi-arid southern Ethiopia have faced continuous threats of land loss and encroachment, with 
the most recent example being a surge of allocations of land for biofuel (mainly Jatropha curcas) 
production (Cotula et al., 2008). This scramble for land for the production of Jatropha poses 
challenges for farmers and pastoralists in semi-arid areas across East and West Africa.
In Ugandan rangelands, pastoralism is again the main economic activity but decades of 
government policy has promoted sedenterisation and the creation of privately owned ranches. 
It is now only in the Karamoja region of north eastern Uganda where such traditional land 
management practises can be said to continue more or less intact. (Jabs, 2007)
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3.4 Southern Africa: Democratisation, devolution, wildlife 
management, rural development
CBNRM approaches fuelled by democratisation and private 
landowner experience
Innovative decentralized approaches to wildlife management that emerged in 
Southern Africa starting in the 1960’s have played a key role in the development of 
CBNRM throughout the region, and influenced CBNRM across sub-Saharan Africa 
(Suich et al., 2009). CBNRM built on institutional reforms that occurred in Namibia 
(then South-West Africa), South Africa and Zimbabwe in the late 1960’s and early 
1970’s, whereby private landowners were given rights over wildlife on their land. 
Balint and Bond (submitted) note that this “represented a radical departure from 
the preservationist paradigm that had guided wildlife management for more than 
half a century”. These reforms, coupled with other factors including drought and 
the removal of livestock subsidies, led to widespread wildlife recoveries on private 
lands as a result of the economic incentives that were created for landholder 
investments in wildlife as a form of land use, coupling ecological recovery with 
economic productivity at the local and national levels (Child, 2004). The extension 
of devolved or decentralized natural resource management to communal areas 
from its initial piloting in freehold white-owned lands under minority regimes 
resulted from political changes in the region – namely, the extension of suffrage to 
the rest of the population, which occurred in 1980 in Zimbabwe, 1990 in Namibia, 
and 1994 in South Africa. In addition, the hunting ban implemented in Kenya had 
an important impact on the economic value of wildlife, as trophy hunting was not 
previously considered to be viable south of the Zambezi. 
Thus, unlike the other regions of Africa, CBNRM in Southern Africa does not 
include a component that is strongly linked to PAs. Rather, it tends to be based, 
at least conceptually if not always in practice, on a foundation of common 
property theory which recognizes that there is a strong relationship between local 
investments in resource stewardship and proprietorial rights to the resources in 
question (e.g. Murphree, 1993). Exceptions are Mozambique and South Africa. 
Mozambique has significant resident populations in its PAs and so has been 
developing a range of co-management options, and like East African countries 
has seen heightened tensions between local, private, and state interests in natural 
resource management following the flurry of reforms carried out in the mid-1990’s 
after the end of civil war (Nhantumbo and Anstey 2007). In South Africa, with 
most resources enclosed by private lands or state PAs, many community-based 
initiatives focus on co-management, benefit sharing, and innovations such as 
“contractual parks” (Box 12). 
Overall, however, and as noted above, within the Southern Africa region, the 
term CBNRM refers very specifically to approaches where the explicit objective of 
natural resource reforms is the devolution of authority from the state to defined 
groups of resource users on communal land. A typical approach has been to 
establish (or strengthen)  community-based organizational structures that are 
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Box 12. Contractual parks in South Africa
One innovative conservation mechanism which has been popular in South Africa since the 1980s 
is the contractual park (Reid & Turner, 2004). These parks are established on land owned privately, 
either by individuals or community groups, which are then managed by the national conservation 
authority and effectively become part of the national PA estate (Reid, 2002). Management of 
contractual parks is carried out in accordance with a joint management agreement devised by a 
board comprising representatives of both the landowners and the conservation authority (Reid, 
2002). The conditions under which such parks have been established are diverse. These include 
creating incentives to landowners neighbouring existing PAs to bring their land into the PA without 
transfer of title (e.g. Addo Elephant National Park), establishing new PAs on community land (e.g. 
Richtersveld National Park) and returning title to community groups formerly evicted to make way 
for the establishment of PAs (e.g. Makuleke land claim; Child et al., 2004). The latter two examples 
are particularly informative and worth considering in more detail. 
The Richtersveld National Park is the country’s only entirely contractual National Park. It is a remote 
desert area, with around 6000 livestock herders living in the park. Under the contract with South 
Africa National Parks (SANParks) the residents receive rent for the land from SANParks, which is 
paid into a community trust. Income and employment from touristic activities in the park has been 
slow to materialise in the region, largely due to its remoteness and lack of ‘big five’ game animals. 
However, the park “occupies a central place in Richtersvelders’ view of their community assets and 
their plans for the future” (Reid and Turner, 2004). Co-management of the park has nonetheless 
been complicated by ethnic and political divides between park residents, who are highly diverse 
and drawn from a very large area (Grossman and Holden 2009; Reid and Turner, 2004). 
The Makuleke region of Kruger National Park (KNP) was established in 1969, when the Makuleke 
people were evicted to allow KNP to be expanded. In 1996, following the establishment of the 
new democratic government, the Makuleke people reached an out of court settlement with the 
National Parks Board which granted transfer of title for 20,000 hectares of land back to the evicted 
community on condition that conservation activities continue on the land for 99 years, with no 
residence or agriculture. The land claim is managed under a Communal Property Association (CPA) 
established in 1999, which has leased the area to SANParks for 50 years. All conservation activities 
are the responsibility of SANParks, which does not pay ground rent to the CPA. However, the CPA 
has the rights to commercial and cultural activities, which are very valuable given the touristic 
activities in the area (Reid and Turner, 2004). 
Experience of co-management within contractual parks in South Africa has been mixed. Joint 
Management Boards have functioned fairly well, but have been hampered by the power of 
SANParks representatives, who have little time to give to the parks. The Makuleke land claim has 
generally functioned well (Grossman and Holden, 2009), but there has been conflict between the 
traditional chief and the new, democratic CPA which has tenure of the land claim. “Unfortunately, 
the different family and political differences play themselves out by using these ‘overlapping’ 
development roles to suit different individual agendas” (Collins and Snel 2008). In this case the 
traditional royal family received a lot of benefits from the CPA. This might appear an example of 
‘elite capture’ of benefits, but most people in the community were content with the situation and 
felt the royal family were the rightful beneficiaries. (Collins and Snel, 2008). 
Contractual parks appear to make a contribution to conservation objectives, and also provide 
landowners with considerably greater benefits than are normally available to park-adjacent 
communities. However, they are rarely profitable and typically require some form of subsidy from 
central government or other parks. Nonetheless, Reid (2002) argues that these failings are more a 
problem of implementation than of concept, and that contractual parks “contribute much towards 
meeting conservation and development objectives, and successful joint management should rather 
be defined as a process which facilitates an equitable power balance between the landowners and 
conservation authority, through which the social and economic objectives of the landowners, and 
the ecological and economic objectives of the conservation authority are met”.
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legally recognized, and to grant those local groups conditional rights over natural 
resource use and management, including commercial uses that involve third-party 
leases or joint ventures partnerships. In Botswana, for example, CBNRM mobilises 
local communities to form legal trusts so that they can obtain quotas from the 
wildlife department and land leases from District Land Boards, and thereby enter 
into joint venture agreements for trophy hunting or photographic tourism access 
agreements with the private sector (Jones, 2004a). 
Wildlife conservation integrated with local land management and 
rural development 
CBNRM in Southern Africa has been firmly rooted in wildlife management (Table 
4), with income that could be earned from tourism and trophy hunting providing 
the main economic incentive for rural communities to invest in wildlife as a 
form of land use, improving local economic options and extending the amount 
of land used for wildlife across the region to communal areas. At the core of 
CBNRM initiatives has been a widespread recognition amongst policy-makers in 
southern Africa that for wildlife to persist outside PAs on private and communal 
lands, it must be an economically competitive land use option for landholders, 
and if it is not it will be replaced by agriculture and livestock (Child, 2004). 
Programmes such as CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe have been able to bring together 
a diverse array of policy-makers, scholars, and development and conservation 
organizations around the agenda of enhancing wildlife’s local economic value 
and strengthening local resource proprietorship (Jones and Murphree, 2001). 
More recently, a broader range of natural resources have been included such as 
forestry, Veld products, water, and fisheries (Arntzen et al., 2007). In addition, 
the rural development potential of CBNRM has been increasingly recognised and 
mainstreamed in much of the region. In some cases this has been a result of 
the source of funding (e.g. if derived from a development agency with poverty 
reduction as its core objective) but in other cases national development and 
poverty reduction strategies have emphasised the role of CBNRM in achieving 
social objectives. Indeed, the predominant centrality of state wildlife agency 
bureaucrats and foreign donors in driving CBNRM reforms- as opposed to 
“bottom-up demand” from citizens- is a salient feature in the region (Nelson  
and Agrawal, 2008).
In particular, some countries have begun to devolve rights over forest resources 
to local community institutions although this has generally been restricted to 
the use of NTFPs, with access to valuable timber resources retained by the state 
(Jones, 2004a). In Botswana, for example, only 24% of forest land is under 
community management compared to 71% of land overall  (Nhantumbo 2007). 
Shackleton et al (2000) note that although the income generated by NTFPs 
is marginal compared to the returns from trophy-hunting or tourism, it can 
be a critical livelihood support. Moreover, given the sheer number of people 
who generate some benefit from NTFPs compared to hunting or tourism, the 
cumulative economic impact is often under-estimated. 
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Country Programme Comments
Botswana Formation of wildlife 
trusts 
Started in 1989. Initially driven by USAID Natural 
Resources Management Project (NRMP) II. Sources 
of income: both hunting and tourism contracts. 
It is estimated that there are now over 100 
community wildlife trusts.
Mozambique Multiple programmes Diverse local initiatives emerging following 
end of civil war in early 1990’s and policy and 
legislative reforms in land and forestry and 
wildlife sectors. Substantial donor support since 
that time. Initiatives tend to be local, somewhat 
decentralized projects (e.g. Chipanje Chetu 
in Niassai Province and Tchuma Tchato in Tete 
Province).
Namibia Communal Conservancy 
programme
Initial community initiatives in the 1980s led to 
formal development of CBNRM in wildlife policy 
process in early 1990’s. Legal changes to enable 
formation of community conservancies passed 
in 1996 and first conservancy gazetted in 1998. 
Long term support since early 1990’s provided by 
USAID. Formation of conservancies on communal 
land with rights over wildlife. Diverse sources 
of income including hunting, tourism, and non-
timber products.
Zambia Administrative 
Management and Design 
for Game Management 
Areas (ADMADE); 
Luangwa Integrated 
Resources Development 
Programme (LIRDP)
ADMADE national programme initiated in the mid-
1980s and supported by USAID and government 
wildlife agencies. Revenue-sharing scheme 
focused mainly on Game Management Areas 
(GMAs). LIRDP initiated in the Lupande GMA in 
1988 with Norwegian support aimed specifically 
to link wildlife revenues with integrated rural 
development in the Luangwa Valley.
Zimbabwe Communal Areas 
Programme for 
Indigenous Resources 
(CAMPFIRE)
Legislative reforms enabling granting of 
authority over wildlife to Rural District Councils 
passed in early 1980’s after independence. 
CAMPFIRE programme design produced in 
1986 and implementation started in 1988 and 
subsequently backed by USAID. Rights over 
wildlife decentralized to Rural District Councils. 
Main source of income from contracts with 
trophy hunters. Economic and political uncertainty 
placed severe constraints on community-based 
organisations and locally developed institutions but 
recent experience of resource rights agreements 
demonstrating considerable strength and resilience 
of these organisations. 
Table 4. Examples of large-scale CBNRM programmes in  
Southern Africa
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Box 13. CBNRM  linking conservation and development in 
Southern Africa
“The conceptualisation of CBNRM as a mechanism for wildlife conservation in southern Africa 
has changed over time, particularly driven by the provision of large-scale donor support” (Roe 
et al 2006). In Namibia, for example, community-based wildlife conservation was pioneered in 
the mid-1980s in response to poaching- particularly of elephants and black rhinos. A community 
game guard programme contributed to addressing this problem and this was supplemented by 
experiments in wildlife tourism to generate income for local people and provide an additional 
economic incentive for conservation. Jones (2004a) notes, however, that with the advent of 
external donor support the objectives of CBNRM began to change: “A USAID-funded US 
$14 million support programme for CBNRM started in 1993, known as the Living in a Finite 
Environment (LIFE) Programme. The establishment of the LIFE Project and the relationship with 
USAID brought a new set of agendas to CBNRM in Namibia. The language of the LIFE goal and 
purpose began to shift the agenda for CBNRM more towards rural development goals than 
conservation goals” (Jones, 2004a). 
Linkages with the private sector
The private sector is very strongly linked with CBNRM in Southern Africa, 
particularly because so much of formal CBNRM in the region is based on 
commercial uses revolving around wildlife, principally tourism and tourist hunting, 
and commercial ventures that are usually operated by the private sector. The 
CAMPFIRE programme in Zimbabawe, for example, has relied on the tourist 
hunting industry for more than 90% of its total revenues (Frost and Bond, 
2008). It is often argued that the private sector has an important role to play 
because CBNRM projects usually depend on commercializing resources in some 
way, and private sector actors are best placed to do so (e.g. Collins and Snel, 
2008; Madzudzo et al., 2006). Some commentators have, however, expressed 
concern at the level of private sector involvement in some areas given power 
and information asymmetries, as well as potentially divergent interests between 
private and local actors (Madzudzo et al., 2006). Wolmer and Ashley (2003) 
for example, note that private sector engagement can result in more benefits 
accruing to local elites rather than the poor. This raises questions about how 
to evaluate the trade-off between improved opportunities for some versus less 
equality for many. The phenomenon of “elite capture” – and whether private 
sector involvement, particularly through joint ventures, exacerbates this, is 
discussed in the next chapter.
Exceptions and anomalies
Although broad trends can be discerned within Southern Africa in terms of the 
overall development of CBNRM – e.g. large-scale national programmes, a focus 
on hunting and wildlife tourism, devolution of authority to new community-
based organisations – the region also exhibits a number of significant differences. 
Mozambique stands out as a case in point- a Portuguese-speaking contrast 
to its Anglophone neighbours – the post-independence Marxist government 
nationalised all land – but private and community land use rights are equal in 
law, unlike the other countries in the region. Also Mozambique’s extensive forest 
estate has meant that CBNRM initiatives have tended to be forest-based rather 
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than the wildlife and tourism focus of the rest of the region (Nhantumbo and 
Anstey, 2007).
South Africa also stands out as an unusual case in the region. Here CBNRM 
is commonly associated with local community claims for land restitution 
– particularly in areas where land was taken for national parks (Arntzen et al. 
2007). In many cases where land in PAs is claimed, a “contractual park” is 
established as a form of co-management, as detailed in Box 12. 
Box 14. Is Namibia a model for CBNRM?
One of the best known African examples of community-based wildlife management is Namibia’s 
communal conservancies. Reforms providing for the establishment of communal conservancies 
were passed in 1996. These reforms enabled the residents of communal lands to form a local 
organization, defined by a governing constitution, membership, and land area, and to apply 
to the government for user rights over the wildlife therein. Since the late 1990s, the number 
of conservancies has increased rapidly, with approximately 50 in existence by 2007, covering 
118,704 km2 of land, or about 14.4% of the country. By 2007 these areas generated over US$2.5 
million of revenue from wildlife-based activities such as tourism and tourist hunting. Wildlife 
populations have widely recovered in these conservancies, including rare species such as black 
rhinos and predators such as lions (NACSO, 2008). 
A number of aspects of the Namibian CBNRM model are particularly salient for the design of 
CBNRM initiatives. First, the rights granted to communities over wildlife are relatively broad and 
secure; these rights are conditional and can be revoked but they are not term-limited. Second, 
there is no “middle-man” between communities and the private sector; third there is no local 
or state government “tax” on the revenue earned – 100% of benefits from wildlife are retained 
locally; and fourth, the programme had a long history of development prior to the involvement 
of external actors and donors (Balint and Bond, submitted). 
However, a key question that emerges from CBNRM in Namibia, is that given the empirical 
success of the country’s wildlife management approach (NACSO, 2008), why have equivalent 
rights over wildlife not been devolved to local communities anywhere else in Southern Africa, or 
East Africa for that matter? Are there particular contextual factors that have enabled rights over 
wildlife on communal lands in Namibia to be devolved? In addition to favourable bio-physical 
characteristics (low population density, high aridity favouring wildlife over crop agriculture) Nelson 
and Agrawal (2008) argue that key factors in the Namibian experience in terms of enabling key 
CBNRM reforms have been a) relatively low levels of institutional corruption in Namibia which 
reduces policy-makers’ incentives for withholding authority over valuable resources; b) relatively 
low centrally-captured revenues from wildlife uses (e.g. tourist hunting) on communal lands, 
which also reduces central incentives for maintaining control. 
In addition, many observers (e.g. Jones and Murphree, 2001) have pointed out that the 
foundations for wildlife management reforms in Namibia providing for communal conservancies 
were laid by the earlier devolution of rights over wildlife on private freehold lands in the 1960’s. 
Following the onset of majority rule and independence from South Africa in 1990, there was 
both a political imperative and an opportunity that had not previously existed to extend devolved 
rights over wildlife to communal lands. It is worth noting that this political context, which was 
central to CBNRM’s subsequent emergence in Namibia, is one that is unlikely to be repeated in 
other countries and raises important questions as to how applicable the Namibian example is 
elsewhere. Nevertheless, Namibia’s CBNRM legislation itself is transferable and provides a useful 
model for devolving substantial rights over wildlife and wildlife-based revenues – presuming that 
the political will can be found to fully empower communities in the first place.
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3.5 West Africa: Land tenure, pastoralists, decentralisation,  
co-management
Decentralisation of land
In West Africa, CBNRM is underpinned by land tenure. Most West African 
economies are highly dependent on natural resources (agricultural products, such 
as coffee, cocoa and palm oil and cotton, and oil in Nigeria), which are regarded 
as having the strongest potential to be a motor for West African economic 
development. As West Africa’s population continues to grow rapidly (at 2.6%, 
with the population estimated to reach 400 million by 2020 (ECOPAS, 2007), land 
rights are already politically and economically very important in many countries, 
and this is likely to increase. Where land and resources are valuable, they have 
often been made the property of the state, or are protected from community 
use by state legislation (such is in the case of valuable timber stands; (Ibo, 1997), 
which can hinder the development of CBNRM. Although land decentralisation 
policies in West Africa go a long way to re-establishing community management 
and authority over natural resources, the state generally retains control. 
The land management and tenure systems of West Africa have their routes 
in colonialism, during which French and English colonial policy in the region 
generally gave the state centralised authority over all unregistered or common 
lands (the exception being in Liberia and Sierra Leone where colonial authorities 
left the ‘usufruct’, community tenure laws intact during colonial rule; (IIED, 1999). 
In many cases, land tenure and management became even more centralised 
following Independence (e.g. the State Land Act of 1962 in Ghana (Alhassan 
and Manuh 2005) the 1968 decree in Mali (Hilhorst and Coulibaly 1998), and 
the 1960 decree in Cote d’Ivoire (Stamm 2000). However, weak implementation 
and enforcement of these laws meant that a pluralistic land management 
system – a mixture of traditional and government tenure laws – evolved and 
has tended to dominate until the present day, creating a multifarious land 
tenure and management environment, which has sometimes led to conflict 
(e.g. land conflicts in northern Cote d’Ivoire (Chauveau, 2000; Stamm 2000)). 
In the last 10 – 20 years most countries in West Africa have moved towards 
more formal decentralised system of land management, with land registration 
and decentralisation decrees, supported by high levels of international donor 
investment, including the World Bank and the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) Global Environmental Fund, a number of EU governments 
(especially the Swiss, French and Netherlands), and national and international 
NGOs. Current land management policies for each country (where available) can 
be found in Annex 1 of this report.
In Francophone countries the main method has been the Gestion de Terroirs 
approach (Box 15), widely supported by international development agencies, 
which gives communities the legal right and the tools to manage their own 
land. The Gestion de Terroirs approach was a response to the failures of earlier 
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technocratic and managerial approaches to development (Batterbury, 1998) and its 
emphasis on the creation of locally meaningful socio-spatial units of environmental 
management (Painter et al. 1994) reflects an international paradigm shifts towards 
‘grassroots’ development and the decentralisation of resource management. It 
generally comprises the following stages:
n Clarification of land tenure. Existing land tenure structures are recorded at a 
village level. At this point land disputes and village input can be heard and 
recorded, and the current village/clan/family boundaries mapped.
n Creation of new regional and village councils, to provide the administrative 
structure for decentralisation; generally established through Government decree. 
n Enhancement of local management capacity, including the preparation of village 
management plans/ local development plans, micro-financing for development 
and training of both village, district and regional authorities, and continuing 
support for village decentralisation through district authorities.
Box 15. Gestion de Terroirs in practice
Gestion de Terroirs at the national level
The situation in Mali provides a good example of how Gestion de Terroirs is operationalised 
at the country level. Here, a programme of decentralisation was implemented following a 
change of government in 1991. In 1995 local communities were invited to participate in 
reviewing the legislation on land and water management in Mali (Ogier et al., 2001), and 
in 1999 a government decree made decentralisation practically operational. Two important 
articles in the 1999 decree are:
n Article 11: local governments are responsible for managing, developing and conserving their 
estates, and for protecting the ecological balance of their land
n Article 14: local governments may delegate power to village authorities, interest groups and 
neighbourhoods that have an established rural management structure (Ogier et al., 2001). 
Although management authority and decision-making is devolved to local authorities and 
villages through this process, the land is still legally the property of the state, and the new 
system should be described as one of co-management. 700 new communes (administrative units 
comprising several villages) were created, and the first municipal elections held. Rural councils 
were established, each with its own major (Ogier et al. 2001). The Pastoral Charter of 2001 also 
recognises the role of local village institutions in conflict resolution (Winter, 2000). In order for 
power to be legally devolved, village authorities are required to produce a management and 
development plan, approved by government, and to be implemented through management 
contracts with the local council and the village organisation. This is an area where government 
or donor support for villages is in great need for the system to succeed. Fortunately there are 
a number of projects running in Mali (both government and NGO led) which aim to support 
village institutions with the decentralisation process, and feedback on progress has generally 
been positive. 
Gestion de Terroirs at the community level
An example of the benefits of Gestion de Terroirs approach in practice is provided by efforts 
to promote community-based management of fan-palm ecosystems in Niger. In south-western 
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Niger fan-palm groves play a principal role in the local economy, and are at the core of the 
region’s agricultural and pastoral activities, providing many human and animal foodstuffs as well 
as products for the manufacture of furniture and fishing gear, for medicinal use, and for bee-
keeping. Prior to the introduction of the Gestion de Terroirs approach, the palm groves were 
state managed with no benefits accruing to the local community. As one village chief put it: “The 
palm groves will never be protected if the people living in them are ignored.” The new approach 
resulted in the gradual development of a new institutional framework  for the decentralised and 
community-based management of natural resources. Substantial results have been achieved:
n Twenty-six local management agencies (SLGs) now handle the planning and autonomous 
management of the resources in their terroir.
n Over 3,000 hectares have been regenerated thanks exclusively to the communities’ own 
efforts over the past five years.
n 59 environmental protection crews, employing over 310 workers, are responsible for 
protection and surveillance activities in the fan-palm groves.
n Participation by the local inhabitants in the process of palm wood marketing has led to 
improved performance and higher earnings with over 15 million Central African Francs (FCFA) 
generated.
The Gestion de Terroirs approach has also been implemented within the management plan of 
W Park (a transboundary PA, straddling Niger, Burkina Faso and Benin). The EU Ecosystèmes 
protégés en Afrique Soudano-Sahélienne (ECOPAS) programme has carried out social sciences 
studies in the PA’s periphery to understand the structure of village networks and ensure that 
the buffer zone’s management units would complement local socio-political structures (Casti 
2004; de Visscher and Ancey, 2001). Gestion de Terroirs has not, however, been appropriate to 
address the issue of pastoralism in the Park and the ECOPAS programme has developed another 
participatory land management approach, more compatible with seasonal land use ( Fournier 
and Toutain 2008). 
Elsewhere, land registration (e.g. Ghana’s 1986 Compulsory Land Title 
Registration Scheme (Alhassan and Manuh 2005) , and Cote d’Ivoire’s influential 
1967 decree which granted land ownership to those who cultivated it (Stamm, 
2000)) has been used as an alternative method. However, in practice, very few 
land title requests have been processed: In Ghana between 1986 and 1990 
five thousand applications were received but only 148 processed (Alhassan and 
Manuh, 2005); see Annex 1 for details of land tenure legislation by country.
Some countries, such as Senegal and Mali, adopted a policy of decentralisation 
as early as the 1970’s, and have therefore had time to set up the administrative 
structures and policies required for regional and local land management to be 
effective. Other countries, such as Ghana and Benin, have only recently embarked 
on decentralisation policies, and currently the infrastructure and training required 
at the regional and local level for these policies to be carried out effectively are 
weak or non-existent. 
International agencies, such as the World Bank, together with national 
governments, have been setting up programmes to build capacity for 
decentralisation in West Africa. These generally help villages to map and register 
land, produce village management plans, provide micro-financing for village 
development projects, and provide training in sustainable resource management. 
Examples include the World Bank-funded ‘Community Based Rural Development 
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Project’ in Ghana which has been providing infrastructure and support for 
decentralisation and rural development since 2004 (World Bank, 2008c); the ‘Rural 
Land Management and Community Infrastructure Development project’ (PNGTER) 
in Cote d’Ivoire, which is intended to empower communities, stimulate local 
investment and facilitate sustainable management of natural resources and rural 
infrastructure (World Bank, 1997); and the Support to Decentralised Collectives 
for Participatory Development (ACODEP) programme in Mali which is intended to 
build local management capacity within farmer organisations (Toure, 1998).
Pastoralists, decentralisation and land tenure 
Livestock is critically important to West African economies. In the Sahel, livestock 
production constitutes 40% of agricultural GDP, and if labour and organic 
manure are counted as livestock products, this increases to nearly 50% (ECOWAS 
and SWAC/OECD, 2008). Despite the importance of livestock for the regional 
economy, and the prevalence of pastoral production in the sector, pastoral land 
tenure and mobility in East and West Africa is a complex and generally poorly 
understood issue. Decentralisation impacts pastoral land tenure in two ways: on 
the one hand, it is the means by which governance structures are regionalized 
and localised, and properly implemented can promote local participation, 
dialogue between land users, and responsibility for natural resources. On the 
other hand, pastoralists are often poorly represented on local governance 
structures and may not be present in the area year-round. Decentralisation also 
sub-divides the national domain into smaller territorial units, which “create” 
physical, administrative, or financial barriers to livestock mobility. This can lead to 
a multiplication of laws and regulations governing livestock mobility and reduce 
access to natural resources (Benjaminsen and Lund 2001; Hesse and Thébaud, 
2006; Thébaud, 2006).
The movement of animals is a key strategy for pastoralists across West Africa. 
The challenge for land tenure is to create policy and legislative frameworks that 
can provide mechanisms for negotiation among land users, and are sufficiently 
flexible to allow the access to grazing and water resources that pastoralists 
require at certain times during the year. While in East Africa the major challenges 
for pastoral land tenure and mobility are linked to wildlife conservation and 
tourism, in West Africa the key element of many land tenure policies in the Sahel 
is the concept of mise en valeur, or the requirement to put land to productive 
use in order to retain rights. This is particularly problematic for pastoralists, as 
definitions of productive use are often based on cultivation and the establishment 
of infrastructure, e.g. the tilling of fields, digging wells, putting up fences etc. 
Pastoral land use does not lend itself to these kinds of requirements and so a 
broader definition of mise en valeur which takes into account mobile livestock 
production is necessary (Thébaud 2002).
Although legislation and policies to facilitate pastoral mobility are still weak, some 
progress is being made. For example, the establishment of livestock corridors is 
one approach to facilitating mobility, and throughout West Africa governments 
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and donors have invested in the identification and demarcation of these livestock 
routes (Bonnet et al., 2007). Another important advance is the increasing 
recognition of the need to link land and water rights. Control over access to 
water points has direct implications for grazing. This is often poorly addressed in 
land use policy and legislation which tends to be sectoral, focusing either on land 
or on water (Thébaud et al., 2006). As a result, policies can sometimes contradict 
and undermine one another. In Niger, however, an innovative Rural Code states 
that herders have a right to use rangelands in common and that herders can 
obtain recognition of priority rights on their home areas (terroir d’attache). This 
includes both land and water rights. Outsiders may gain access to water and 
grazing resources on the basis of negotiations with the right holders. Through this 
innovative legal concept, the Rural Code seeks to build on the traditional resource 
management systems.
In dryland areas of Mali, competition for resources and the erosion of pastures 
has increased significantly in the last five years, creating severe livelihood impacts 
for pastoralist herders. These problems for herders have been exacerbated 
by the Malian policy of decentralisation, as common property resources have 
become village-managed and therefore restricted access (Bocoum et al., 2003). 
In response to this, two NGO’s in Mali, the Near East Foundation (NEF) and SOS 
Sahel, operating in the Mopti region, have recently set up projects to incorporate 
the needs of herders into district management plans. This has included the 
production of herder maps, quantifying herder land use in the district, inter and 
intra village meetings to discuss disagreements and possibilities for communal 
land use, and in some cases the reinstatement of transhumance routes, with the 
authority of district officials (Bocoum et al., 2003).
Box 16. Local conventions – an innovative approach to CBNRM in 
West Africa 
An important tool for establishing rules of access to and use of natural resources in several 
Sahelian countries of West Africa has been the ‘local convention’. These can be defined as 
“agreements, written or oral, negotiated between two or more groups of actors, defining 
management and use rules for land and/or natural resources found in a given area” (Yeye et 
al, 2009). These conventions are frequently implemented as part of the Gestion de Terroirs 
approach. Their implementation varies, but typically involves the production of an inventory 
detailing all natural resources and their users, followed by negotiations between stakeholders to 
establish rules governing access. These negotiations are expected to be participatory, involving all 
local stakeholders. Local conventions have been widely used in areas in which widely divergent 
land use practices take place, such as transhumant pastoralism and agriculture. Conflict over 
access to resources such as water is common in such areas, and local conventions are intended 
to reduce such conflicts, often by establishing livestock corridors which enable pastoralists to 
move through farmland (Wehrmann, 2008). In some cases (e.g. examples from Burkina Faso) 
agreements do not involve any state actors, and can be written or unwritten (Yeye et al, 2009). 
In others, state actors (e.g. the Forestry Service for the Siwaa convention in Mali) are parties to the 
agreement. Local conventions have had mixed success, often being delayed by disputes during 
their formulation and implementation (Hilhorst and Coulibaly, 1998). 
Community management of natural resources in Africa

Forest management – continued state control
Forestry is a major industry in many West African countries, and the value of 
timber and charcoal results in more centralised management of forest resources 
than seen for general land management. In the mid 1900s, when the demand for 
timber was increasing rapidly, many West African governments protected timber 
stands within forest reserves and fôret classée / fôret protégée4 which prevented 
local use, but allowed commercial extraction. 
Nevertheless, moves towards decentralisation are resulting in some new forestry 
co-management arrangements between communities and the state. In Mali, for 
example, forests are managed by local committees and forest revenues are shared 
with local communities as part of the overall decentralisation policy (Ogier et 
al. 2001). In Ghana, communities receive 25% of taxes on forest use as a result 
of decentralisation (compared to 10% before decentralisation; Kasanga and 
Kotey, 2001, see Annex 1 for further information on community forestry laws 
by country). Elsewhere, although the theoretical framework of decentralisation 
provides authority for forest management at the local level, in practice the barriers 
to implementation are high (Box 17). In Senegal for example, the forestry code 
attributes significant powers over forest exploitation, use and management to 
Rural Councils, although in practice the Rural Councils are unable to exercise their 
formal legal authority on forests exploitation and the rural communities remain 
unable to benefit from commercial forest exploitation (Ribot, 2008). 
Wildlife – slow progress on devolution
The involvement of pastoral communities in the management of wildlife/
livestock interactions does not occur in West Africa in the same way as it does 
in East Africa. The problem is that pastoral populations have little experience 
of managing wildlife interactions because their “historical” rangelands were in 
areas with low wildlife density. Furthermore, PAs still tend to be focussed on strict 
wildlife protection rather than sustainable use and very rarely have governance 
structures emerged that allow community participation. A review of community-
based wildlife management in West Africa (Zeba, 1998) highlighted a paucity 
of initiatives in the region and suggested that most projects were developed 
by state institutions, which then engaged community participation, rather than 
being community-driven. However, due to changing climatic conditions and socio-
political pressures (such as land tenure conflicts), pastoral areas in Western Africa 
are increasingly moving south to where the main PAs are located (Boutrais, 2008). 
4.“Forêts classées” and “Forêts protégées” are protected areas, in terms of the IUCN categories and are part 
of the State Public domain. “Forêts classées” are managed by the State service, and are protected from any 
“production objectives” (extraction), due to their classified status. “Forêts protégées” are also part of the State 
permanent domain, but recognise land use rights and customary rights, except for clearing, bush fires and 
commercial logging (in most cases, the hunting rights issue is not addressed by the legislation). The “Forêts 
sacrées” (sacred forests), were legally initially part of the “Forêts protégées” State domain, but management 
has been devolved to a local group or a village community for a special or sacred protection. In this case, 
communities have customary land use rights. The “Forêts sacrées” status indicates clearly a willingness to 
involve local communities in the management, and the classification process is made jointly by the state and 
the concerned communities. 
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Box 17. Co-management of forests in Cote d’Ivoire? 
In 1912 the first National Forestry Service was set up in Cote d’Ivoire, and, as was the policy 
in Francophone West Africa at the time, this brought with it the gazettement of large areas of 
forest (known as foret classe.). These areas of forest were legally guarded against all settlement 
or harvesting of timber or other forest products with the aim of preserving forest and allowing 
the regeneration of degraded forests (Ibo 1997). By 1951 gazetted forests covered 25% of the 
remaining forest area. However, under the 1967 decree of ‘The land to those who cultivate it’ 
forests were rapidly occupied and cleared. In the 1970s and 1980s approximately 300,000 ha 
was being cleared annually (Ibo 1997).
In an attempt to reduce the rate of deforestation, the State Forest Department (SODEFOR) 
embarked on a ‘forest co-management’ strategy in 1994. This set up ‘Farmer Forest Committees’ 
within state owned forests. These are represented within regional committees which decide on 
land use and management within the gazetted and state-owned forest. The forest is divided into 
different ‘zones’, including an agricultural zone, where farmers are permitted to farm, but not 
to clear land. These zones are generally areas where villages are already in existence, or forest 
is already severely degraded, and the allocation of these zones can involve the re-settlement of 
communities. Farmers are then offered 10-year leases on this land. 
However, government commitment to make this co-management strategy work appears to be 
weak: local level planning must also be approved by national meetings, which are held in the 
capital, precluding many Farmer Forest Committees from attending. In addition to this very few 
meetings have taken place since the inception of the co-management strategy (Kesse, 2002).
This places a new urgency on the need to include pastoralist communities in 
wildlife management and conservation programmes in the region, and changes 
are beginning to occur. In Benin, for example, a co-management strategy has 
been developed for Pendjari Biosphere Reserve in conjunction with the 30 
villages located with the buffer and development zone of the reserve and is 
now operational (GTZ, 2008). Communities participate through ‘the Villagers’ 
Association for the Management of Wildlife Reserves’ (AVIGREF). The PA 
complex is supported by a Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit 
(GTZ) led project and the project has been leading in the development of pilot 
approaches involving local communities that were influential in the framing 
of a new legislation (Loi 2002-16 adopted in 2004) opening the door to local 
participation in management and benefit sharing (GTZ, 2008; Yves Hausser pers 
comm.). The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP, 2008) also reports 
that in the buffer zone of W Regional Park a regional agreement involving 
pastoralists from Niger, Burkina and Benin, and ratified by Livestock Ministries of 
these three countries, has set up new zoning arrangement for pastoral activities. 
Other potentially important new developments in the region include the World 
Bank-funded West Africa Pilot Community-Based Natural Resource and Wildlife 
Management Project (World Bank, 2005), which aims to introduce community PA 
and wildlife management strategies to the region, and the Community Resource 
Management Area (CREMA) projects in Ghana (Box 18). Community PAs have 
also been established under the Community Protected Areas Initiative (CPAI), set 
up by the Nature Conservation Research Centre (NCRC) in Ghana (NCRC, 2008). 
There are currently six sanctuaries which are owned and controlled by traditional 
leaders and community representatives. 
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Box 18. Devolution of authority over natural resource use in Ghana
An important experiment in devolved authority over resources is the CREMA concept in Ghana, 
established under the Collaborative Community Based Wildlife Management policy of 2000 
(Annex 1). These areas are established through agreements between communities and the 
Wildlife Division of the Forestry Commission with the aim to assist communities to manage 
natural resources in their own forests. Participating communities are given full authority to control 
access and harvesting of resources within their management area. Each CREMA has an Executive 
formed from Community Resource Management Committees, which themselves are formed of 
individual farmers or land holders. The CREMA process has been supported by UNDP Global 
Environment Fund (GEF), European Commission, Dutch Government, CARE International and 
other organisations. To date, the project has surveyed and demarcated over 200,000 hectares 
of traditional community forest, and is currently in the process of obtaining formal transfer 
of authority for the management of the areas to the local communities (UNDP, 2008). Six 
CREMAs have been fully initiated in western Ghana and several others are under development 
countrywide. Four of the established CREMAs in western Ghana are considered to be performing 
well, whereas two are yet to establish constitutions and begin activities. Recent news reports 
suggest that CREMA’s are to be incorporated into Ghana’s Forest Master Plan, which is currently 
under review (Ghana News, 2008). 
To date CREMAs have delivered some success for conservation of natural resources through a 
reduction in illegal activities, believed to be based on the expectation of future returns. It is too 
early to judge impacts on livelihoods, although early experiences suggest negative sentiments as 
CREMA regulations restrict certain activities. Social capital indicators, in contrast, are very positive, 
as CREMA members perceive the institutions to be working for the common good. It is also 
considered too early to evaluate issues such as the governance performance of CREMAs.
The organisational structure of CREMAs is clear, but different actors perceive them in different 
ways, as being primarily about land use, governance, securing traditional authority, securing PAs, 
etc. In addition, a wide range of drivers act to influence the outcomes of CREMAs, not all of 
which are captured within the structure of the CREMA model. For example, whilst CREMAs have 
tenure over natural resources, they do not have tenure over land itself, and the land tenure system 
continues to have a major influence on resource use. Land tenure largely remains with local 
authorities, and is a major driver of land use, as those granted tenure of an area must actively use 
it or they risk losing it. Similarly, fluctuations in the global commodity markets can influence land 
use within CREMAs, by increasing or decreasing the value of different land use activities. 
Overall there has been good progress with CREMAs and considerable enthusiasm at the 
community level. However there have also been challenges and delays, most of which are 
institutional, centring on poor communication, lack of technical capacity and lack of clarity of 
goals. The CREMA model is uniquely Ghanaian, but has some similarities to CBNRM approaches 
used in southern Africa (e.g. Namibia) which have been underpinned by a high level of political, 
institutional and donor support. There are concerns that if similar support is not given to the 
CREMA programme, it may not enjoy the same level of success in the long term.
Source: Murphree (2008a)
One limitation for wildlife-based CBNRM is the limited potential for ecotourism 
which often provides the economic incentive for local management efforts in 
other regions. Unlike Southern and Eastern Africa, infrastructure for tourism in 
West Africa is poor, wildlife less visible, and wildlife habitat accessible often only 
by foot  – thus often taking days before target species are spotted. Exceptions 
include the Community-Based Ecotourism Project and the CPAI Weichau 
Community Hippo Sanctuary in Ghana, and the community-based game ranching 
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Bushmeat, as a major source of protein and income, represents a form of wildlife 
valorisation for rural forest communities. Within the CBNRM framework there is 
potential for local skill development, in terms of social organisation and hunting 
management, and this could have a strong and direct impact on livelihoods (Rieu 
et al. 2007). However, the issue of bushmeat is a very complicated one. On one 
hand, bushmeat provides an important source of animal protein and cash income 
in rural forest areas; on the other hand village hunting is perceived as one of the 
worst threats to wildlife conservation in the region. An increasing commercial 
trade in bushmeat is suggested as one of the main reasons for unsustainable 
hunting in many areas (Robinson and Bennet, 2000; Wilkie and Carpenter 
1999), which could in the long term put local protein resources at risk. Bushmeat 
hunting is arguably a more sensitive issue in Central Africa (Box 3) where it 
represents the main protein source for the rural poor; due to heavy presence of 
trypanosomiasis, cattle are not generally reared in rain forest areas. 
Traditional resource management
In addition to formal decentralisation processes, traditional management systems 
have continued to dominate in many rural areas (Kasanga, 2002; Edja, 2001) due 
to lack of awareness and/or enforcement of state controls. Traditional land and 
resource management is still an important element of CBNRM in many countries 
of West Africa. In most cases, village elders (such as the stools or skins in Ghana 
(Kasanga & Kotey 2001)) have overall administrative rights over community land, 
and oversee the heads of lineages groups (e.g. hennu in Benin (Edja, 2001)), 
and the heads of households, who are in charge of family land use and rights. 
Often the use of specific resources (such as certain fruit tree species or wildlife) 
is forbidden within the community (Symon, 2006). These systems of tenure and 
Box 19. Game ranching in West Africa: The Nazinga Reserve, 
Burkina Faso
Burkina Faso’s Nazinga Game Ranch is the only functioning game ranch in West Africa. It was 
established in 1979 by the Burkina Faso government in collaboration with the African Wildlife 
Husbandry Development Association, with the following objectives:
n To ensure protection of wildlife threatened by poaching and agricultural encroachment
n To create jobs by integrating the local populations into management of the ranch.
n To provide animal protein for local people through cropping of wild game species.
After serious initial conflicts with the local communities and a large amount of intial investment, 
the Nazinga Game Ranch is now able to cover its running costs from revenue generated from sale 
of meat and other animal products, sports hunting and tourism. Game meat is mainly derived 
from the warthog, Phacochoerus aethiopicus, but also from other ungulates. Local hunters are 
trained to cull the larger game on a strict quota system about 5% of the population of each 
species. Local people also act as guides and helpers for sport hunters, and part of the revenue 
from sport hunting and tourism is paid to the local communities.
Source: FAO (1999).
project at the Nazinga reserve in Burkina Faso (Box 19) as well as village stays and 
local guiding around Pendjari in Benin. 
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use can exist for specific resources, such as the fishing systems and master of 
waters seen in Mali (Kassibo, 2002). Ghana has a tradition of small community-
managed ‘no take’ areas, known as ‘sacred groves. These are natural areas 
protected by communities from extraction, often because they are thought to be 
the location of a deity, an ancient burial ground, or the location of an old village, 
and therefore containing ancestral spirits (Symon, 2006). A study of sacred groves 
in the country of Ghana showed that every rural village in the survey had at least 
one sacred grove, though some consisted of no more than a few trees (Blench 
2004). These groves are thought to constitute the bulk of the 1% of forest that 
exists outside PAs and forest reserves (GBBP 2008). 
3.6 Summary: the diverse Pan-African experience
It is clear from the overview presented in this chapter that the nature of CBNRM 
varies enormously from region to region, country to country, and place to 
place and is shaped by a number of factors – not least the historical political 
structures in which it developed. In some cases the original crafting of reforms 
developed locally, such as the devolution of wildlife management to commercial 
farmers in Zimbabwe and Namibia during the period of minority rule, which 
laid the foundations for subsequent CBNRM initiatives. In other cases CBNRM 
programmes have been heavily influenced by external, more global actors, 
such as the French school of geographical thinking which led to the Gestion de 
Terroirs approach becoming adopted as a management strategy in West Africa 
(Basset et al., 2007), donor agencies such as USAID which has funded CBNRM 
programmes in several countries of Southern Africa, and regional organisations, 
such as CARPE and ECOFAC, which have been the largest funders of CBNRM 
and land tenure policy reforms in Central Africa. 
While this review focuses on ‘formal’ CBNRM initiatives, as exemplified by 
donor-funded or government-administered programmes and projects, it is clear 
that communal management of natural resources remains central to livelihoods, 
national economies, and environmental conservation across large areas of the 
sub-continent. This ‘traditional’ communal management takes many forms and 
is extremely difficult to analyse – as local resource management systems are 
often largely informal, resting on local norms, beliefs, and customs – but it is 
a critical element of CBNRM in practice across sub-Saharan Africa. Often these 
locally adaptive systems of resource use and governance are under growing 
threat from external economic and political forces that threaten local resource 
tenure and access.
The influence of the private sector, conservation and donors
As we have noted, the historical, political and governance context of each 
state provides the dominant influences on how CBNRM evolves. Three other 
key variables seem to emerge from the regional reviews that also have a 
significant bearing.
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First, the private sector has had an important role in the development of CBNRM. 
In Eastern and Southern Africa the tourism industry has driven the prominent 
role played by wildlife in many CBNRM projects. This is not the case in West 
and Central Africa, where tourism has not flourished as a result of generally 
poor infrastructure and ecological conditions for tourism, when compared 
to many East and Southern African countries. The timber industry has had a 
major influence on NRM in Central and West Africa but has not facilitated the 
development of CBNRM, with few examples of timber companies encouraging 
community-based timber management. By contrast, there is evidence that 
lucrative, centralised timber concessions provide disincentives to granting greater 
rights over forests to local communities in the region (Oyono, 2004).
Similarly, donor agencies – and other external support agents such as NGOs 
– influence the shape and agenda of CBNRM programmes. Official aid agencies 
changed their policies significantly in the late 1990s to focus on poverty reduction 
as a priority. Where they might have previously funded community-based 
conservation initiatives as part of a broad sustainable development agenda, they 
now expect their interventions to deliver much more significantly in terms of 
economic development goals. This can be seen in the increasing emphasis on 
development in the Namibian conservancies programme discussed above, which 
reflected changing priorities within USAID during the 1990s.
Finally, regional patterns also emerge in the relationship between CBNRM and 
biodiversity conservation. CBNRM in Southern Africa has clearly revolved around 
wildlife management in rural areas, and in some cases, particularly Namibia and 
Zimbabwe, localized wildlife management has become a strong compliment to 
traditional protected areas in terms of conserving wildlife and other biodiversity. 
In Central Africa, CBNRM is linked to conservation through park outreach 
schemes and community conservation areas. In contrast, in West Africa the focus 
of CBNRM (and particularly the Gestion de Terroir approach) is more on land 
decentralisation and sustainable management of natural resources in general, 
rather than biodiversity in particular.
Institutional arrangements for CBNRM across sub-Saharan Africa
A fundamental issue for CBNRM across sub-Saharan Africa’s diverse national 
and sub-national settings is the policy and legal framework within which 
resource governance operates. These are far from the only issues determining 
the nature and outcomes of CBNRM – the historical and socio-political 
context also needs to be taken into consideration and plays a profound role in 
determining the shape of CBNRM, the way it evolves, and its impacts (Box 20). 
This is discussed in the next chapter. Nevertheless, a review of the policy and 
legal framework provides insights to the extent to which CBNRM is recognised 
at state level (at least in rhetoric if not in practice) and the extent to which it 
addresses broad natural resource management or is simply an “add on” to state 
conservation policy revolving around protected areas. It also helps shed light on 
the policy and institutional reforms that have contributed to changing CBNRM 
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outcomes – in terms of empowerment effects, economic and environmental 
impacts, as discussed in Chapter 4. A summary of policy and legal provisions is 
provided in Annex 1.
Box 20. Reforming natural resource governance: Policies, laws,  
and beyond
A great deal of the discourse on CBNRM, as in the wider realms of environment and 
development, focuses on ‘policy reform’. In discussing the ways that rights over resources are 
exercised, it is useful to distinguish between policies and laws, and to clarify the way they both 
affect governance arrangements. 
Policies are effectively a statement of government’s intentions, strategy, and overall vision for 
a given sector. Policies are not legally binding and do not shape the rules that govern who can 
use resources and how they may do so. Those rules are created by laws, and subsidiary laws 
termed regulations which are functionally equivalent but generally do not require legislative 
approval to take legal force. Laws provide the basic definitions of rights and responsibilities, 
allocating those rights and responsibilities among different actors within government and within 
society. Constitutions, which define the basic rights of citizens and governing architecture of 
nation-states and other major organizational and membership-based bodies, are higher-order 
institutions which provide the parameters that laws must conform to and comply with. 
Importantly, governance is not merely contingent on institutions such as policies, laws, and 
Constitutions. These institutions establish the formal ‘rules of the game’ in terms of how 
rights over natural resources are defined and exercised. However, these rules depend on other 
institutions and organizations for their enforcement, such as courts of law as well as various 
bureaucratic agencies. In much of sub-Saharan Africa, the rule of law is relatively weak, meaning 
that formal institutions play a limited role in determining how resources are used and decisions 
made. Informal, extra-legal factors such as personal or economic relationships and interests, 
kinship or ethnic ties, and cultural norms may play a much greater role than formal institutions. 
These distinctions are important when considering how rights over resources are determined 
and exercised, and when framing issues relating to natural resource tenure reform and 
institutional change.
Annex 1 reveals the great diversity of laws and policies relating to CBNRM across 
Africa. Furthermore, the regional overviews presented in this chapter demonstrate 
that resource management in practice is a function not only of laws and policies, 
but also of how these articulate with local historical and ecological circumstances. 
Indeed, many of the formal tenure arrangements as reviewed in Annex 1 simply 
do not apply at the local level where traditional or informal systems dominate. 
Whilst this diversity makes it difficult to seek out unifying trends, it is possible to 
identify certain important patterns. 
n Formal land tenure arrangements differ a great deal across Africa (Toulmin 
and Quan, 2000). In many cases states retain formal ownership of all land 
(e.g. Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mali), whereas in a 
few countries there is strong private freehold land tenure dating back to the 
colonial era (e.g. Kenya, South Africa) but in most countries the dominant 
trend is state ownership with varying degrees of local recognition of tenure 
rights (whether de jure or de facto) (Alden Wily, 2008).
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n Many African states have embraced the rhetoric, and to varying degrees 
the practice, of decentralisation, often in broad domains and not limited to 
natural resource management (Ribot, 2003). This can be realized through 
the recognition of traditional authorities over land and other issues, as in the 
Stools of Ghana (Kasanga and Kotey 2001) or by decentralisation of resource 
management to newly created bodies, such as the Commission Villageoise 
de Gestion des Terroirs in Burkina Faso (Burkina Faso, 1989), which have no 
traditional homologue. In many cases, however, this policy rhetoric is not 
evident in practice. As many observers have noted, governments around the 
world have adopted the rhetoric of decentralisation, devolution, and local 
empowerment, but rarely has such language been matched by the depth of 
institutional reforms (Batterbury and Fernando, 2006; Nelson and Agrawal, 
2008; Ribot, 2004). An important question for CBNRM revolves around how 
formal institutional reforms relating to the management of wildlife, forests, 
and fisheries can be better integrated with the everyday forms of informal 
collective resource management that continue to be an important part of 
African economies and societies
n With or without formal decentralization processes, a balance is often struck 
between formal (either state or private) and traditional or customary land 
tenure, and this varies on a continuum from de facto traditional tenure 
resulting from a failure of the state to enforce formal regimes (e.g. Democratic 
Republic of Congo; Debroux et al, 2007), through to explicit recognition of 
traditional tenure arrangements in law (e.g. Ghana; (Kasanga and Kotey 2001). 
It should be noted, however, that understandings of ‘traditional’ tenure vary a 
great deal from place to place, and can be highly controversial. For example, 
the legitimacy of ‘traditional’ governance institutions is often contested in 
countries where such institutions were defined (and often established) by 
colonial administrations as tools for indirect rule. Such ‘traditional’ institutions, 
it may be argued, are not be traditional at all, but have been fundamentally 
shaped through the patronage bestowed on individuals or groups by colonial 
and post-colonial governments for political reasons (Mamdani, 1996). 
n There is often a vast gap between policy rhetoric and on the ground practice 
as a result of lack of implementing legislation or enforcement of existing laws 
– either through weak institutional capacity or through poor governance – lack 
of political will, vested interests and absence of rule of law. In many African 
countries informal institutions dominate and formal law is often disregarded 
– or at best less significant than these other ‘hidden’ institutions (Hyden, 
2008). This high degree of informality underlies the region’s generally high 
levels of corruption, with the importance of informal patronage in structuring 
political power in African countries playing a central role in the region’s 
governance dynamics (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; van de Walle, 2001). Notably, 
it is in southern African countries with highly exceptional levels of government 
transparency and low corruption – particularly Namibia, South Africa, and 
Botswana – where some of the most substantial and instructive CBNRM 
reforms have occurred (Nelson and Agrawal, 2008).
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n Formal laws and policies relevant to CBNRM within countries can be somewhat 
contradictory (see Box 20 – on policy, legislation, governance etc). For example, 
Uganda has actively adopted decentralisation of state services to the district 
level but retains highly centralised control over most wildlife resources through 
the national Uganda Wildlife Authority. Similarly, Tanzania has devolved 
considerable authority over land and forest management to the village level 
whilst simultaneously introducing new regulations governing tourism on 
community lands that result in a re-centralisation of resource-derived revenues 
(TNRF, 2008).
 
n Reforms – or retrenchments – in sectoral government policy on natural 
resource management can act as either an enabler or barrier for CBNRM, 
but as the regional overviews illustrate, land tenure arrangements can 
make even the most enlightened CBNRM initiatives unviable. The Tanzanian 
experience is also illustrative – the notable successes of participatory forest 
management would not have emerged without a local governance and land 
tenure framework being in place to enable tenure over forests to be granted 
to defined groups (villages) with defined land areas (village lands; Alden Wily 
and Mbaya, 2001). The lack of defined village-level local governance and land 
tenure entities in Zimbabwe in the 1980’s was a major factor in the subsequent 
evolution of the CAMPFIRE programme, in its decision to vest authority over 
wildlife with Rural District Councils (Murphree, 2005). 
n Laws specific to CBNRM are unusual, and in all cases the legal framework 
for CBNRM emerges from a bundle of sectoral legislation relating to issues 
such as local government, land, forests, wildlife and fisheries. These can be 
very complex (e.g. Malawi, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon), contributing to the policy 
contradictions noted above. In countries with very high levels of forest cover, 
provisions for CBNRM can to some extent be made through a single piece 
of sectoral legislation, because issues of land and wildlife converge within 
forestry legislation (e.g. Republic of the Congo, Guinea). However, even here 
there can be contradictions, as in Liberia where post-conflict land reforms 
strengthening the land rights of forest dwellers has met resistance from the 
forestry bureaucracy.
n Finally, there are several examples of coordinated national level CBNRM 
programmes, often developed in partnership with major donor agencies 
(e.g. USAID projects in Namibia and Malawi). In some cases these have been 
influenced by existing programmes in other countries, such as the Namibian 
conservancies program which explicitly built on lessons learned from the 
earlier CAMPFIRE program in Zimbabwe. Similarly, the Gestion de Terroirs 
approach initiated in Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso grew out of the Terroirs 
approach developed by French geographers in the 1960s, but was to some 
extent inspired by CAMPFIRE (Bassett et al., 2007). Examples of these are 
provided in Table 5.
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Region Protected Areas 
outreach
Collaborative 
management
Community-based 
management 
Central Africa5 Most formal CBNRM 
in the region is park 
outreach around 
strict protected 
areas, with no real 
community control 
Several countries have legal 
framework for community 
forestry, but limited progress 
on the ground.
CCAs emerging in 
DRC 
East Africa Revenue sharing in 
Uganda, Rwanda, 
Kenya, and Tanzania 
Beach Management 
Units and limited access 
to resources within PAs 
in Uganda. Wildlife 
Management Areas in 
Tanzania. Joint forest 
management in Tanzania, 
Kenya, and Ethiopia
Community Based 
Forest Management 
in Tanzania. 
Communities 
entering joint venture 
partnerships with 
tourism operators on 
their land in Kenya 
and Tanzania
Southern Africa Limited. Forestry in 
Mozambique where 
large populations 
live in PAs
Co-management of South 
African Contractual Parks. 
Fisheries in Malawi
Various national 
programmes 
giving wildlife 
management rights 
(in varying degrees) 
to communities (e.g. 
Zimbabwe, Namibia, 
Botswana).
West Africa Limited. Zoning for 
pastoral activities in 
buffer of W Regional 
Park; Village Hunting 
Zones in Benin
Decentralisation of resource 
management (but not 
ownership) through Gestion 
de terroirs approach (e.g. 
Cote D’Ivoire, Burkina Faso). 
Some sectoral policies 
encouraging participation 
– eg wildlife in Burkina Faso 
and Benin
CREMA programme 
in Ghana
Table 5. Different regional approaches to community 
involvement in natural resource management
5. The columns for co-management and community management are, to a significant degree, transferable for 
Central Africa – eg CCAs are often based on a co-management approach but include some more devolved 
examples. Community forestry includes the principle of devolution in policy rhetoric but in practice is more like 
co-management.
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What has CBNRM achieved in Africa? 
The ‘3Es’ – empowerment, economics, 
environment
Murphree (2008b) identifies three ‘pillars’ by which the viability of CBNRM 
programmes can be evaluated: conservation, benefits and empowerment. 
There are, however, potential tensions between these pillars. The generation of 
economic benefits, for example, is often an essential incentive for conservation, 
but increasing resource-based revenues can also stimulate increased local 
competition and potentially concentration of benefits (so-called ‘elite capture’). 
When benefits become concentrated in local elites in a way that violates local 
social norms and undermines collective action, it can work against the basic 
tenets and assumptions of CBNRM. Similarly, as resources become more valuable 
through CBNRM, there may be increasing interest at the national or district level 
in capturing community revenue streams. In this section we build on the three 
pillars framework to explore the impacts of CBNRM – focusing on empowerment 
impacts, economic impacts and environmental impacts – and the interactions 
between these. 
4.1 Empowerment
As Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen (2000) has argued, development is as much 
about empowering people to take charge of their own lives and futures 
as it is about economic welfare, per se. In sub-Saharan Africa, poverty and 
underdevelopment are closely related to the disempowerment and political 
marginalization of people, particularly rural communities, that has occurred since 
the colonial era. Many commentators argue that community empowerment 
is one of the greatest impacts of CBNRM (e.g. see Arntzen et al., 2003; WRI, 
2005) – far exceeding any economic or environmental benefits. 
n In the Luangwa Valley in Zambia, Dalal-Clayton and Child (2003) suggests that 
possibly more important than tangible benefits are the organisational capacity 
and empowerment effects created by the process of revenue distribution 
– which involves regular elections, bank accounts, audits, and a high level of 
participation in decision-making by villagers.
n In Tanzania, the Village Council budget of Ololosokwan village, Ngorongoro 
District, increased from about US$ 2,500 in 1995-1997 to nearly US$ 60,000 
by 2003 as a result of the development of several village-private sector tourism 
agreements in the intervening period (Nelson and Ole Makko, 2005). This 
precipitated a great increase in the capacity of the village to invest in social 
Aurélie Binot, Tom Blomley, Lauren Coad, 
Fred Nelson, Dilys Roe and Chris Sandbrook 
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services and provide local benefits to village residents. It also increased the 
capacity of the village to advocate for its land and resource rights, using the 
financial capital from tourism to develop political capital in the struggle over 
land and resource tenure. 
n In West Africa, one of the main advantages from land decentralisation is cited 
as the strengthening of community borders from outside resource use and 
economic migration (Ibo, 1997b; Stamm, 2000). By mapping and enforcing 
community boundaries, communities are provided with legal backing to prevent 
entry to, and use of, their lands. 
n In the DRC, CCAs have been established under the request of local 
communities, with the aim of protecting their territory from external 
degradation (either from displaced communities, economic migration, or 
commercial logging). 
However, CBNRM may or may not strengthen local level governance institutions. 
In Botswana, there have been repeated instances of local trusts embezzling 
or mismanaging revenue from wildlife-based enterprises, which Rihoy and 
Maguranyanga (2007) attribute both to the role played by local elites and the way 
CBNRM has been facilitated, with a lack of long-term investment in building local 
capacity. In Kenya, pastoralist Group Ranches have repeatedly failed as collective 
resource governance institutions, leading communities to individualize formerly 
communal pastures and seek new, generally smaller collective landholding 
arrangements (Mwangi, 2007). In Tanzania, there are examples of villages 
transparently managing tourism revenues but also of villages with sustained 
records of misuse of funds, thereby undermining the potential for wildlife-
based revenues to generate collective incentives for conservation (Sachedina 
and Nelson, In press). In West Africa, mapping and enforcing community 
boundaries for land registration can enhance the ability of communities to  
prevent external exploitation of their land, but where the national infrastructure 
for implementing decentralisation policy is weak, new laws on land tenure can 
serve to add further confusion to an already pluralistic system and potentially 
further weaken traditional community management. For instance, in Cote d’Ivoire, 
weak enforcement of national tenure policies, coupled with a high demand for 
land has created new ‘intermediate’ institutions, falling between ‘traditional’ and 
‘state’ tenure laws (Stamm, 2000). Similar weakening of traditional structures 
can be seen in Central Africa; in Gabon state ownership of the forest has eroded 
the traditional system, which relied on perceived clan and family ownership and 
power in order to demarcate and enforce hunting and agricultural boundaries 
(Pourtier, 1989; Starkey, 2004). 
Certainly, local governance is no panacea for institutional transparency and equity. 
In Tanzania, Brockington (2008) reviews village governance in Rukwa region, and 
describes multiple incidences of coercion, criminality, lack of transparency, fraud, 
and high levels of taxation with no corresponding level of investment. 
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Although there are widespread cases of mismanagement, fraud, and relatively 
dysfunctional collective governance at the local level, it is important to recognize 
that governance is an adaptive social process. Transparent collective local 
governance institutions are highly unlikely to emerge overnight, particularly where 
institutions are newly created, and take time to evolve. This has been one of the 
main lessons of CBNRM throughout sub-Saharan Africa. In Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE 
programme, for example, there are numerous cases of communities going 
through phases of strong local management alternating with periods of lower 
transparency and higher elite capture (Taylor and Murphree, 2007). These phases 
are also influenced by governance dynamics at non-local scales, such as changing 
national political conditions (Rihoy et al., 2007). Local systems of accountable 
governance take time to evolve, as mechanisms of accountability develop and are 
adapted to local social norms. For example, Lund and Treue (2008) in their review 
of community-based forest management in Mfyome village, Iringa, Tanzania, cite 
examples of corrupt village government officers being ejected from management 
committees after reports of embezzlement. 
A key issue for CBNRM reforms’ impacts on local governance and the 
empowerment of rural citizens lies in considering not only the degree to which 
power is being transferred to the local level, but also the degree to which the 
recipients of decentralised authority are accountable and democratic. Mamdani 
(1996) argues that many local government authorities, including local actors often 
framed as ‘traditional’ rulers by colonial administrators, in African states amount 
to forms of ‘decentralized despotism’. Ribot (2004) builds on this work in pointing 
out that decentralisation of NRM may or may not be democratic, depending 
on whether or not powers are transferred to downwardly accountable local 
institutions. CBNRM is premised on local collective action driven by shared benefits, 
and the local institutional landscape is critical to enabling such cooperation.
Who gets empowered?
African societies, whether traditional or modern, are usually not homogenous 
or strictly egalitarian communities, but are subject to a wide range of social and 
economic forms of differentiation. CBNRM is about fostering collective action 
for governing natural resources at the local level, but it is virtually inevitable that 
such collective action will benefit some local actors more than others. CBNRM 
initiatives should take care to be aware of these local forms of differentiation and 
exclusion, and to ensure equity and inclusiveness where possible, but it is highly 
unlikely that CBNRM itself can or should correct all local forms of inequality, some 
of which may be strongly grounded in local social norms and beliefs. However, 
it is essential for CBNRM efforts to be cognizant of the ways that interventions, 
particularly those that seek to create new resource management institutions, 
may be biased towards particular social groups or elites, and how new resource 
governance measures may distribute costs and benefits in differential ways. 
n For example, many countries in West Africa have embarked on – or fully 
established – decentralisation policies and increasing local level structures are 
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being established for NRM. At the same time, traditional land and resource 
management systems have persisted in the region – often due to the weakness 
of the state government and low levels of awareness and enforcement of 
state policy. The new institutions set up under the decentralisation process 
undoubtedly empower local communities with newfound rights over resources – 
but at the same time can undermine and disempower existing local institutions.
 
n In Cameroon the current reforms to the Forest Code, although providing 
communities with rights to manage their own forests, can often clash with 
traditional forestry laws and traditional power structures. In the case of the 
Ngola-Achip Community Forest in East Cameroon, established in 2001, Kenneth 
(2006) argues that communities need to create a legalised association in order 
to create a forest reserve; these new power structures can disrupt traditional 
management structures, creating a new ‘elite’ within the village.
n In Cote d’Ivoire, Stamm (2000) reports a clash between statutory and customary 
institutions noting in particular the undermining of traditional authorities by  
new power structures and groups, and the undermining of local rules by 
state laws, especially regarding restricting community land access to outsiders 
(Stamm, 2000). 
Empowerment of one community or social group can have negative impacts on 
other groups. In West Africa, for example, mapping of tenure rights, which is 
part of the decentralisation process has meant that economic migrants (often 
moving from northern countries into the Gulf of Guinea) can lose tenure rights 
in their own community (IIED, 1999), and, as outsiders, be denied access to 
new communities. Pastoralists, who can clash with static village communities 
over land use, are often marginalised further by decentralisation policies, which 
often view land management in terroirs or parcels of land. A key element of 
many land tenure policies in West Africa is the concept of mise en valeur or 
the requirement to put land to productive use in order to retain rights. This is 
particularly problematic for pastoralists as definitions of productive use are often 
based on cultivation and the establishment of infrastructure, e.g. the tilling of 
fields, digging wells, putting up fences etc. Pastoral land use does not lend itself 
to these kinds of requirements so a broader definition of mise en valeur which 
takes into account mobile livestock production is necessary. An important advance 
for pastoral land tenure is the concept of terroir d’attache. For instance, the Rural 
Code in Niger states that herders have a right to use rangelands in common and 
that herders can obtain recognition of priority rights on their home areas (terroir 
d’attache). This includes both land and water rights. 
Differences in land use and power between ethnic groups can also result 
in one group succeeding in securing land rights over another, as a result of 
decentralisation policies. For example, in Central Africa one of the ethnic groups 
that are often disaffected by decentralisation are the Ba’aka (Joiris, 2000), due to 
their often remote and nomadic way of living, and the perception of pygmies as 
Community management of natural resources in Africa

a ‘lesser’ ethnic group by many Bantu groups. Women are also often negatively 
impacted by land registration, when they have indirect (patrilineal) access to 
land through their husbands, and so can lose land rights with registration. In 
matrilineal situations land registration may not prove detrimental (IIED, 1999); 
however, patrilineal inheritance seems to be the dominant form in West and 
Central Africa. In Benin, Mongbo (2008) found that in two case-study villages 
the creation of community forest management committees were causing friction 
between younger and elder members of the community; elder members still 
wished to run committees using traditional ways, which include myth and local 
religion, whereas younger members no longer believed in these older traditions 
after a recent movement in the community towards Christianity. 
The phenomenon of ‘elite capture’ where the most powerful or richest members 
of a community are able to seize a disproportionate level of power and/or 
benefits can constrain or undermine the intended outcomes of CBNRM. For 
example, decentralisation in Mali provides an example of how village councils 
can strengthen the local elite, rather than providing a community voice. Under 
the 1991 decentralisation decrees in Mali, fishing councils were set up at regional 
levels, and management committees in villages. However, the local fishing chiefs 
ji tigi are often elected into the regional council positions – due to their local 
influence, which has resulted in the most powerful members of the community 
strengthening their voice in decision-making (Kassibo, 2002).
In Kenya, the Group Ranch structure of land and resource management has 
proven to be highly susceptible to control by local elites, who have tended to 
reward themselves with allocation of lands and revenues in many areas, thereby 
converting communal property to individual property (Mwangi, 2007; Thompson 
and Homewood, 2002). In Tanzania, increasing local revenues have often resulted 
in local disputes over financial allocation, or a general emergence of patterns of 
non-transparent fiscal management (Sachedina, 2008). In the same area, though, 
there are cases of local communities consistently holding leadership accountable 
through electoral and social sanctions (Nelson and Ole Makko, 2005). This reveals 
the inherent variability in local governance performance that is a feature of 
CBNRM, as with governance in human societies in general. 
Elite capture is not always considered as a bad thing. During the Makuleke land 
claim process in South Africa there was conflict between the traditional chief and the 
new, democratic Common Property Association which had instituted the land claim. 
In this case, the royal family received a lot of benefits from the Common Property 
Association, but most people in the community were happy with that and felt the 
royal family were the rightful beneficiaries (Collins and Snel, 2008). Furthermore, 
elite capture at the local level as a result of CBNRM may simply be replacing the 
elite capture that would have occurred at district or national levels in the absence of 
CBNRM. Any analysis of the success of failure of CBNRM in a particular location or 
context thus needs always to take account of the counter-factual – what would have 
happened in the absence of CBNRM and would it have been any better?
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Empowerment through changing rights 
One mechanism for empowering communities is to strengthen their legal rights 
over land and resources. The summary of the policy and legal framework for 
CBNRM in different countries presented in Annex 1 reveals a huge variation in the 
degree to which control over land and resources remains centralised or has been 
devolved to community level. Overall, however, several main institutional trends 
predominate in sub-Saharan Africa (as in many parts of Asia and Latin America; 
Ribot, 2004; Ribot et al., 2006).
n  First, nearly all African countries have been influenced by historical trends 
during both colonial and post-colonial periods which served to centralise 
authority over lands and resources, and effectively dispossessed local 
communities (Alden Wily, 2008). 
n Second, during the past twenty years there have been widespread reforms 
calling for decentralisation and devolution of rights over lands and natural 
resources. These reforms have occurred and often been closely associated with 
the introduction of broader political democratisation reforms in sub-Saharan 
Africa, or occurred in contexts of major political changes such as the ends of 
civil wars or the overthrow of autocratic regimes. 
n Third, although CBNRM reforms have been widely promoted, in the vast 
majority of cases the constitutional or legislative changes required to 
decentralise authority over resources have been much more truncated than 
reformist rhetoric, and in some cases reformist policy rhetoric has been followed 
by re-consolidated central control. A problem in many CBNRM interventions 
has been conflating policy reform with governance reform; policy statements 
are only one element of governance, and far less important than legislative or 
constitutional changes that provide the basis for citizens’ rights and privileges. 
In East Africa, for example, despite sweeping reforms across the region since  
the late 1980s, major gaps remain between policy and practice in NRM (Barrow  
et al., 2000). In large measure, these gaps are not simply a failure of governments 
Box 21. Do joint ventures encourage elite capture?
In Botswana a model for formal CBNRM that has been widely promoted allows communities to 
enter into a joint venture agreement with the private sector around hunting and/or tourism. It 
has been argued that this arrangement has created opportunities for elite capture of benefits, 
which has limited the impacts of wildlife revenues at the local level (Madzudzo et al., 2006).
However, as Rihoy and Maguranyanga (2007) note, one of the main drivers of this type of 
monopolization of joint ventures in Botswana by elites has also been inadequate commitment 
to local capacity building through long-term technical support. Where initial community-
based management structures are established as new, unfamiliar entities, major investments 
need to be made in capacity-building and ensuring broad local awareness of local rights and 
responsibilities in order to encourage accountability of new management structures.
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to implement ‘good’ policy, but reflect the prevalence of informal institutions in 
ordering these societies, a general weakness of the rule of law, and generally 
patronage-based governance throughout contemporary Eastern Africa (see 
Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Kellsall, 2008). In Tanzania, vested political-economic 
interests in the logging and charcoal trade, both at national and local government 
levels, appears to be having a negative impact on communities’ abilities to secure 
rights over and benefit from forests (Milledge et al., 2007). In the wildlife sector, 
policies designed to devolve authority over wildlife passed in the late 1990’s have 
gradually been replaced by measures to centralise control over wildlife-based 
revenues generated on community lands (Nelson et al., 2007). For example, recent 
Ministerial regulations require tourism companies to cease paying villages directly 
for access to village lands and re-route all revenues through the Wildlife Division, 
and have led to considerable debate over who should benefit from wildlife and 
tourism investments on community lands (TNRF, 2008). 
Similar tensions over the benefits derived from valuable natural resources are 
prevalent elsewhere:
n In many Central African countries timber often contributes a significant 
portion of national GDP. As a result, forests have overwhelmingly remained 
state property, and forest concessions are sold to mainly international timber 
companies, providing important government revenues (FAO, 2006; Forest 
Monitor, 2001). Many countries in Central Africa have provision for community 
forests, but in practice few have been established or managed (with the 
exception of Cameroon).
n In Southern Africa Mozambique provides a case in point, where despite policy 
reform processes that favour CBNRM, the state has retained control over 
the most valuable natural resources (timber, tourist areas). The lack of real 
devolution of authority reflects a combination of many processes witnessed 
elsewhere including power struggles and elite capture (Anstey, 2005) coupled 
with the weakness of the justice system in terms of making ‘rights’ practically 
defensible (Nhantumbo and Anstey, 2007). 
n In Botswana, the new CBNRM policy channels up to 65% of revenue from 
wildlife on community lands to a centralized trust fund, whereas for many 
years communities that established CBOs and obtained wildlife user rights 
were entitled to 100% of the revenues derived from third-party contracts  
and lease agreements.
Poor law enforcement, often resulting from weak rule of law, can also make 
enlightened policy largely irrelevant. In Equatorial Guinea, for example, the forest 
law has, since its inception in 1948, provided for community participation in 
forest management. Currently 70 per cent of the taxes from forest production 
in the communal forests are expected to go towards projects that benefit the 
local communities (FAO, 2006). In practice, however, enforcement of the legal 
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requirements of forestry companies is thought to be virtually non-existent, due 
to a lack of Ministry staff and capacity for the adequate monitoring logging 
activities, and enforcement of forestry laws (Forests Monitor, 2001). 
Box 22. How much devolution is enough?
There has been substantial debate in the Southern African region on the appropriate extent of 
devolution for successful CBNRM – inspired to some extent because of perceived limitations 
of the CAMPFIRE programme in Zimbabwe due to its failure to devolve authority fully to 
the community level. For example, Murombedzi (2001) argued that CAMPFIRE “has not 
sufficiently devolved rights in wildlife to local communities….the top-down preferences of 
central government on communities have merely been replaced by the top-down preferences 
of local governments on communities.” The key problem as identified by many such analyses of 
CAMPFIRE at the time, was that proprietorship over wildlife was decentralized to RDCs, rather 
than, as CAMPRIRE’s initial proponents had hoped and intended, to the local communities living 
alongside wildlife themselves (see also Murphree, 2005). 
 
Some argue that CBNRM cannot work without full devolution to the community level (Balint 
and Bond, Submitted; Dalal-Clayton and Child, 2003; Jones and Murphree, 2001; Musumali 
et al., 2007). In contrast, others argue that full devolution may bring problems because 
community institutions are fragile and require ongoing external support (e.g. Mahenye 
in Zimbabwe; Balint and Mashinya, 2006). Carrere (2007) observed in the community 
forests of Melombo, Cameroon, that communities found it hard to prevent illegal logging 
without government authority, and most communities required support from local NGOs or 
government to run the forestry business effectively. Other scholars in Southern Africa have 
recently argued that because having strong relationships with higher levels of government can 
help to buffer local level institutions against political moves towards recentralisation, even weak 
forms of decentralised authority to the district level may help communities access benefits from 
resources and secure rights over time (Rihoy et al., 2007; Rihoy and Maguranyanga, 2007). 
Shackleton et al. (2002) note that one problem is that different stakeholders have different 
visions and experiences of devolution and emphasise that “A shared framework, more 
accountable to local livelihood needs and people’s rights to self-determination, is required. 
Careful re-assessment of the state’s claim to be protecting the wider ‘public interest’ forms part 
of this process.” 
Legal rights are not enough
Legal rights, it is clear, are not enough, and need to be set in the broader 
historical and political context of each country. Nelson and Agrawal (2008) 
describe for example that institutional reforms devolving rights to the local 
level have been relatively more successful in countries where public institutions 
are relatively efficient and the rule of law operates – for example Namibia, 
Botswana, and pre-crisis Zimbabwe. These, they argue, are not the norm across 
sub-Saharan Africa – where in general state institutions are characterised 
by patrimonial relationships and weak rule of law: “In these countries, the 
devolution of valuable natural resources such as wildlife to the local level 
is fundamentally at odds with the interests and incentives that dominate 
governance processes” (Nelson and Agrawal, 2008).
Much depends on the robustness of community organisations (new or old) and 
their ability to adapt and respond to internal and external pressures. Russell and 
Dobson (In press) argue that “social embeddedness and the willingness/ability of 
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an institution to address threats posed by social and ecological shocks are critical 
to the long-term resilience of any…institution.” This is exemplified by Botswana, 
where Arntzen et al. (2003) note: “The inconsistent performance of older and 
more recently established CBOs shows that organisational capacity changes over 
the life-time of organisations, and is determined by the ability of organisations to 
effectively respond to the challenges they meet in both their internal and external 
environment.” Equally in Tanzania, Nelson and Ole Makko (2005) note that in 
some places poor fiscal management has become entrenched, while in others the 
oversight capacity of the Village Assembly has evolved and accountability between 
the Village Council and Village Assembly has improved in an iterative manner. 
Box 23. Working with existing institutions or building new ones?
CBNRM programmes vary in the extent to which they establish new community institutions or 
build on existing institutions. In Tanzania, for example, the basis for local collective decision-making 
is the Village Council and Village Assembly, institutions established in the mid-1970s and given 
authority over village lands through the 1999 Land Act and Village Land Act (Alden Wily and 
Mbaya, 2001). Private sector-community partnerships in tourism use this existing local governance 
framework, as does the official framework for CBFM defined by the Forest Act of 2002. The WMA 
system, however, requires the formation of a new entity, a supra-village CBO that becomes, once 
the WMA is gazetted, a so-called ‘Authorized Association’ (AA). The rationale for the creation of 
this new institution is that in almost all cases, WMAs cover a number of individual village areas (in 
practice ranging from 2 to more than 25 villages). The establishment of this CBO/AA has been one 
of the more contentious aspects of WMA establishment in some communities, particularly those 
where wildlife-based tourism has been established under existing village government structures 
and communities are reluctant to shift power upwards to an unfamiliar new entity where lines of 
accountability to the Village Assembly are unclear and untested (see Nelson, 2007; TNRF, 2008). 
The degree to which WMAs build local capacity or weaken local resource governance capacity, 
by shifting authority over large areas from Village Councils to CBOs/AAs, remains unknown and 
is a key concern regarding WMAs going forward (TNRF, 2008). There is already wide anecdotal 
evidence that WMAs are prone to manipulation and control by district-level authorities, due to the 
relatively weak links between Village Assemblies and the CBO/AA management bodies.
The institutional basis for CBFM in Tanzania contrasts sharply with that of community wildlife 
management. Rather than the formation of a separate (and potentially competitive) local institution, 
the forest law integrates forest management responsibilities within the context of elected village 
governments. Where more than one village share the management of a single forest area, it is 
common to see the development of a resource-wide institution constituted from individual village 
governments, which provides a forum for linkage and co-ordination. 
In West Africa, decentralisation committees can clash with traditional community systems; village 
communities are often run using traditional beliefs and religions, which are often used for crime 
prevention/systems of peacekeeping. New decentralisation laws and committees can cause friction 
between younger members of the community, who move towards decentralisation, and the older 
members, who keep with traditional beliefs and laws (Engberg-Pedersen, 1995; Mongbo, 2008).
In Kenya, communities themselves have established new collective resource management systems. 
The limitations of the Group Ranch structure (particularly local elite capture described above) has 
meant that collective mechanisms for rangeland management in parts of Kenya (mainly the wildlife-
rich southern rangelands of Kajiado and Narok Districts) have largely given way to individualized 
landholding patterns. However, local groups have sought to address the ecological problems 
inherent in fragmentation by re-aggregating properties for purposes of both livestock management 
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as well as wildlife/tourism ventures (BurnSilver and Mwangi, 2007; Thompson et al., 2009) and 
developing new collective structures such as shareholding corporations, local membership-based 
trusts, and landholder associations. 
This has also occurred in DRC, where the Tanya reserve was established and is managed by the local 
Bamate and Batangi chiefs (Mehlman et al., 2006). Similarly the Ngira’Yitu Community Reserve 
(La Réserve communautaire Ngira’Yitu, RENGYIT), was set up by the Utunda, Bana-Bangi and 
Wassa groups, and the  Bakumbule Community Primate Reserve (La Réserve Communautaire des 
Primates de Bakumbule, RéCoPriBa) was established and is managed by the chiefs of the Kisimba 
and Ikobo communities (Mehlman et al., 2006; Vwirasihikya, 2003). Where communities are not 
the instigators of collective management however, combining two or more village authorities can 
cause tensions in local communities. For example, in the case of community forestry in Cameroon, 
where Community Forests must be formed by an association or co-operative (Bigombe, 2002), 
these new power structures can disrupt traditional management structures, creating a new ‘elite’ 
(Kenneth, 2006).
Experiences from fisheries co-management in Malawi also point to the need for locally-appropriate 
institutions (even if these may take longer to mature) over externally imposed frameworks that 
seek rapid success (Russell et al., 2008). 
Ribot (2004) notes that, in numerous cases from around the world, decentralisation reforms grant 
authority over resources to new local collective governance bodies because it is easier for central 
interests to maintain control or upward accountability over such structures which are not grounded 
in local patterns of social interaction and familiarity, and that this in turn helps central interests 
to maintain control and influence over local resources. The ‘politics of choice’ in natural resource 
governance reforms- deciding who to empower when transferring new forms of authority to local 
governance bodies- are central to the impacts CBNRM has on local communities (Ribot, 2007).
4.2 Economics
The potential of CBNRM to generate economic benefits for local people has 
been a key driver of efforts to revive or stimulate CBNRM, because such benefits 
can in theory create incentives for resource conservation and contribute to 
local economic development and poverty reduction (WRI, 2005). Paradoxically, 
however, as was noted in the above discussion on empowerment, the high 
value of  some natural resources – which should contribute to these goals – has 
meant that state authorities and other vested interests have a strong incentive 
not to devolve authority (for example see the discussion on wildlife in Tanzania 
and timber in Central Africa). This section reviews the available evidence for the 
economic impacts of CBNRM in Africa, and the impact this has had on poverty 
reduction at the local level.6 
Evaluating the economic benefits of CBNRM
Conventionally, definitions of the economic benefits of natural resources were 
restricted to direct values of natural products (such as meat or timber) or 
associated activities (such as tourism and research). However, it is now recognised 
by economists that wildlife and other natural resources have diverse values which 
go far beyond those that can be measured in financial terms. These include use 
values (direct, indirect and option) and non-use ‘existence’ values (see Figure 3). 
6. This section is very much dominated by data from East and Southern Africa. The researchers collating 
information for this review from Central and West Africa have noted a dearth of quantitative information. 
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Source: Emerton (2001)
Total economic benefit of 
natural resources
Use values Non-use values
Direct Values: 
Natural products 
that can be 
consumed directly, 
such as live sales, 
meat, hides, skins 
and trophies; 
education, tourism 
and research 
activities
Indirect Values: 
The ecological and 
environmental 
services associated 
with wildlife 
and its habitat 
such as carbon 
sequestration, storm 
protection, and 
climatic control
Option Values: 
The premium 
placed on 
maintaining 
natural resources 
for possible 
future uses, 
such as touristic, 
pharmaceutical, 
industrial and 
agricultural 
applications
Existence Values: 
The intrinsic 
value of wildlife, 
regardless of 
use, such as their 
cultural, aesthetic 
and bequest 
significance
Figure 3. The diverse values of natural resources
Furthermore, to determine whether benefits derived from natural resources 
deliver development outcomes or incentives for conservation, it is not sufficient 
simply to measure the cash value of such benefits. Rather, several important 
issues must be considered, as outlined by Emerton (2001). First, the nature 
of benefits must be determined, because this will affect their impact on local 
livelihoods. For example, a communal benefit such as a new school may be 
valuable, but does not offer a replacement to lost sources of income resulting 
from reduced resource use options under a CBNRM regime. Second, the 
distribution of benefits must be determined, because if it is heavily skewed 
in favour of certain individuals, the ability of CBNRM to deliver broad-scale 
development outcomes and incentives for conservation will be undermined. 
Third, the costs associated with natural resources and their management must 
be weighed up against any benefits derived from them. These include the direct 
costs of setting up CBNRM initiatives and carrying out conservation activities, 
such as employing game rangers, the costs associated with living with wildlife, 
such as crop-raiding or risk to personal safety, and opportunity costs of foregone 
alternative land use, such as agriculture. All of these costs can be considerable, 
and can undermine the positive benefits of CBNRM. 
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The nature of CBNRM benefits
The potential benefits which can be derived from natural resources for local 
communities are diverse (Figure 2). These include the empowerment benefits 
discussed in the previous section, and a wide range of other values, from 
tangibles such as food (for example distribution of game meat from hunting 
operations is a key component of the Namibia national CBNRM programme); 
cash payments (e.g. from sales of hunting quotas, tourism agreements and so 
on);  and jobs (e.g. within tourism enterprises, as game guards and rangers, 
within hunting operations) through to less quantifiable returns such as spiritual 
and intrinsic values. It is clear that developing a full understanding of the 
economic impact of CBNRM at any site would require a range of quantitative and 
qualitative data, covering these various different dimensions of cost and benefit. 
Unfortunately, this review found that in the great majority of cases such data 
were not available. Rather, published data are heavily focused on the financial 
benefits of CBNRM – either in the form of individual and/or community cash 
payments and income earned from employment. Little information is available 
on other benefit streams and on costs. Jones (2004a) notes: “There has been 
little attention focused on some key issues concerning the links between CBNRM 
and poverty reduction/alleviation and sustainable rural livelihoods….most work 
has focused almost entirely on income generation and has not tried to analyse 
CBNRM impacts against a broader understanding of poverty that also considers 
other factors… yet there are other dimensions to poverty that need exploring in 
the CBNRM context.”. 
Furthermore, the focus of attention in evaluating economic benefits has been on 
formal, ‘projectised’ CBNRM. As our overviews have shown, however, in the great 
majority of cases CBNRM takes place outside any formal ‘projectised’ framework, 
and little is known about the total economic value derived from such systems, 
although it must be very considerable (Box 24).
Box 24. The economic value of ‘traditional’ CBNRM
In some cases, more traditional forms of local collective resource management continue to 
support the livelihoods of millions of people. This CBNRM income is often unquantified, and 
hence unrecorded and undervalued by policy-makers, but the few studies that have attempted 
to quantify it have revealed a considerable contribution to the local and national economies. In 
South Africa, for example, Shackleton and Shackleton (2004) estimate that value of everyday 
resource use to the national economy is around US$ 800 million per annum. Similarly in 
Kenya, the most significant economic income arises from pastoralist livestock production on 
communally managed rangeland, estimated by Hesse and MacGregor (2006) to be worth US$ 
800 million. Numerous studies – particularly of NTFPs – have highlighted their role in supporting 
the livelihoods of millions of poor people (e.g. Shackleton et al., 2000). However, even in such 
cases (e.g. pastoralism in East Africa), policy measures such as land tenure reforms, investment 
policy, and local government legislation have a major impact on the ability of local communities 
to maintain established resource management practices and attendant benefit flows.
Community management of natural resources in Africa

Even as far as documenting financial benefits goes, the vast majority of literature 
on measured economic benefits comes from Southern and Eastern African case 
studies, where many CBNRM revenue-generating projects focus on wildlife 
management, such as ecotourism or game ranching. In contrast, there is a paucity 
of information on CBNRM revenues from West and Central Africa. There are a 
number of reasons why this is the case:
n Firstly, decentralisation of resources in community management is relatively 
nascent in both West and Central Africa.
n Secondly, both in West and Central Africa there are limitations for ecotourism 
and game ranching. For many countries in both regions significant revenues 
from conventional ‘photographic’ ecotourism are not yet a viable possibility; 
flights are expensive from Europe and America, infrastructure for tourists is 
poor, and training for tourism is weak. This is compounded in West Africa 
by low wildlife populations (in many countries due to long-term habitat 
degradation and hunting) and in Central Africa by currently inaccessible 
forests, which currently require a lot of time and money to see. Compared 
with the ‘charismatic megafauna’ of South and East Africa that can be seen 
by vehicle, these circumstances are not currently conducive to ecotourism, 
although the ‘untouched’ nature of the high biodiversity Congo Basin has 
high ecotourism potential once infrastructure and country-access problems 
have been solved, and safari hunting does take place in several Central African 
countries. 
n Thirdly, as noted in earlier sections, where there are valuable natural resources 
(particularly timber) with revenue-generating potential, the state has, in 
general, resisted efforts to devolve authority to local communities and 
community benefits from timber remain very limited.
The scale of CBNRM benefits 
One major component of the policy and institutional reforms in different parts 
of Africa favouring decentralisation and/or devolution of authority over natural 
resources has been the new potential afforded to communities to capture revenue 
previously accruing to the state. Table 6 provides examples of national reforms 
that have facilitated this local revenue capture. 
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Country Revenue capture as a result of policy reform Reference
Benin 20% of forest use fees go back to local communities Mongbo (2008)
Ghana Percentage of land use profits retained by local stools 
increased from 10% to 25% 
Kasanga & Kotey (2001)
Mali Under the new decentralisation policy, the state works 
with village communities on state-managed timber 
contracts, and the village and state share the revenues 
Becker (2001)
Tanzania Villages can enter into direct agreements with tourism 
companies to share profits from photographic tourism 
on their land
Where WMAs have been established, AAs for WMAs 
receive a proportion of Tourist Hunting Game Fees
Decentralisation of authority over forest management 
has meant that village governments are now able 
to collect taxes and fees from forest users. In Iringa 
District, annual village incomes from PFM increased 
from around US$ 540 in 2002 to around US$ 720 
by 2005; potential sustainable timber revenues from 
community forests may be tens of thousands of dollars 
per annum
TNRF (2008)
MNRT (2008b)
Lund (2007)
Namibia The community conservancy policy introduced in 1996 
has meant that conservancies can enter into direct 
agreements with tourism and hunting companies 
(previously negotiated through the government) and 
agree a mutually acceptable revenue share
NACSO (2007)
DRC 2002 forestry code stipulates that 40% of logging fees 
must be used for basic community infrastructure 
Debroux et al. (2007) 
Cameroon Communities retain profits from timber extraction in 
community forests apart from a government felling tax
(Egbe, 2001; Fomete 
and Vermaat, 2001; 
Forest Monitor, 2001)
CAR In the ZCV, 50 to 70 % of hunting taxes remain locally Roulet and Binot (2008)
Table 6. Examples of national policy reforms enabling local 
capture of CBNRM revenue
As a result of these reforms, financial returns – at the collective level – can be 
significant. Table 7 provides examples of financial returns – from cash payments 
and salaries – at diverse sites, and the wide range of resource use activities used 
to generate income, including photographic and hunting tourism, timber sales, 
and national park revenue sharing programmes.
Community management of natural resources in Africa

Country CBNRM initiative Financial returns Reference
Benin Village committees in 
Penjari National Park 
receive 70% of ecotourism 
and hunting profits
US$ 70,000 in 2005 UNEP (2008)
Burkina Faso Buffalo hunting at 
Nazinga reserve
First season generated ~ US$ 
1,300 – equivalent to 21 local 
salaries
Vermeulen and 
Ouedrago (2003)
CAR ZCV revenue from hunting 
areas
1999/2000 generated ~ US$ 
110,000 of which 82% went 
to village committees
1992 – 2008, a total income 
of €1,641,376 raised – in 
2004 village level incomes 
estimated to be in the region 
of €6,000/year.
ECOFAC (2008), 
Mbitikon (2005)
Mamang-Kanga 
(2008)
Cameroon Timber sales in community 
forests
Ngola Achip forest made 
enough profit to build 72 
houses and fund scholarships
Kenneth (2006)
Rwanda Parc National des 
Volcans revenue sharing 
programme
Over US$ 110,000 in 2007 Martin (2008)
Ethiopia Community based tourism 
at Meket
Over US$ 15,000 between 
2005-2007
TESFA (2007)
Kenya Community-Based Tourism 
venture in Laikipia
Income of US$ 16,053 across 
100 sampled households
Mizutani et al. 
(2005)
Namibia Communal conservancies Total income in 50 
conservancies of over US$ 4 
million in 2007
NACSO (2008)
Zimbabwe CAMPFIRE Total from 1989-2001 over 
US$ 20 million
(Frost and Bond, 
2008)
Table 7. Financial returns from African CBNRM initiatives
Where necessary returns have been converted to US$ for comparability using 2009 exchange rates.
Benefit distribution mechanisms
Where CBNRM takes place as a result of a formal project or policy / legal reform, 
it is common for benefits to be distributed to local people through structured 
mechanisms or regulations. These mechanisms vary a great deal with local context, 
but two main strategies can be identified for channelling funds to communities, 
households and individuals. These are cash payments at the community level and 
investment in community projects. 
Cash payments are most commonly made to the relevant community 
organisation rather than directly to households or individuals. Revenues from the 
harvesting of timber and charcoal in Tanzania’s community forest reserves, for 
example, are paid in cash to the Village Natural Resource Committee and from 
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there into a village bank account for use in supporting local forest management, 
or for wider community development needs. There are no cases of Tanzanian 
villages paying registered village members dividends based on wildlife/tourism 
earnings, although income from these ventures is received in cash at the collective 
level and managed through village bank accounts according to established village 
government procedures.
Similarly in CAR, hunting revenue from the ZCV project is collected by the 
community management committee, and at the end of each season is split 
between the Forestry Fund (a special account for the Forest Development and 
Tourism Ministry), and the communities. 
In the majority of cases the community organisation is able to decide for itself how 
best to further distribute the funds – whether as cash dividends to individuals and 
households or for communal benefits. In the ZCV initiative, for example, a general 
meeting is convened at the end of each hunting season to decide on funding 
priorities for the villages, and these have included: medicines, school supplies, 
salaries for game wardens, nurses, accountants, and members of staff, support for 
small farmers (purchase of goats, enclosures and vet bills), maintenance of roads etc 
(ECOFAC, 2008). Similar mechanisms occur in the Dzanga Sanga reserve in the CAR.
In Southern Africa most communities elect not to pay household dividends (Bond, 
2001). However, in some cases this is because such payments are discouraged by 
higher authorities, and dividends can be ‘disguised’ through food for drought relief, 
tillage payments to households, etc. (Taylor and Murphree, 2007). In Botswana 
very few CBOs involved in CBNRM distribute revenue directly to households. 
In many cases, revenues are simply too modest to become the major livelihood 
source. Other reasons are the high costs of many community organisations and 
preference for community projects (Arntzen et al., 2007). Similarly in Namibia, 
support to community initiatives is the most common form of benefit distribution, 
but individual cash payments are increasing. These have worked best where 
the number of conservancy members is small and the revenue considerable, as 
discussed in more detail below. 
In Kenya, by contrast, payment of dividends to members of local wildlife 
associations and Group Ranches is common, at least where the membership 
of landholder associations is relatively small. Similarly in Zamibia, Child (2006) 
is convinced that benefit distribution is most effective when cash payments are 
made directly to individuals who then have the option to re-invest in community 
projects, an approach which has been used and promoted in the communities in 
the Luangwa Valley. 
In some cases CBNRM payments are made to community structures via an 
intermediary – often the local or district government, or traditional leaders – who 
often retain a percentage of the income. The issue of CBNRM ‘taxes’ is discussed 
further below. 
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Investments in community projects are sometimes facilitated through the 
establishment of trust or endowment funds, such as the Mgahinga and Bwindi 
Impenetrable Forest Conservation Trust (Uganda) and the Eastern Arc Mountains 
Conservation Endowment Fund (Tanzania) which operate as independent entities 
and use a ‘Local Community Steering Committee’ structure to vet and screen 
proposals coming from the local level. A more common channel for funds 
disbursed in this manner comes from revenue sharing schemes from national 
parks and other PAs to front line communities affected by conservation. In some 
cases the lower levels of local government (parish or village) are used as an 
entry point for planning and supervision of these investments (Archabald and 
Naughton-Treves, 2001).
Box 25. Community Trusts as a mechanism for managing CBNRM 
at the local level
Community Development Trusts (CDTs) are a mechanism which has been developed in Southern 
Africa as a means to accommodation legislative impediments to the distribution of CBNRM 
benefits to local people. CDTs have been implemented in Zambia and Zimbabwe, and in 
Botswana they form the main mechanism for CBNRM throughout the country. As Jones (2004a) 
says, “CBNRM implementation in Botswana mobilises local communities to form legal trusts so 
that they can gain quotas from the wildlife department and enter into joint venture agreements 
for trophy hunting or photographic tourism with the private sector. A number of trusts have 
formed around the management of other resources such as veld products.” By 2007 91 such 
trusts were registered in Botswana, covering 150 villages in all 10 districts, including almost 
135,000 people or 10% of the population (Schuster, 2007).
Within the CAMPFIRE programme in Zimbabwe, community trusts have been used to oversee 
local activities such as community based tourism. They are able to gain land leases from RDCs 
which place them in a strong position in terms of providing group rights over land and resources. 
Child et al. (2003) argue that for this approach to be successful, such trusts need more capacity 
and support in developing appropriate accountable and transparent relationships between the 
trustees and community members. Ultimately, however, Trust formation still depends upon the 
willingness of councils to allow communities to take on increased management responsibility. 
In Zambia CDTs possess full juridical personality and all members of the community are 
entitled to membership though village and area committees and chiefdom level board. A key 
strategy of the trusts is to apply to the District Council and then the Land’s Commission to 
convert strategic parcels of customary land into leasehold. Once the trust holds leasehold land 
it could then seek investors and partners for development as the statutory lessor. In this way 
customary land would be alienated from the community back to itself in the form of the trust, 
which could then keep control of its land through a ‘head’ lease arrangement and manage 
investments directly through sub-leases. The trusts are designed to avoid land converted from 
customary to leasehold slipping out of the control of the community by using the advantages 
of private title for its own purposes.
In governance terms a key element concerns the downward accountability of the board to the 
members. Village assemblies are the democratic bases as they elect village committees that in 
turn supply the area and then board representatives. The Board is also accountable through an 
Annual General Meeting and through a General Assembly every three years (Sekute Community 
Trust, 2003). The traditional leaders’ role in the trusts relates to community mobilisation, 
oversight and regulation of elections, ensuring the trust constitutions are upheld and where 
necessary providing arbitration to resolve conflicts. The Chiefs’ land authority status exists in 
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law and cannot be given away so the Trusts will propose land sites to be converted for the 
traditional ruler to consider. In this way the Chiefs have allowed a democratic process to advise 
and guide them. Should they wish to ignore the advice they risk undermining the very structure 
they have enabled. The Trust is constituted at the Area level, a tier of organisation below the 
Chieftainship, corresponding with the traditional Headmanship. With the active participation 
of the communities the Trust identifies and prioritises natural resource and development 
opportunities and builds them up into Chiefdom level visions, strategies and action plans. 
Communities are being actively engaged to ensure they drive the trust agendas and not vice 
versa with the process being pushed ahead in the Sekute and Makuni areas. (Nesbert Samu 
– African Wildlife Foundation (AWF), pers. comm.)
A review by (Arntzen et al., 2007) highlights common community benefits from 
CBNRM programmes in Southern Africa including schools, clinics, community 
halls, road improvements, crèches, reticulated water, toilets, gardens, nurseries, 
and community vehicle. Collective income can also be allocated to individual or 
household needs – in Namibia’s #Khoadi //hoas conservancy for example, Jones 
and Mosimane (2007) report expenditure of 5 to 10 percent of gross revenues on 
community benefits, such as support for schools, loans to livestock owners, and 
development of water points. Similarly Shompole Group Ranch and Ecotourism 
project, in southern Kenya generated US$ 115,000 in a period of five years which 
has been spent on upgrading the water system, bursaries for poor children to 
go to school, support to the local school and other shared benefits (Ole Petenya, 
2007). In the ZCV areas of northern CAR, as well as in the Lossi sanctuary in 
Congo, the community benefits have all been invested in collective infrastructures 
but under the supervision of a village board. 
The significance of economic benefits
As discussed above, measuring the scale of monetary returns at the communal 
level does not tell the full story of the economic impact of CBNRM. Two of 
the other crucial factors which must be considered are (1) how benefits are 
distributed at the individual or household level, and (2) how significant returns 
at that level are in the local context. These issues are important because if the 
distribution of benefits is highly skewed or benefits are trivial in the local context, 
the ability of CBNRM to deliver development outcomes and create incentives for 
conservation will be undermined.
In most studies income is measured at the level of the community and then 
extrapolations are made as to what average benefits are received by households 
(Roe et al., 2006). Such averages generally mask the distribution of income 
between and within households. It certainly appears that at the individual or 
household level, CBNRM cash incomes are often limited. For example Roe et 
al. (2006) conclude that in general, formal CBNRM programmes in Southern 
Africa have not performed well at generating income at household level – except 
in rare cases where communities are small and there are high value wildlife 
resources (Bond, 2001; Jones, 2004a; Turner, 2004). For example, in 2006, after 
renegotiating a contract with a private sector partner to prevent revenue capture 
by the RDC, Masoka ward in Zimbabwe received US$ 132,522 through the 
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CAMPFIRE programme. There were 340 households in this area, making the returns 
equivalent to approximately US$ 390 per household (Taylor and Murphree, 2007). 
As Taylor and Murphree (2007) conclude, “As a cash crop, wildlife outperforms its 
only rival in Masoka, cotton, by several orders of magnitude.”
In other areas, as Bond (2001) has demonstrated, differences in human and 
wildlife population densities result in enormous variability in the per capita returns 
of CAMPFIRE. The earliest CAMPFIRE wards, located in the Zambezi valley, have 
low human populations but considerable wildlife populations, and returns per 
household have been very significant in these areas. However as other wards with 
less favourable conditions for CAMPFIRE joined the programme average returns 
declined, and Bond (2001) notes that “In real terms the median benefit per 
household declined from US$ 19.40 in 1989 to US$ 4.49 in 1996”.
The inequitable distribution of benefits is often associated with the domination of 
benefits by well placed local elites (as discussed in the Empowerment section above). 
At the local level, benefits can be concentrated among traditional chiefs, the well 
educated or the wealthy (reviewed by Ribot, 2003). Benefits can also be captured 
by non-local stakeholders through the levying of taxes on returns of CBNRM. This is 
discussed in more detail below in the section on constraints to CBNRM incomes.
Box 26. CBNRM and poverty reduction
A number of studies have reviewed the distribution of benefits from CBNRM programmes, 
and the extent to which they are pro-poor – either by specifically targeting poor people, or by 
generating outcomes that particularly benefit poor people even if this was not their original 
intent. In many cases, these studies found that the (relatively) wealthy benefit more from CBNRM 
than the poor:
n A study of PFM in Tanzania assessed the distribution of benefits across different wealth 
categories and concluded that there were a range of barriers that prevented greater 
participation in the programme by poorer members of the community. This included the 
payment of harvesting fees, the requirement for upfront investments of labour and capital in 
income generating projects, as well as a more systematic exclusion of the poor from decision 
making structures and processes (MNRT, 2008a). 
n In Kenya’s Maasai Mara, wealthier members of the community benefit more from wildlife 
income  than the poorer members – the top quartile (measured by household income) 
obtaining 60-70% of overall wildlife income while the bottom quartile gets about 15% 
(Thompson et al., 2009). 
n In Benin there is evidence that marginal groups (women, migrants, tenant farmers) lose out 
from PFM (Mongbo, 2008).
In other cases, the distribution of benefits does not favour one wealth group over another. For 
example, in Namibia, Bandyopadhyay et al. (2004) suggest that benefits are not limited to a 
small number of wealthy individuals: “The results suggest that the improved welfare effects of 
conservancies are poverty neutral in the arid north-western Kunene region and pro-poor in the 
semiarid Caprivi region. There was little evidence to suggest that the better educated or the asset 
rich were gaining more from conservancies relative to their less-educated or poor counterparts; 
thus, it was concluded that conservancies, if not pro-poor, are at least not being dominated by 
the elite.” In a follow up study (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2008) confirm this finding. 
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Where data are available to determine the magnitude and distribution of 
returns from CBNRM these must be placed into the context of the broader local 
economy. A number of commentators have remarked that household income 
from CBNRM is often relatively insignificant compared to income from other 
sources, and only likely to be a supplement to household incomes rather than 
the main source. For example, although the revenue sharing scheme operated by 
Parc National des Volcans in Rwanda generates over US$ 100,000 per year for 
local people, the area adjacent to the park supports a human population of up to 
600 people per km2 (Plumptre et al., 2004). When the money from the revenue 
sharing scheme is placed into this context, it becomes clear that the returns per 
household are minimal. Similarly, in the richest wildlife areas of Kenya, such as 
around the Maasai Mara, livelihoods in rangelands remain overwhelmingly reliant 
on livestock, relative to income from tourism and agriculture (Homewood et al., 
2009). Returns to pastoral landowners across Kenya from wildlife average US$ 
5 per ha/annum, with those areas having established tourism concessions on 
private lands generating an average of US$ 10 per ha/annum, rising to US$ 50 
per ha/annum in the Maasai Mara (Norton-Griffiths, 2007). Across the wide array 
of local conservancies, landowner wildlife associations, and tourism joint ventures 
situated around the Maasai Mara, tourism/wildlife income accounts for about 16-
25% of household income, compared to 60% for livestock and less than 5% for 
arable agriculture (Thompson et al., 2009). In other cases, returns from CBNRM 
can make up a large proportion of household income. In Botswana, for example, 
Arntzen et al. (2003) finds that household income from community-level trophy 
hunting concessions in some areas can amount to US$ 45 a month – 87 % of the 
average household income.
Where individual or household benefits from CBNRM appear small, they can 
still be highly significant in areas when there are few other income-earning 
opportunities  (Arntzen et al., 2007). For example, in Maputaland, South Africa, 
Easton (2004) reports that hunting returns can be greater than alternative land 
uses per unit area. The same is true for Namibia where few alternative sources 
of income can be derived from vast arid and semi-arid regions of the country 
(Barnes et al., 2002). Such income can also help to diversify local livelihoods and 
enhance household resilience (Mizutani et al., 2005; Thompson et al., 2009). 
These impacts can be particularly beneficial where CBNRM takes place in remote 
areas with minimal provision of services from the state, as is often the case. 
However, this can lead to the state effectively handing over provision of services 
to CBNRM initiatives (Box 27). 
The economic costs of CBNRM
It is not possible to evaluate the overall economic impact of CBNRM without 
considering costs as well as benefits. These costs fall into three main categories. 
First, there are the costs involved in establishing and running CBNRM initiatives, 
which can be very substantial. Second, there are opportunity costs from 
alternative land uses which are not compatible with CBNRM. Finally, there are the 
costs of living with wildlife, which can be exacerbated where CBNRM results in 
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population growth and increased problems such as crop raiding. In this section 
these different categories of cost are considered in turn. 
Where CBNRM takes place on an informal, ‘traditional’ basis, the costs involved 
in administering management regimes are likely to be relatively minimal, and to 
be met entirely by local people. However, where CBNRM interventions take place 
through formal projects or as a result of large-scale legal reforms, costs can be 
very high. These include initial start-up costs such as paying for technical expertise, 
equipment etc., and ongoing management costs such as staff salaries and 
vehicles. These costs are often met by donor agencies, which have made very large 
investments in CBNRM programmes in several African countries. 
If the revenues flowing from CBNRM activities are low, they may fail to meet the 
ongoing running costs. This is the case at the Mount Cameroon Project (one of 
only four known game-ranching programmes in Central Africa), where the costs 
are higher than the benefits and the project has to be supplemented (Akumsi, 
2003). Similarly, the West Africa Pilot Community-Based Natural Resource and 
Wildlife Management Project, with US$ 7 million in funding from the World Bank 
from 1996 – 2005 in northern Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso, failed to produce 
any revenue streams from ecotourism or game hunting by the end of the project 
(World Bank, 2005).
Box 27. CBNRM as a substitute for, or subsidy of, state services?
Adams and Infield (2003) point out that through systems of support to community projects 
from collective income, CBNRM can effectively become a subsidy programme for national 
government spending. In Uganda, for example, following the introduction of revenue sharing 
from PAs, some local governments appear to be reducing investments in the sub-counties and 
parishes surrounding the PAs, as there is a perception that the funds from revenue sharing are 
sufficiently supporting the infrastructure and service delivery needs of these areas. The danger 
therefore is that revenue sharing then simply fills the gap left by the district councils resulting in a 
zero sum gain for affected communities (CARE, 2008). The additional costs that they incur from 
conservation are consequently not reflected in the level of external investment. However, Taylor 
and Murphree (2007) comment that this complementing of what should be public spending can 
be particularly valuable in times of political crisis and budget deficits (e.g. in Zimbabwe).
Understanding the opportunity costs involved in adopting CBNRM regimes is 
a vital, but rarely considered, component of economic analysis. In some cases, 
such as arid regions of Namibia as mentioned above, the opportunity costs of 
alternative land uses, such as agriculture, are fairly minimal. However in other 
areas such costs can be very significant. The classic example of opportunity costs 
associated with conservation is from Kenya, where Norton-Griffiths & Southey 
(1995) estimated that if all parks, reserves and forests were turned over to 
agriculture and livestock production, they could generate net returns of US$ 203 
million per year, compared to the US$ 42 million generated by tourism and forestry 
at that time. Since this seminal study far greater emphasis has been placed on the 
value of ‘ecosystem services’ and other values not quantified in the original study, 
but it is unfortunate that so few analyses of CBNRM in Africa identified by this 
review attempt to estimate either such non-monetary values, or opportunity costs. 
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Like benefits of CBNRM, opportunity costs are unlikely to be equitably distributed. 
Turner (2004) notes that not only are the wealthy often better placed to take 
advantage of CBNRM programmes, but, more worryingly, that the poorest people 
are most likely to be dependent upon hunting and gathering to supplement their 
livelihoods and may be the most disadvantaged by increased law enforcement 
associated with ‘formal’ CBNRM. Where communities set aside land for wildlife 
and tourism, households lose access to grazing, water, and other resources. This 
can happen on a large scale where large areas of land are zoned for wildlife, 
or on a smaller scale where people no longer have access to land used for a 
community-run camp site for example. Often it is the poorest individuals and 
households – who have limited alternative resources – that suffer the most from 
this loss of access, however temporary (WRI, 2005). In Zambia, for example, 
selling hunting rights as a part of a CBNRM programme can mean local hunters 
lose their prestige and identity (Brockington et al., 2008; Marks, 2008). Similarly 
there is evidence from Botswana (Arntzen et al., 2003) and Namibia (Sullivan, 
2000; Vaughan et al., 2004) to suggest that the poorest people are also 
negatively affected by the restrictions on access to game meat that CBNRM can 
impose. In Central Africa the reduction in availability of bushmeat is one of the 
most debated effects of regulated resource use on local communities, where 
bushmeat can provide up to 80% of protein needs (Koppert et al., 1996) and up 
to 70% of household incomes (Starkey, 2004). Whether such problems represent 
localised institutional failings of individual CBNRM projects or a more general 
problem with the CBNRM model is open to debate. 
Finally, it must be recognised that if CBNRM interventions are successful in 
achieving resource conservation, resulting increases in wildlife populations 
can result in greater conflict between wildlife and local people. In Tanzania 
for example TNRF (2008) point out that villages can often end up subsidizing 
national economic benefits from wildlife in Tanzania by bearing the costs (with 
no provisions for compensation and weak local investments in human-wildlife 
conflict mitigation) of living with wildlife, while consumptive uses of wildlife such 
as tourist hunting generate mainly centrally-captured revenues. This problem 
is, however, largely a reflection of institutional arrangements in Tanzania which 
grant central authorities proprietorship and the ability to monopolize benefits 
from wildlife on community lands, leaving communities with the costs while 
benefits flow elsewhere. This issue is considered in more detail in the section on 
environmental impacts of CBNRM below.
Constraints to maximising income streams
Governance is perhaps the key constraint to maximising local returns from 
CBNRM and enhancing pro-poor impacts. As already noted in the discussion on 
empowerment, there are strong disincentives for African states and bureaucratic 
institutions to devolving rights over valuable resources to the local level (see 
Gibson, 1999). For example, Nelson and Agrawal (2008) argue that the value 
of tourist hunting, and its administration by central agencies in a context of low 
government accountability and transparency, can create incentives for continued 
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Treasury 
(Bangui)
Forestry 
Fund 
(MEFCPT, 
Bangui)
Communes 
(communal 
budget)
Villages 
(community 
office)
Management 
zone account 
(technical 
staff)
National Nationa1 Local Local Local
Hunting Permits 100% – – – –
Licence for a guide – 55% 45% – –
Corporate License 45% – 55% – –
Size of hunting zone 
(750FCFA * km2 zone)
– – 20% 50% 30%
Use of the ZCV – – – 50% 50%
Hunting tax (before capture) – 20% 15% 30% 35%
Hunting tax (if an animal is 
caught)
– 20% 15% 30% 35%
Commercial meat sale – – – 100% –
central control over wildlife and the marginalization of local economic interests. 
As Ribot (2004) details, similar incentives are in fact found across Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America, although the relative weakness of democratic and accountable 
governance institutions in sub-Saharan Africa may particularly inhibit CBNRM 
reforms (Nelson and Agrawal, 2008). 
As noted above, the distribution of CBNRM benefits at the local level can often 
favour particular individuals at the expense of the majority. However, this process 
also operates across different scales, and is perhaps most noticeable in terms of 
benefit capture by central and district government institutions – often evidenced 
in the form of revenue retention or a ‘tax’ on CBNRM income. This is manifest 
in a number of different ways. In Botswana, for example, new regulations mean 
that income from joint venture tourism now has to be split 65%/35% with the 
government (government retaining the larger share). The rationale behind the new 
policy is to redistribute wildlife benefits to areas that are poorer in resources but 
this has been seen as controversial and recentralising (Schuster, 2007). Mbaiwa 
(2008) points out that in Sankuyo, “the 35 per cent remaining in the communities 
is too little even to pay for the running costs of their office.” In Zimbabwe, revenue 
from wildlife in CAMPFIRE districts is captured by RDCs in the first instance and 
then distributed to local communities. However, RDCs retain a portion for their 
administrative costs (at most 15% of revenues) and for resource management 
(35% of revenues Arntzen et al., 2007). In Ghana all rents, dues, royalties, 
revenues or other payments are collected and distributed by the Administrator of 
Stool Lands (a post created in 1994): 25% to the landholding Stool, 20% to the 
traditional authority, and 55% to the District Assembly (Kasanga and Kotey, 2001). 
Table 8 illustrates the taxes that are applied with the CAR ZCV initiative and how 
these are distributed between national and local levels.
Table 8. Distribution of principal taxes for the ZCV 
Translated from Roulet, 2006.

Natural Resource Issues No. 18
Box 28. Revenues from community-private sector tourism agreements 
in northern Tanzania also benefit local and national government
In northern Tanzania, villages have entered into legal contracts with investors for purposes of 
carrying out tourism which will bring benefits from wildlife to the local communities. Many of 
these village investor contracts are in villages around Serengeti and Tarangire National Parks and 
have been in place for more than 10-15 years. Different agencies and branches of government 
have often promoted these ventures as a way of increasing local economic opportunities and 
direct benefits from wildlife outside state PAs (TNRF, 2008).
 
One long-standing example of this arrangement comes from Ololosokwan village, which 
neighbours Serengeti National Park. TANAPA assisted the village to establish a campsite for 
tourism companies so that the village would be able to secure additional benefits from wildlife 
tourism. Since the late 1990s, the income of Ololosokwan and the other villages in Loliondo 
Division (Ngorongoro District) has increased to a total of over US$ 300,000 (TZS 360 million) 
each year from these tourism enterprises. In addition, revenue to the district council has also 
increased proportionately (ibid).
Increasing revenue from village-operator tourism ventures in Loliondo Division, Ngorongoro 
District. Data is for cumulative earnings of 7 villages, 1996-2007. (Source: TNRF, 2008)
However, new regulations may change the amount of income that can be retained by villages 
under these arrangements. For community lands which are not designated as WMAs, new 
regulations on non-consumptive tourism mean that payments of around US$ 45-65 per client 
per day will need to be paid by tourism companies to the Wildlife Division rather than to villages. 
This represents a substantial new tax on village wildlife-based tourism ventures, and may 
displace 50-75% of village revenues or make these ventures non-viable in commercial terms. The 
Wildlife Division will reportedly re-direct 60% of revenues from these areas back to the villages, 
although mechanisms for this are not yet clear and debate continues over implementation of 
these non-consumptive tourism regulations.
For tourist hunting, revenue from WMAs is paid to the Wildlife Division and then a proportion 
is passed on to the community. Revenue returned to the local level may be quite substantial: 
according to data from the Wildlife Division, five AAs shared a total of US$ 61,850.75 from 
Tourist Hunting Game Fees for animals hunted on their land in 2006, while in 2007, eight AAs 
shared a total of US$ 69,883.44 (MNRT, 2008b). However, the basis for these payments is 
unclear, and the communities do not know what proportion of total revenues from hunting in 
their areas is represented by the money they are being given.
Overall TNRF (2008) estimate that that a minimum rate of central taxation on wildlife revenues 
generated from community lands is about 40%, and may range higher and even up to 100% 
where mechanisms for ensuring revenues are returned to villages are not functioning.
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Namibia appears unique in that CBNRM earnings are untaxed and communities 
retain 100% of income from wildlife, although Tanzanian forestry law also allows 
communities to retain all the income generated from products harvested from 
Village Land Forest Reserves. Because Namibian communal conservancies receive 
the full value of the revenue from leases and concessions, the local-level incentives 
for participation and resource stewardship are strong (Balint and Bond, Submitted).
Taylor (2009) notes encouraging developments in CAMPFIRE where some wards 
have now switched to direct payments from safari operators to producer wards 
in order to ensure benefits are not captured by RDCs. With respect to Masoka 
ward he notes: “Consequently an all time low of US$11,437 received in 2004 was 
followed by a dramatic rise to US$132,522 in 2006, a ten fold increase in income.”
A central cause of state and district governments capturing the bulk of revenues 
from valuable resources such as wildlife and timber is a lack of enabling policy 
and legislation that might given local communities greater control over resources 
and their economic values. In Kenya, for example, Norton-Griffiths (2007) 
comments that a protectionist wildlife policy that proscribes most consumptive 
forms of wildlife utilisation greatly limits the economic options available to 
landowners from wildlife. Prior to the introduction of the hunting ban in 1977, 
private landholders were able to charge fees for wildlife utilisation occurring on 
their land and by the mid-1970’s, the Mbirikani Group Ranch outside Amboseli 
National Park was earning US$35,000 from fees charged for hunters using their 
land (Homewood et al., 2009). Norton-Griffiths (2007) notes non-consumptive 
wildlife tourism is limited to about 23,000 square kilometres, or about 5% of 
the total rangeland area where wildlife is found in Kenya. In the vast expanses of 
northern and eastern Kenya where little photographic tourism takes place, there 
are few or no incentives for communities to invest in wildlife conservation, and 
it is the areas where wildlife is accorded no economic value that large mammals 
declines have been steepest during the past 30 years (Western et al., 2006). 
Sustainability of economic benefits
In Southern Africa in particular, but also in East Africa (particularly Tanzania) and 
some parts of West and Central Africa, formal CBNRM programmes are highly 
dependent on tourism (including tourist hunting) for revenue generation. This 
is currently less true in West and Central Africa, where the majority of CBNRM 
projects are linked with PAs buffer-zone projects or forestry projects. Tourism is 
notoriously subject to external pressures – including economic conditions in tourist 
originating countries, political unrest in destination countries, and the changing 
tastes of tourists themselves. High-end luxury tourism (as often used in CBNRM 
initiatives) is considered the most vulnerable to shocks such as terrorism or political 
instability, as wealthy tourists are often risk averse (Lepp and Gibson, 2003). As 
an example, Jones (2004a) notes that for several years until early 2002 tourism in 
the Caprivi Region in north east Namibia had come to a halt because of political 
unrest and the spilling over of the civil war in southern Angola into Namibia. These 
characteristics of the tourism industry make visitor numbers, and hence income, 
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highly unpredictable from year to year, undermining the sustainability of revenue 
streams to tourism-based CBNRM initiatives. In the early 1990s, for example, 
Kenya Wildlife Service announced a policy of sharing 25% of park revenues with 
surrounding communities, although subsequently this high proportion proved 
impossible to sustain, particularly when civil unrest disrupted the tourism industry.
Recognising a need to diversify income sources, CAMPFIRE had tried to move 
away from a reliance on trophy hunting and expand into photographic tourism. 
However, because of the political and economic instability, tourism to Zimbabwe 
has collapsed (Jones, 2004a). Tourist hunting is more resilient to political problems 
(such as in Zimbabwe at present), making it potentially more sustainable than 
photo-tourism. Hunters are also less fussy about the context of their hunt, often 
being prepared to tolerate the presence of livestock (Lindsey et al., 2006). 
The long-term sustainability of CBNRM initiatives can also be undermined by the 
inequitable distribution of benefits discussed above. For example, Lindsey et al. 
(2007) postulate that the inequitable distribution of hunting revenues represents 
the most serious threat to the long term sustainability of the industry. The reasons 
for this inequitable distribution are predominantly governance issues raised 
earlier in this review – inadequate provisions for community rights, ineffective or 
incomplete devolution of authority over wildlife – but sometimes also relate to 
the capacity of often new community organisations to negotiate a fair deal with 
hunting operators. 
Other forms of CBNRM which do not involve tourism are also vulnerable to 
problems with sustainability. For example, management regimes which allow 
for the off-take of natural resources under a quota system can be vulnerable to 
over-exploitation. This is particularly problematic when environmental fluctuations 
lead to low production of the resource, which may coincide with peak demand 
if agricultural production systems have also been affected by poor environmental 
conditions (Barrett and Arcese, 1995). 
A further issue is that PA authorities are increasingly becoming autonomous 
agencies, responsible for covering their own budgets. The incentives to share 
large proportions of their budgets with communities are thus low when there 
are other competing priorities. In Tanzania, for example, community benefit 
sharing comprised less than 2% of TANAPAs record-high total revenues in 2006-7 
(TANAPA, 2007). Similarly in Benin, only 30% of hunting fees are retained locally, 
as the National Centre for Wildlife Management (CENAGREF) is an autonomous 
agency and must finance an important part of its budget. 
In Central Africa, projects are often at risk due to their reliance on donor support, 
and therefore projects can end at the end of the initial funding period; examples 
include cane-rat farming in Gabon, which wound down after the end of the EU 
funding cycle (Abernathy, pers comm.), and the West Africa Pilot Community-Based 
Natural Resource and Wildlife Management Project, which was not continued after 
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2005, when World Bank funding came to an end. ECOFAC projects in Central 
Africa also have 4-year funding cycles, which can decrease project sustainability. 
Similarly, many community-run projects in Central Africa are reliant on outside 
logistical support; examples include the community forest policy of Cameroon, 
where community forests have required a large amount of technical support to 
produce the paperwork and management plans required to obtain legal status 
(Kenneth, 2006)
Conclusions
Several key lessons can be drawn from this discussion of the economic impacts of 
CBNRM in Africa:
n Economic benefits can be highly valuable at the community level, whether 
through formal or informal processes
n Benefits are realised in a wide range of forms, including cash income, 
meat / forest product quotas, community investments, skills development, 
contributions to the national economy, social security and the intrinsic value of 
protected resources
n The inequitable distribution of benefits can undermine conservation and 
development outcomes of CBNRM. The significance of benefits must also be 
understood in the local context
n CBNRM activities can incur considerable costs, including management costs, 
opportunity costs, and increased conflict with larger wildlife populations
n Benefits captured locally from CBNRM are inherently connected to governance 
and institutional factors, particularly the degree to which communities are able 
to made decisions about resource utilisation and retain benefits without high 
levels of taxation or external appropriation; this is a major constraint in many 
countries to maximising local returns from natural resources through CBNRM
n The great majority of published studies of economic impacts of CBNRM focus on 
Eastern and Southern Africa, and fail to take account of non-monetary benefits 
of CBNRM or of associated costs, including opportunity costs. This makes it very 
difficult to assess the overall economic performance of CBNRM in Africa.
4.3 Environment 
As we noted in our introduction, CBNRM is premised on the devolution of 
authority over natural resources to the community level. CBNRM has been 
criticized as an ineffective strategy – both for conservation and development –  
but often because the necessary reforms have not taken place in terms of transfer 
of resource management authority and rights, power relations and institution 
building. Furthermore, where proponents of more ‘top-down’ approaches to 
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resource management and conservation have highlighted the successes of 
strategies such as state-run PAs they have often failed to compare this apparent 
success with community-based approaches in similar contexts. The reality is that 
in many countries a large proportion of biodiversity or wildlife populations are 
found outside state PAs and CBNRM can make an important contribution to a 
portfolio of conservation approaches at the national level. However, many of the 
studies that have collected data on the environmental or ecological outcomes of 
CBNRM have tended to be based on specific, small-scale, case studies with few 
assessing performance at a national or regional scale. This lack of broad scale 
data has been explicitly recognised as a problem by donors (e.g. DFID, 2002).
Wildlife trends under CBNRM regimes
In general, it is difficult to judge the environmental effectiveness of CBNRM, 
because overall there has been little empirical monitoring of many projects’ 
impacts. Jones (2008) notes, for Southern Africa: “Little attention has been given 
to empirical research on the impacts of CBNRM on wildlife or wild habitat. This is 
an area that requires further research and in particular the link between perceived 
benefits from CBNRM and local level conservation management.” There is also 
a problem in attributing causality to any environmental improvements since they 
could as much be caused by external factors (e.g. changes in rainfall, disease 
outbreaks and so on) as by any management regime. 
Nevertheless there are examples of impressive results. In Namibia’s communal 
conservancies programme, for example, the contribution of CBNRM to the 
recovery of wildlife populations across large parts of northern Namibia including 
endangered species such as black rhino, elephants and Hartmann’s zebra is well 
documented. The general trend for all these species over the past 15 years or 
more has been upwards (NACSO, 2004). Elephant numbers in north-western 
Namibia are increasing (from 300 in the early 1990s to around 800 at present) 
and elephant are expanding their range in both the northwest and northeast 
(Jones, 2004a). Despite the attribution problems described above, there is 
general consensus that without community commitment to conservation, species 
such as the black rhino would not survive and be increasing on communal lands 
as they are at present (Durbin et al., 1997). These sustained increased in wildlife 
populations outside of PAs is a particular phenomenon of Southern Africa (see 
Child, 2004), and it is perhaps no coincidence that this is the region in which 
devolution of authority over wildlife to rural communities is most widespread 
and established. 
In Botswana, there is no indication of wildlife numbers increasing to the extent 
they have done in Namibia but data in Arntzen et al. (2003) show that most 
species have remained stable in recent years, while steenbok, impala and elephant 
numbers have increased by up to 5%. While there have been some declines in 
CBNRM areas there is no indication of the cause of this decline (Jones, 2004a). 
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Box 29. Economic incentives driving environmental improvements
In Kenya’s Laikipia District, zebra numbers have increased from an estimated 6,000 in the 
late 1960s to over 30,000 by the mid 1990s (Georgiadis et al., 2003; Georgiadis et al., 2007). 
Predators such as lion and hyena remain widespread and the endangered wild dog returned to 
Laikipia in 2000 and has increased rapidly in number over the past nine years. Laikipia District 
is entirely constituted from either private or communal land or Group Ranches (held collectively 
for extensive grazing) and it is in these areas where wildlife has recovered and increased. A main 
reason for the increase in wildlife is that Laikipia has developed a strong wildlife based tourism 
industry, and private ranchers and local communities have set aside land to conserve wildlife 
because of its economic benefits (TNRF, 2008). Similarly, in Uganda a review of Integrated 
Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs) undertaken over a 15 year period around 
Bwindi Impenetrable and Mgahinga Gorilla National Parks revealed that community attitudes 
towards the PAs had improved dramatically between 1991 and 2003. The key determinants of 
these changes in attitude were attributed to the operations of the Bwindi Trust Fund, benefits 
gained locally from tourism and the sustainable agriculture programme being promoted by 
CARE International (Namara et al., 2003). 
TNRF (2008) note that the conservation impact of tourism highlights the need for reforms which 
enable greater economic returns to be captured at the local level (such as through consumptive 
utilisation) if wildlife populations are to persist outside of state PAs. In Southern Africa, for 
example, revenues from trophy hunting have resulted in requests to have land included in 
wildlife management projects, and in some cases increasing wildlife populations (Baldus and 
Cauldwell, 2004; Child, 2005; Lewis and Alpert, 1997; Weaver and Skyer, 2003). 
In Tanzania, there is a growing body of literature on the impact of PFM but 
many of the findings reported until recently have been based on perceptions of 
community members rather than any quantitative analysis. Nevertheless those 
perceptions point to some positive outcomes (e.g. see Kajembe et al., 2006; Lund 
and Treue, 2008; Mustalahti, 2006; Sjoholm and Louno, 2002; Woodcock et al., 
2006) including:
n improvements in water discharge and quality from PFM areas
n increasing signs of natural regeneration in degraded areas
n reduction in unregulated and unsustainable levels of harvesting (such as 
logging, charcoal production and hunting of game) 
n reduced incidences of fire
n reduced village revenue from fines, due to reduction in illegal activities 
n reduction in encroachment of agricultural land into forest areas
n increases in game and wildlife numbers/diversity.
Similarly in West Africa and Central Africa, very few initiatives have systematically 
measured impacts – one of the rare cases being the Tayna Community Reserve 
in DRC. In 2001 Tayna field staff conducted an initial census of the intended 
community reserve using 68 km of line transect surveys. The same transects were 
repeated in 2005/2006, allowing change in wildlife populations over 5 years to be 
monitored. They found a ten-fold significant increase in elephant encounter rate, 
a three-fold increase in chimpanzee encounter rate, and a two-fold increase in 
gorilla encounter rate; during the same time period human signs showed a seven-
fold decrease (Mehlman et al., 2006).
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Nevertheless, local perceptions elsewhere – where reported – highlight positive 
outcomes:
n The Zone Siwaa villages decentralisation project in Mali reported slowing in the 
degradation of natural resources, notably concerning excessive logging and the 
erosion of agricultural soils (Ba, 1998). 
n The Diaba Basin Community Protected Area project reported signs of forest 
regeneration (Kaba, 2007). 
n The Penjari Biosphere Reserve co-management project in Benin has resulted 
in reductions in poaching, illegal logging and building inside the park (GTZ, 
2008). 
n The West Africa Pilot Community-Based Natural Resource and Wildlife 
Management Project in Cote d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso reported a reduction 
in agricultural encroachment within the conservation zones which it created 
(World Bank, 2008b). 
n In CAR, the ZCV initiative – which establishes hunting zones around PAs in a 
co-management approach – has produced mixed results, reporting increases in 
the populations of some key species: elephant (50%), warthog (300%), bush 
pig (75%), hylochere (40%) kudu, wild dog and leopard, and decreases in the 
populations of other key species: spotted hyena (80%), lion (60%), Cheetah 
(50%), giraffe (50%), cobs, Redunca, hartebeest and buffalo. 
n The Mount Cameroon Project also reported wildlife increases, using community 
indicators, and plans to implement scientific monitoring.
The potential for positive environmental impacts is high in logging areas, as legally 
defined community management can protect community managed areas from 
international logging, cancelling concessions. The Kilim Ijim project in Cameroon 
has reported forest regeneration (measured using satellite data) since the project 
began in 1987. However, with many projects in their infancy, reporting is scarce.
Environmental outcomes of CBNRM compared to other  
NRM strategies
In some cases, community owned or managed land appears to be performing 
better than state land in maintaining wildlife populations. In CAR, for example, 
wildlife densities were perceived to be higher inside the ZCV than inside the 
nearby National Park. In Kenya and Tanzania, wildlife is declining both within 
and outside PAs (see Norton-Griffiths, 2007; Stoner et al., 2007; TNRF, 2008). 
However, where local landholders have been able to generate significant 
economic returns from wildlife, numbers are recovering or stable. For example, 
Western et al. (2006) report that the amount of wildlife found in private 
(individual and communal) conserved areas now exceeds the proportion found 
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in formal government PAs (40% to 35%). Furthermore, while game counts 
between the late 1970s and late 1990s in National Parks indicate declines, counts 
carried out on community conservancies between 1990 and 2005 show stable or 
increasing populations of game (Western et al., 2006).
 
Similarly, a number of studies undertaken in Tanzania have sought to assess the 
effectiveness of traditional forest reserves, (managed by customary institutions) in 
relation to forest condition, and in comparison to state managed Forest Reserves. 
Mgumia & Oba (2003) established that although traditional forest reserves in 
Tabora Region were relatively small in size, they had a greater woody species 
richness and taxonomic diversity than a neighbouring state managed forest 
reserve with comparable ecological conditions. Similarly, Mwihikomeke et al. 
(1998) estimated that >7,000 ha of montane forest in 1,740 sites (locally known 
as mshitu) in North Pare mountains and Handeni districts were being managed 
through the application of traditional management practices for the protection 
of sacred forests. A third study from Shinyanga region documents the impact of 
establishing ngitili, a traditional system of reserving pasturelands and dry season 
grazing areas by Sukuma pastoralists, which results in a rapid regeneration of 
trees (Monela et al., 2005). The study was able to document the re-establishment 
of a total of 152 different trees, shrub and climber species within ngitili, as well 
as 145 bird species and 21 mammal species. This contrasted with a general 
decline of forest condition in areas outside established ngitili. In a synthesis of the 
various quantitative studies that have assessed PFM impact in Tanzania, Blomley 
et al. (2008) found that community involvement in forest management is strongly 
correlated with improving forest condition and is more effective than either open 
access or sole state management regimes (Fig 4). 
Figure 4. Mean annual changes in growth characteristics in 13 
forests under different management and ownership regimes
Source: Blomley et al., 2008
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Conservancy District Size
Siana Wildlife Trust Narok 20,234 ha
Shompole Community Trust Kajiado 10,000 ha
Ol Kiramatian Kajiado 10,000 ha
Eselenkei Conservation Area Kajiado 5,000 ha
Lumo Community Wildlife Sanctuary Taita-Taveta 45,788 ha
Il n’gwesi Group Ranch Laikipia 8,675.5 ha
Namunyak Wildlife Conservation Trust Samburu 30,000 ha
Total PA estate in Kenya, excluding community PAs 8,148,460 ha
Land area under conservation
Although data on trends in specific resources – wildlife population, forest 
coverage and quality – may be scarce, it is clear that CBNRM has made significant 
contributions to the extent of land area under conservation (Tables 9 and 10). 
In Zimbabwe for example, land used for wildlife production under CAMPFIRE 
protects an area of land roughly equivalent in size to Zimbabwe’s Parks and 
Wildlife Estate taking into account land used for residential and crop growing 
purposes (Child et al., 2003). Further, Jones (2004b) notes that despite the rapid 
conversion of wild land to settlements and agriculture in much of Zimbabwe, 
most of the original twelve CAMPFIRE districts have been able to maintain 
substantial wildlife areas. In the COMIFAC countries of Central Africa the state 
PA estate is estimated to be 390,155 km2 with an additional 115,201 km2 under 
community management (Coad et al., 2008).
Table 9. Some of the group ranch tourism-wildlife conservancies 
in Kenya’s pastoral rangelands
Source: Blomley et al., 2008
In Tanzania, the ten gazetted WMAs have a total area of 12,450 km2 set aside by 
villages as wildlife area, with up to 20,000 km2 in WMAs that have not yet been 
formally gazetted. The amount of land set aside by villages as tourism concessions 
or conservation areas is poorly documented. As but one example, Emboreet and 
Lolkisale villages have between them set aside about 40,000 ha of land adjacent 
to Tarangire National Park as tourism concessions, protecting key wildlife dispersal 
areas (Sachedina and Nelson, In press). Vastly larger but largely undocumented 
areas are conserved as dry season grazing reserves by numerous pastoralist 
communities throughout northern Tanzania. PFM is reported to cover a total of 
4.1 million hectares on mainland Tanzania, involving 2,300 villages, including 2.2 
million hectares as Village Land Forest Reserves (MNRT, 2008c). 
In Namibia, communal conservancies accounted for 14.4% of Namibia’s land 
area at the end of 2006 (NACSO, 2007). Crucially, in some areas communal 
conservancies do not just add to the total land under wildlife management, but 
link previously discrete PAs (Roe et al., 2006). 18 of the registered conservancies 
occur immediately adjacent to, or in key corridors between, national parks or 
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Name Type Country Size (km2) Total PA estate 
of country (km2)7
Reference
CBNRM National 
Forest
CBNRM 
corridor
Equatorial 
Guinea
5,000 6,420 Mehlman 
(2006)
The Dzanga-Sanga 
Special Reserve
Co-managed, 
multiple use
CAR 6,865 118,565 WDPA 
(2008)
Foret D’Ngotto Co-managed 
forest reserve
CAR 802, with 
1,370 
extension
118565 WDPA 
(2008)
Zones 
Cynégétiques 
Villageoises (ZCV)
Co-managed 
buffer zones
CAR 80,000 118,565 ECOFAC 
(2009)
Lac Tele 
Community 
Reserve
Co-managed 
reserve
ROC 4,389 36,361 WDPA 
(2008)
Lossi Gorrila 
Sanctuary
Co-managed ROC 2810 36,361 WDPA 
(2008)
Sanlonga CBNRM 
corridor
CBNRM 
corridor
DRC Still being 
delimited; 
approx 5000 
from map
302,652 Steel (2008)
Kinigi CBNRM area CBNRM 
corridor
Rwanda/
DRC
893 ––– Hitimana  
et al. (2006)
Tayna Nature 
reserve
CCA DRC 900 302,652 WDPA 
(2008)
Reserve 
Communitaire 
des Primates de 
Bakumule
CCA DRC 1,300 302,652 Vwirasihikya 
(2003)
Itombwe Massif CBNRM 
corridor
DRC At least 1000 
by 2010 (still 
to be delimited 
and land use 
determined)
302,652 Mehlman 
(2006)
Bakano Forest 
reserve 
CCA DRC 957 302,652 WDPA 
(2008)
Lowa forest CCA DRC 393 302,652 WDPA 
(2008)
Table 10. Examples of areas covered by co-managed, CBNRM 
corridors and CCAs in Central Africa
Source: Coad et al. (2008)
game reserves. These 18 conservancies provide 55,192 km² of land being used for 
conservation objectives in addition to the existing PA network of 114,080 km². This 
is a 48 per cent increase in Namibia’s conservation area (LIFE, 2004). 
Annex 3 provides further detail on the land area under formal protection in different 
African countries and the land under some form of community management.
7. Calculated by UNEP-WCMC from the Feb 2008 version of the WDPA; for further information contact 
protectedareas@unep-wcmc.org
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The downside of positive ecological outcomes – Human Wildlife 
Conflict (HWC)
In some cases local communities can be the victims of their own CBNRM success. 
Where wildlife numbers increase – either inside or outside PAs – they inevitably 
come into increasing contact with local farmers, herders and other residents, 
often with adverse outcomes – including personal injury (and in extreme cases 
death); crop damage; livestock killings and so on. Crop and stock losses to wild 
animals can have significant impacts on poor people. The loss of one or two 
head of cattle to someone who owns only four or five head will have a far 
greater impact than someone losing one or two head from a herd of fifty or 
more. In Namibia, for example, the increase in the numbers of wild ungulates in 
north-west Namibia has increased competition between wildlife and livestock for 
grazing, browse and water (Weaver and Skyer, 2003). The Wildlife Integration for 
Livelihood Diversification (WILD) project in Namibia made some estimates of the 
value of crops lost to wildlife in two Caprivi conservancies and concluded that the 
losses represented 18% in Mayuni Conservancy and 22% in Kwandu conservancy 
of average annual household incomes for the region (Murphy and Roe, 2004).
In Central Africa, elephants are the most commonly cited crop-raiding species, 
creating overnight heavy crop-losses, although a national study of crop-raiding 
by Lahm (1996) suggests that the less visible cane rat could cause similar levels 
of damage over a more prolonged period of time, and crested mangabeys were 
highlighted by Kamiss and Turkalo (1999) as an important crop-raider around 
Dzanga-Sanga reserve, CAR. Most agricultural production occurs in a small band 
around villages and roads, and forest close to the village is often burnt and 
cleared to create fields, which means that fields are directly adjacent to forest 
habitat, creating direct access for forest species. 
A study of crop-raiding in farms surrounding Bia Conservation Area, Cameroon, 
showed that from 2004 – 2006, 95 farms experienced 103 raids, (Oppong et 
al, 2008), and a previous study by the same research from in 1999 suggested 
that accumulated losses/farm/year could be as high as 33% (Sam, 1999), In the 
Dzanga Sanga reserve,  CAR, a nine-month study of crop-raiding was carried out 
in 1999, using a questionnaire in the surrounding villages. However, response 
rate was low, and this was thought to be because of the lack of compensation 
for crop-raiding that villagers received from the park, and possibly due to villagers 
finding their own solutions to elephant damage, namely poaching, which they did 
not want to discuss with park managers (Kamiss and Turkalo, 1999).
The incidence of crop-raiding events has also been measured in the Kakum 
Conservation area, Ghana, where the surrounding community suffer severe losses 
each year; in 2001 a study of crop raiding in 203 farms showed that 26% of 
farms suffered one or more raid over the year, and the incidence of crop raiding 
decreased with distance from the park boundary (Barnes et al, 2003).
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As we have noted previously, a significant amount of Africa’s wildlife is still 
found outside any formally protected area – particularly in the pastoralist zones 
– and the potential for conflict is thus high and can be a major disincentive 
for wildlife stewardship. In Uganda for example, Blomley and Namara (2003) 
note “The net result to frontline communities is that they now suffer a ‘double 
marginalisation’. UWA has rather elegantly shed some of its responsibilities to 
local governments in the name of ‘local empowerment’. Local governments, 
however, without corresponding resources and skills appear unwilling to take up 
these roles and responsibilities. Traditional coping mechanisms such as hunting 
and trapping are considered illegal except when targeting a handful of vermin 
species, while the costs for more labour intensive crop protection measures 
(such as guarding) fall squarely on the shoulders of frontline communities.” 
In Gabon, snare hunting is illegal, as is hunting of elephants without a permit 
(Christy, 1997). Crop raiding elephants can be killed by a government elephant 
hunter, but costs and lengthy regulations mean that villages often take elephant 
control into their own hands – and potentially suffer the legal consequences. 
Interestingly, the erosion of traditional community structures may be a factor 
in increasing crop losses from raiding. Lahm (1996) provides an example from 
Gabon, where changes in land tenure towards government ownership, and 
high rural-urban migration have resulted in less cohesive, fragmented societies. 
She suggests that traditional communal practices which united village residents, 
such as net hunting, planting and cooperative crop protection have been largely 
abandoned in favour of individually-owned firearms and scattered agricultural 
plots. Because elephant crop-raiding is widespread and the agricultural system 
is no longer strategically organised for defence against crop-raiding animals, 
plantations cannot be protected efficiently (Lahm, 1996).
Recognising the scale and significance of the problem, many CBNRM 
programmes have, however, developed a range of approaches for dealing 
with human-wildlife conflict. Muruthi (2005) describes two basic approaches 
– mitigation and prevention. A third strategy – compensation – is also being 
subject to increasing interest and experimentation. 
Preventative measures: Exclusion of wildlife by use of physical barriers is the 
most common preventative measure. Perhaps the most striking case of this in 
East Africa is the fence around the perimeter of the Aberdares National Park in 
central Kenya – standing around 3.3 metres tall and stretching several hundred 
kilometres. In southern Uganda, the International Gorilla Conservation Project 
has constructed a stone wall around the boundary of the Mgahinga Gorilla 
National Park which has significantly reduced conflicts between local residents 
and buffalo resident in the park (Biryahwaho, 2002). These approaches are 
highly expensive, however, and their cost effectiveness has to be questioned. 
Other less expensive physical barriers include trenches dug along the boundary 
of Queen Elizabeth and Kibaale National Parks (Uganda) used to deter 
elephants from crop raiding (Chhetri et al., 2004; Keigwin, 2007), planting of 
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non-palatable crops such as wheat, lemon grass and Artemisia annua (an anti-
malarial; Martin, 2008) and the use of repellents such as chilli powder. 
In Dzanga-Sanga reserve of the CAR, villagers have constructed their own 
‘fences’ around fields, which consist of a string mounted around the cultivated 
area, with various objects such as cans, discarded plastic bags etc, suspended 
from the string (Kamiss and Turkalo, 1999). In 1994 a small electric fence was 
erected in one village close to Dzanga-Sanga, as a pilot project by the US Peace 
Corps. Powered with a solar panel, it was intended to provide a low-tech, long-
term solution, but its use ended after the departure of the Peace Corps due to 
a lack of maintenance and interest from the community,
 
Guarding of crops is a widely adopted coping mechanism, particularly as crops 
approach their harvesting time, but it places heavy demands on time – and 
often has negative effects on school enrolments as children are often the ones 
selected to undertake this assignment (ibid). Guarding is often made slightly 
easier by the use of simple alarm systems (such as bells, tins etc) which mean 
the guard does not need to be awake all night long. Drumming, shouting, 
clapping or ‘scare-shooting’ all help to drive wildlife away following incursion 
by wildlife (Muruthi, 2005). A range of other group, or community based 
interventions that combine guarding with noises designed to scare problem 
animals have been reported for a range of species including mountain gorillas 
(Macfie, 2000) and elephants (Sitati et al., 2007). The Human Gorilla Conflict 
Resolution Programme (HuGo) has had some success in scaring gorillas off 
community land and back into the park at Bwindi. Groups of local people are 
organised into Gorilla Monitoring and Response Teams to do this. They are paid 
in kind, and some have received grants to set up income generating activities 
(Byamukama and Asuma, 2006). Villages around Dzanga-Sanga in CAR burn 
Chinese bamboo near the fields, which ‘explodes’ when burned, and frightens 
elephants away, albeit temporarily (Kamiss and Turkalo, 1999).
The use of wildlife ‘diversions’ has been tested in Kenya and Tanzania by AWF. 
Building of alternative water sources meant that wildlife were less prone to 
using water sources used by people and livestock and had the immediate effect 
of reducing conflict. A longer term approach is through the use of landscape 
management approaches – where land-use planning is undertaken in conflict 
areas. The removal of crops prone to damage by wildlife, and the introduction 
of crops that are less prone is one such example (Biryahwaho, 2002). 
 
Mitigation measures: Although prevention is clearly the best option in 
terms of reducing conflict, at times reactive approaches are required after 
human-wildlife conflicts have occurred. The main approach under this heading 
is Problem Animal Control (PAC), most often undertaken by the national 
wildlife authority. The ‘problem animal’ can either be killed or captured 
for translocation. Kenya Wildlife Service has a dedicated Problem Animal 
Management Unit, and in the UWA rangers at the PA level are allocated to 
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working on addressing problem animal incidences. As a measure to mitigate 
damage from wildlife, however, it has proven to be rather ineffective, and 
Lahm (1996) suggests has often been introduced only to appease villagers. In 
many cases, while the action may have an important public relations aspect, 
the animal or animals that are assumed to have caused the conflict may 
be incorrectly identified and may not be killed – and will continue to inflict 
damage (Muruthi, 2005). 
The problem is compounded by the fact that communication is often poor 
and the time taken for a message to be passed to the relevant authorities and 
for a reaction to be effected may be too long and the animals in question 
may have moved on (ibid). This is often observed in Gabon, where controlled 
shooting usually occurs long after the initial conflict event. Because Gabonese 
law requires that an elephant be shot within five kilometres of the affected 
village, delayed authorisations may result in the death of a non-raiding animal 
while the original culprit(s) may return (Lahm, 1996).
Translocation has also been used for high priority animals or endangered 
species such as elephants or rhinos as a means to remove specific animals 
known to be problematic. While it attracts a great deal of publicity and is 
often very appealing to the general public, the results are often mixed. Apart 
from being extremely expensive, death of the animal is common, due to the 
stress of relocation. Even if they survive the move, animals may continue with 
crop raiding in their new locations, which has the effect of simply moving the 
problem from one place to another (ibid). 
Interestingly, safari hunting clients might be more willing to pay to kill problem 
animals, thereby helping to reduce HWC: “There is interest among clients 
in hunting problem animals (crop raiders or livestock killers) with the effect 
that trophy hunting has the potential to generate revenues from animals that 
would have died anyway and potentially to reduce indiscriminate revenge-
killings of wildlife by angry local people. Over 50% of clients are willing to pay 
more or the same as typical trophy fees to hunt problem animals, even if they 
are poor trophies (Lindsey et al., 2006)” (Lindsey et al., 2007).
The use of concentrated herbicides on crop raided plantations to kill elephants 
has been observed in central Gabon (Coad, pers obs, 2005), after elephants 
caused high crop losses and the death of one hunter. Some villages also 
construct traps around plantations; neck traps for smaller species such as cane 
rats, and pits with spikes at the bottom for larger species such as situtunga, 
bush pig and elephants (Coad, 2007). Families often supplement their main 
hunting off-take with catches from traps set around their plantations.
Compensation schemes: A wide range of compensation schemes have 
been tested with varying degrees of success. In the 1990s, Kenya Wildlife 
Service established a national scheme for compensating people in the event of 
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damage to crops from wildlife. After a few years the scheme was stopped as it 
proved to be costly, slow and cumbersome to administer, because the process 
of verifying claims was fraught with difficulties, fraud and corruption and 
because it was subject to insufficient funds for covering claims. In addition, 
the scheme only addressed symptoms rather than underlying causes of the 
conflict (AESG, 2002). 
 Around the Nairobi National Park, a local NGO (Friends of Nairobi National 
Park) developed a scheme to compensate Maasai livestock owners in the event 
of predation by the Park’s lions, leopards or cheetah. However, the scheme 
proved too expensive to continue and was abandoned after a relatively short 
period (Muruthi, 2005). An alternative approach is now being explored 
through the use of insurance policies, where farmers pay a premium for 
cover against a defined risk, such as predation of livestock. The premium is 
subsidised by the Friends of Nairobi National Park, and in principle insurance 
policies could be developed to cover a wide range of wildlife-related risks. 
In Namibia a number of attempts have been made to deal with the negative 
impacts of wildlife on livelihoods. One approach has been the introduction 
of a scheme that compensates farmers for stock losses to predators that 
is administered by the conservancies in conjunction with the government 
and the NGO Integrated Rural Development and Nature Conservation. Clear 
rules and guidelines have been established for the value of livestock and the 
grounds on which compensation will be paid (Jones, 2004a). The #Khoadi 
//hoas conservancy annually spends a significant amount (over N$100,000) 
on mitigation and compensation for elephant damage (Jones and Mosimane, 
2007), and Torra conservancy has also compensated farmers for crop and 
livestock losses (Ogbaharya, 2006). 
There is no compensation for wildlife damage in Tanzania although the draft 
2008 Wildlife Bill provides for ‘consolation’ payments which are not to be 
misconstrued as an obligation for compensation. Addressing human-wildlife 
conflict is carried out by District Game Officers and is in general highly 
ineffective in mitigating these conflicts which are expanding, as a result of 
growing human population and Tanzania’s recovering elephant population. 
CBNRM and land degradation 
Outside of forest areas, much CBNRM takes place in Africa’s semi-arid 
rangelands. An ecosystem assessment of Southern Africa – undertaken 
as part of the MA process – notes that land degradation appears to be 
linked to overstocking with livestock and that there is a particularly high 
correspondence between degraded land and areas of communal land 
tenure (Biggs et al., 2004). Agriculture, including communal grazing, can be 
damaging to wildlife (J. T. Du Toit and Cumming, 1999; Higgins et al., 1999). 
In Southern Africa, “over-cultivation, overgrazing, bush fires, cultivation of 
marginal and easily eroded land, mechanization and the widespread use of 
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chemicals and pesticides, have intensified the degradation of the soil and 
vegetation and led to rapid decline of species types and their numbers” 
(Darkoh, 2003). However, recent models of historical climate changes suggest 
that non-equilibrium dynamics may have dominated in rangelands (Hahn 
et al., 2005). These findings call into question the widely held belief in 
equilibrium dynamics which has underpinned a lot of conservation planning 
and sustainable off-take models. Leach et al. (1999) also note that issues of 
carrying capacity and environmental degradation have been highly politicised, 
and there is much debate about the temporality of the apparent degradation 
of rangeland. 
What is clear, however, is that the extensive wildlife production systems being 
developed by many of the CBNRM programmes are, by nature, multi-species 
systems occupying a range of biological niches. Theoretically these multi-
species production systems reduce the pressure on rangelands compared with 
single species production systems (such as cattle ranching) and agro-pastoral 
systems (see Bond et al., 2004; Child, 1988). The limited data available 
suggests that land which has reverted to wildlife production after a period 
of intensive single species production systems, soon shows gains in diversity, 
resilience, and ecosystem function (Du Toit, 1999). 
This is backed up by a recent USAID/FRAME study which looked at the 
contribution of CBNRM to desertification in a number of Southern Africa 
countries. These studies concluded that CBNRM can be a valuable strategy 
among others in combating desertification (CAR, 2007; Grossman and 
Holden, 2007; Jones and Mosimane, 2007). 
In West Africa CBNRM and decentralisation of land management has been 
offered as a solution to, rather than a creator of, land degradation. Many 
countries have northern drylands with southern forested lands. Historically 
complex and uncertain tenure laws have exacerbated poor land use practices, 
accelerating land degradation in the north, and putting pressure on southern 
forest habitats as farmers migrate southwards in search of fertile land. This has 
often led to policies of decentralisation, in a bid to restrict access and set up 
community-based land management plans. 
For example in Benin, where traditional land practices have been relatively 
unaffected by state tenure policies, they have been markedly affected by 
increasing population densities and resulting land degradation. Traditional 
land rotations (leaving plantations fallow for a number of years to allow time 
for soils to recuperate) are often abandoned to increase profits from the 
land, pay rents, or increase the amount of land that can be sharecropped. At 
the same time, in the struggle for land (and power), elders are discouraging, 
or preventing the sharing out of land to family heirs (Mongbo, 2008). This 
reduces the land available to young famers, and land shortages mean that 
many farmers become tenants or sharecroppers, who do not invest in soil 
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fertility because of the need to produce a yearly, short term profit. The 
planting of trees – a traditional ‘claim’ to land, – is discouraged or forbidden 
by landowners. All this in turn reduces soil quality, contributing to land 
degradation and further land shortages (Adjei-Nsiah et al., 2007).
In a bid to deal with the current unsustainable land use practices, land 
degradation, and rural poverty, the Government of Benin has been working 
with donor organisations to successfully decentralise its tenure systems, and 
set up community tenure and land management schemes. Benin’s relatively 
new NRMP was piloted and funded by the World Bank from 1992 – 1999, 
with the aim of developing and piloting community land management 
plans, in part to reduce land degradation (World Bank, 2005). Similarly, the 
Gestion de terriors approach in Burkina Faso had a significant focus on the 
improvement of soil/water conservation techniques, and terroir management 
plans often involve the zoning of categories of land (forest, fields, fallows and 
pastures), which aim at restricting resource extraction to a limited amount 
of users. This reflects the focus of the Projet National de Gestion de Terroirs 
and its donors towards the intensification of land use and the privatisation of 
property rights, based on the premise that this will create incentive for better 
land management practice and will suppress land related conflicts that are 
also thought to encourage land degradation (Gray, 2002). 
The potential role of CBNRM in addressing broader environmental challenges 
of land degradation and climate change is discussed in more detail in the 
next section. 
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CBNRM as a mechanism for addressing 
global environmental challenges 
The preceding chapter reviews what CBNRM has achieved in terms of 
empowerment, economic benefits and ecological impact across sub-Saharan Africa. 
The assessment is severely constrained by the very limited availability of accurate 
and relevant data-sets. Broadly the chapter indicates that some communities have 
been able to establish proprietorship over land and natural resources. This control 
is often highly contested, sometimes opportunistic and has, in some cases, been 
reversed. Economic benefits have been generated but typically these complement 
existing sources of revenue at a household level. Importantly, there are often 
additional costs, especially where people are living with wildlife. Similarly, the 
ecological impacts are difficult to determine and highly variable with the result 
that reviews such as ours depend largely on case study approaches rather than 
population or landscape level assessments.
This chapter will consider CBNRM and the implementation of a sub-set of 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) known as the Rio Conventions8. 
MEAs are international legal agreements between a large number of states with 
the common goal of environmental protection. They are the preferred tool of 
the international community to address environmental issues that cross national 
boundaries and are therefore regional or global in scale (TIEMPO, 2004). They are 
not new, the first MEAs having been agreed in the early 1900s (Gray, 2003). In 
total, there are now over 700 MEAs (TIEMPO, 2004). Assessing the effectiveness of 
MEAs is often very difficult and can become highly politicised. There is little doubt 
that due to their scale and scope, effective implementation of the Rio Conventions 
is challenging and that tangible results will depend on unprecedented levels of 
global action, particularly in addressing climate change (Stern, 2007).
In the context of this topic, the origins and the evolution of CBNRM programmes 
and projects across Africa is important. Across the continent, CBNRM programmes 
have evolved endogenously primarily in response to local conservation and 
development problems, albeit with some being very heavily supported by external 
multilateral and bilateral agencies (see Chapter 2). Many of these programmes 
have evolved over decades, often starting as small pilot projects unsupported by 
legal frameworks and becoming large programmes with legal and policy backing. 
CBNRM programmes, therefore, are not activities that have been developed with 
the explicit aim of fulfilling the objectives of one or more of the MEAs. 
Ivan Bond
8. Three MEAs were launched at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (the  
so-called ‘Rio Earth Summit’) held in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. These were the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), and the United Nations 
Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD). Collectively they are often referred to as the ‘Rio Conventions’.
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Although drafted in response to different problems and with differing objectives, 
the Rio Conventions have many mutually supporting elements (Schwarte and 
Hyvarinen, 2008). For example, the more intense and far-reaching climate change 
is, the greater the loss of plant and animal species will be (MA, 2005). However, 
successful landscape level biodiversity conservation in tropical forests (supporting 
the aims of the CBD) will also mitigate the effects of green house gas (GHG) 
production (supporting the aims of the UNFCC) and that in turn may reduce the 
effects of desertification in another location (supporting the aims of the UNCCD).
As well as reviewing the efficacy of CBNRM in meeting the aims of the Rio 
Conventions, this chapter also examines the increasing importance and dominance 
of climate change. Many believe that climate change is the single biggest 
challenge facing society over the next century (Eliasch, 2008; Stern, 2007).  
One key policy option, Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation 
(REDD) presents both significant opportunities for existing CBNRM programmes as 
well as rich potential for the exchange of information and lessons learned. 
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)
The stated overall objectives of the CBD are: “The conservation of biological 
diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing 
of the benefits arising out of the utilisation of genetic resources, including 
by appropriate access to genetic resources and by appropriate transfer of 
relevant technologies, taking into account all rights over those resources and to 
technologies, and by appropriate funding.”
The Convention specifically recognises the potential role of local communities  
in biodiversity conservation through Articles 8 (j), 10 (c), 10 (d) and 11 (Roe  
et al., 2006). Some of the areas covered by these articles include maintenance 
of traditional knowledge, benefit sharing, protection of customary rights and 
the importance of financial incentives in biodiversity conservation. Furthermore, 
while not legally binding, the ‘ecosystem approach’ adopted by the CBD [Decision 
V/6] includes the principle of decentralisation to the lowest appropriate level of 
management. The CBD also has a number of thematic areas or work programmes 
which have implications for CBNRM. Notable examples include: 
n The Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines for the Sustainable Use of 
Biodiversity – which includes guidance on local empowerment as well as the 
equitable sharing of benefits.
n The work programme on Traditional Knowledge, Innovations and Practices 
– which is examining, inter alia, mechanisms for ensuring effective participation 
by indigenous and local communities in decision-making and policy-planning.
n The Programme of Work (PoW) on Protected Areas which includes work on 
governance, participation, equity and benefit-sharing. One of the targets 
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of this PoW is: “Full and effective participation by 2008, of indigenous and 
local communities, in full respect of their rights and recognition of their 
responsibilities, consistent with national law and applicable international 
obligations, and the participation of relevant stakeholders, in the management 
of existing, and the establishment and management of new, protected areas.” 
Community-conserved areas will be a major focus in achieving this target. 
Overall it can be seen that there are clear links between the principles and 
approaches of CBNRM and the objectives and provisions of the CBD – both 
promote the sustainable use of biodiversity, benefit-sharing, community 
involvement, decentralisation, and an incentive-based approach to conservation.
The UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD)
The overall objective of the UNCCD is: “To combat desertification and mitigate the 
effects of drought in countries experiencing serious drought and/or desertification, 
particularly in Africa, through effective action at all levels, supported by 
international cooperation and partnership arrangements, in the framework of 
an integrated approach which is consistent with Agenda 219, with a view to 
contributing to the achievement of sustainable development in affected areas.”
As in the CBD, the participation and involvement of local communities is 
emphasised throughout the UNCCD, based on the founding principle in 
Article 3 (a) that: “The parties should ensure that decisions on the design and 
implementation of programmes to combat desertification and/or mitigate the 
effects of drought are taken with the participation of populations and local 
communities and that an enabling environment is created at higher levels to 
facilitate action at national and local levels.” The UNCCD also recognises the 
importance of secure land and resource tenure, and forms of decentralisation.10
The UNCCD places considerable emphasis on promoting the sustainable use of 
natural resources [Article 3 (b)], alternative livelihoods [Article 10. 4], and capacity 
building of local communities for sustainable land and resource management 
[Article 19]. Annex 1, the Regional Implementation Annex for Africa, suggests that 
national desertification action plans should: 
n include measures to delegate more management responsibility to local 
communities [Annex 1, Article 8. 2. (c)]; 
n diversify rural incomes and employment opportunities [Annex 1, Article 8. 3. (a)];
n ensure integrated and sustainable management of natural resources [Annex 1, 
Article 8.3.(b)]; 
9. Agenda 21 is the plan of action that was agreed at the Rio Convention for coordinated action to be taken 
internationally, nationally and locally (see www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/index.htm) 
10. The UNCCD refers to decentralisation and delegation of more ‘responsibility’ to local communities, but does 
not refer to the devolution of ‘authority’ to communities, a crucial element for promoting sustainable resource 
management (see Murphree, 2001) and an important component of CBNRM in southern Africa.
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n improve institutional organisation through decentralisation and the assumption 
of responsibility by local communities and the establishment of local structures 
[Annex 1 Article 8.3.(c)]; and 
n amend the institutional and regulatory framework to provide security of land 
tenure for local populations [Annex 1 Article 8.3.(c)]. 
There is strong convergence between the key principles of the UNCCD and the 
generic approach to CBNRM. Both emphasise participation and the development 
of creating an enabling environment for action at national and international levels. 
Importantly, the UNCCD recognises principles of sustainable use, devolution and 
the central issue of tenure in the management of land and natural resources. 
The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
The main objective of the UNFCCC is to stabilise GHG concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system11. The very nature of climate change means that the status 
of global biodiversity and the process of desertification are both inextricably linked 
to the speed and extent of climate change. Climate change is already considered 
to be one of the five major drivers of biodiversity loss (MA, 2005). The impacts of 
climate change on sub-Saharan Africa are significant and potentially imminent. For 
example, by 2020 an estimated 75 to 220 million people in sub-Saharan Africa 
could be exposed to increased water stress due to climate change and over the 
same time period, yields from rain-fed agriculture could be reduced by up to 50% 
in some sub-Saharan Africa countries (IPCC, 2007).
From a development perspective, the impacts of climate change on biodiversity 
and desertification are likely to affect the poor hardest due to their dependence on 
natural resources to meet livelihood objectives (Peskett et al., 2008). 
There are no specific provisions for CBNRM within the UNFCCC. However, the 
UNFCCC aims to stabilise GHGs as quickly as possible, so that ecosystems can 
adapt naturally to climate change; food production is not threatened; and efforts 
to minimise GHG emissions and climate change are consistent with sustainable 
economic development. 
The existing Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol does not 
make specific provision for community-based carbon sequestration schemes but 
certainly does not preclude these. The principle opportunity for communities to 
participate in the CDM is through its afforestation and reforestation (A/R) option. 
However, only one project has been ratified due to significant technical, economic 
and political constraints posed by the CDM framework and there is a strong sense 
that it has been a failure (Angelsen and Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2008). 
11. http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/items/2627.php
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Can CBNRM contribute to global goals?
The previous chapter has highlighted some of the achievements of CBNRM as far 
as environmental goals are concerned. These findings support a recent, but broad 
analysis of CBNRM in southern Africa (Roe et al., 2006) which found: 
n Biodiversity: There are good examples in Namibia, Botswana and Zambia 
where the main programmes of CBNRM have contributed to the maintenance 
of existing wildlife habitats and wildlife, allowing the recovery of previously 
depleted resources and facilitating the re-introduction of locally extinct species.
n Climate change: The maintenance of intact landscapes through CBNRM 
processes prevents further emissions from landuse change, albeit the carbon 
stored in the semi-arid landscapes of southern Africa (estimated at 140t /ha) 
is substantially lower than that found in tropical forests (250 t /ha12). Tanzania 
provides a good example through its CBFM programme under which 2.1 
million hectares of woodland is managed by villages (Lund and Treue, 2008; 
MNRT, 2008c).
n Desertification: The maintenance of wildlife as a primary landuse has been 
shown to have considerable ecological advantages over livestock and agro-
pastoral systems in semi-arid and arid rangelands (Child, 1989 and (Du Toit, 
1999). Indirectly, unsettled land also provides resource sinks while many 
CBNRM programmes provide some revenues that mitigate the worst impacts 
of either climatic or economic stress.
MEAs are enormously challenging to implement. Much of the international 
environmental legislation is still very soft in nature which has failed to generate 
a set of binding rules (Birnie and Boyle, 2002). Secondly, many of the MEAs are 
unstructured and often developed in response to environmental disasters. Thirdly, 
nation states have a very poor record of the implementation of MEAs. There 
are positive aspects to the MEAs. In a relatively short time period, international 
environmental legislation has moved from the allocation of land, resources and a 
means of settling disputes to a growing set of instruments designed to address 
major international issues. 
Analysing the quantitative relationship between the contribution of CBNRM 
to the delivery of MEAs at a continental or even regional scale is fraught with 
considerable difficulty. Reasons for this include the non-linear relationships 
between variables (such as the impact of human settlement on wildlife numbers), 
the inherent variability of key ecological processes (such as rainfall), the paucity of 
data both from Africa and especially from CBNRM programmes and the absence 
of baselines against which additionality can be measured (Ferraro and Pattanayak, 
2006; Roe et al., 2006; Sutherland et al., 2004)
12. IPCC (2007)
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The challenge of implementing MEAs, particularly in Africa, has already been 
noted. There are several reasons why many, if not all, African governments 
are poorly equipped for implementation. Firstly, MEAs are widely perceived 
as focusing on the environment and not dealing with pressing poverty issues 
(TIEMPO, 2004). Consequently, government ministries with responsibility for 
environmental issues are politically weak, under-resourced, under-staffed and 
burdened by considerable expectations and expanding mandates (see for example 
Cumming, 2004; TIEMPO, 2004). The situation is exacerbated by recent trends in 
bilateral and multilateral donor support to focus on supporting livelihoods, human 
health and education through direct budget support (Collier, 2005). There are 
also other constraints such as the weakness of local government, limits upon civil 
society and the absence of private sector stakeholders. 
Two different sets of evaluation criteria can be applied to the current and 
future contribution of CBNRM to the fulfilment of the MEAs. The first is their 
contribution to physical indicators of performance such as area of land conserved 
or the amount of carbon dioxide not emitted. Generally, this is not a useful 
or meaningful approach to take. This is because, in all but a few cases such 
as Namibia13, the scale of CBNRM programmes is still small compared to the 
physical extent of landuse change. 
The second approach is to consider CBNRM programmes as pilot initiatives that 
can both inform and contribute to the implementation of programmes that are 
specifically designed to meet the MEAs – for example REDD. This includes the 
contribution of CBNRM programmes and projects to many of the challenges that 
are limiting the implementation of the MEAs by national governments.  
For example:
 Conservation vs development: In sub-Saharan Africa, and particularly in 
Southern and East Africa, CBNRM represents and equates to sustainable 
development. It therefore provides a model, albeit at limited geographical 
scale, by which the many goals of the MEAs can be implemented while also 
addressing the development needs of rural people. 
 Financial constraints to MEA implementation: Many CBNRM programmes 
in Africa have benefited considerably from donor support. For example, 
CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe benefited from external support of at least US$35 
million between 1989 and 2003 (Frost and Bond, 2008). In many cases these 
programmes would not have been possible without this form of financial 
assistance. Many CBNRM programmes also generate substantial revenue from 
the use of wildlife and non-timber forest products. Again while the scale 
might be limited, CBNRM provides a model whereby governments do not 
have to bear the full burden of the costs implementation. 
13. By the end of 2007, communal land conservancies covered over 115,000 km2 which is about 39% of all 
communal land and 14% of Namibia’s total surface area (NACSO, 2008). 
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 Local government involvement: One of the major challenges facing 
African governments is that MEA implementation is seldom communicated 
and resourced beyond the responsible central government ministry. Local 
governments rarely understand their role or have the skills and financial 
resources to address the issues. CBNRM processes in all four regions place a 
strong emphasis on devolution of power from central government to different 
combinations of local government and communities. Like the preceding 
arguments, CBNRM programmes or pilots are demonstrating how local 
governments can be involved with the implementation of MEAs.
 Role of private sector: Private sector partners play a key role in the wildlife 
based CBNRM models of east and southern Africa. These models and two 
decades of operational experience show how private sector companies can 
effectively work with local government and communities (Child and Weaver, 
2006). The evidence shows that these partnerships work best where there 
is strong proprietorship over resources at a local level and competition 
between companies for the right to operate (Child and Weaver, 2006). The 
implementation of MEAs has largely been the responsibility of government 
agencies. As with the other examples, CBNRM models provide an example 
of how the private sector can contribute to successful conservation and 
development activities. 
In this section, we have argued that the major contribution of CBNRM to the 
MEAs has been through the establishment of working models and programmes 
of devolved management. This approach specifically avoids direct quantification 
and attribution of conservation gains to the Rio Conventions. There are several 
reasons for this approach. These are; the small geographical scale of CBNRM 
programmes relative to the massive changes in landuse across the continent; 
the absence of good monitoring and evaluation data and the limited baselines. 
However, not all the experiences have been positive. The opportunitistic behaviour 
of some RDCs in Zimbabwe over revenue generated from wildlife, provide us 
with important lessons about the legal and policy frameworks that are needed 
if communities are to be genuinely empowered to manage land and natural 
resources (Bond, 1999).
REDD – lessons and linkages with CBNRM? 
Approximately 17% of global annual GHG emissions are from deforestation and 
forest degradation (IPCC, 2007). This has stimulated a wide range of activities 
and intense debate about the potential for REDD for climate change mitigation 
(Eliasch, 2008). Reports by Stern (2007) and Eliasch (2008) have added further 
impetus to the case for REDD. Both of these reviews agreed that:
n effective action on GHG emission has to include measures to deal with 
deforestation and forest degradation; and
n for industrialised countries, payments for avoided deforestation were cost-
effective compared with the cost of mitigating other sources of GHGs.
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REDD is based on the principle of developed countries making payments to 
developing, forest-rich countries to conserve their forests in order to reduce GHGs 
emitted through deforestation and as a mechanism to store carbon. As such, 
REDD is an example of a relatively new, market-based approach to conservation 
termed ‘payments for environmental services’ (PES). PES is predicated on the 
fact that many ecosystem services are public goods that provide wider benefits 
to additional people beyond the ecosystem manager or custodian (Engel et al., 
2008). Those who benefit from these services could, where there is a compelling 
financial case, make a payment to those who are responsible for maintaining or 
providing a defined ecosystem service. 
There are many similarities between PES and CBNRM – particularly in the context 
of incentives for land and resource management (see Frost and Bond, 2008). 
Arguably, the key theoretical difference between PES and CBNRM lies in the 
conditionality of payments (Wunder, 2005). Many CBNRM programmes and 
projects rely on the neo-classical economic argument that wildlife and wild land 
will be managed and therefore conserved, where the benefits of living with 
wildlife significantly exceed the costs (Bond, 1999; Child, 2004). In this context, 
many ecosystem services that are generated by the management of large areas of 
natural habitat are considered as positive, but unvalued externalities (Bond, 1999). 
PES differs in that payments are negotiated by a willing buyer and seller of 
a service or bundle of services. Payments are then only made if the service is 
provided (Wunder, 2005). Importantly though, PES solutions are not appropriate 
to all conservation problems but are a specific tool that can be used where 
stakeholders other than the land managers derive significant benefits from their 
maintenance (Engel et al., 2008). REDD is one such case.
Although it is a relatively simple concept, there are substantial challenges to 
implementing REDD effectively, these include:
n agreeing key design issues at international, national and sub-national levels;
n establishing costs and the potential of REDD in each case;
n determining the scale at which REDD should be operationalised;
n matching a country’s needs with financing sources;
n setting benchmarks against which REDD payments should be made;
n dealing with leakage (i.e. negative impacts are not just displaced from one area 
to another); 
n ensuring that changes to the use of land and natural resources are permanent 
and not just short-term;
n monitoring, reporting and verifying carbons emissions;
n measuring and monitoring forest degradation; and
n achieving REDD co-benefits and avoiding doing harm.
(Angelsen and Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2008)
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While there may be some conceptual and technical differences between the 
current suite of CBNRM programmes and future REDD programmes, there are 
also many similarities in terms of their implementation. For example, tenure is an 
issue that is currently central to many CBNRM programmes and will be critical 
in terms of the future success of REDD (Cotula and Mayers, 2009). Strong and 
clear tenure rights not only delineate who has rights over land, trees and (in the 
future) carbon finance but they also provide communities with leverage over 
government (Cotula and Mayers, 2009). Typically, land and resource tenure in 
sub-Saharan Africa is complex with multiple forms of tenure (state, traditional, de 
facto and private) but also highly contested between stakeholders. The wildlife 
based CBNRM programmes in southern Africa have developed ingenious legal 
mechanisms to devolve user rights over wildlife from central government to local 
government and communities (Jones and Murphree, 2004). However, while these 
have allowed programmes to be implemented they have not resolved the key 
issue of who controls the land.
In addition to the climate mitigation goals of REDD, there is growing and 
widespread understanding that in some countries REDD will not be successful 
without addressing additional goals such as health, education and biodiversity 
conservation. This is often referred to as REDD++14. The cost of REDD has been 
estimated in the order of US$53 billion per annum (Brown and Bird, 2008). These 
payments will be made to some of the poorest countries where governance is 
a critical issue. To be effective and efficient, there will need to be substantial 
improvements in governance so that REDD payments reach land managers 
and farmers (Bond et al., 2009). Alternatively, options for implementing REDD 
programmes under conditions of weak, but possibly improving, governance need 
to be developed (Cotula and Mayers, 2009).
Both REDD and CBNRM are incentive-driven approaches to land management 
The exchange of information is considered critical to the success of REDD (Eliasch, 
2008). Pilot REDD and CBNRM programmes need to exchange lessons about the 
challenges of using incentives for natural resource and land management. One 
important lesson from CBNRM for example, is that national government does 
not provide an effective supply chain for revenues to resource managers. The 
challenge is linking farmers to the international carbon market without going 
through government. One option being tested in Brazil is to use commercial 
banks to transfer payments from the voluntary carbon market to farmers and 
community organisations (Viana, 2009).
Monitoring is another area in which sharing information and experiences can help 
both REDD and CBRNM stakeholders. REDD, especially if linked to the market, 
will need robust data for monitoring, reporting and verification of avoided 
deforestation and landuse change (Wertz-Kanounnikoff and Verchot, 2008). 
These monitoring requirements will be technically and institutionally challenging 
14. A good model to be emulated is the Balsa Floresta Programme in Amazonas State, Brazil that deals with 
education, health and other civil issues (Viana, 2009)
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for both donor and recipient governments. The CBNRM experience can provide 
valuable lessons on methodologies that have been tried and tested such as the 
monitoring orientated management systems that have been developed in Namibia 
which are centred on community information (Stuart-Hill et al., 2006). 
As well as sharing lessons and experience, CBNRM programmes provide an 
existing framework and community architecture on to which REDD can be added 
without incurring significant start-up costs. This is especially important in the 
moist tropical forests of west and central Africa that store considerable amounts 
of carbon, and in the countries of east and southern Africa where there are 
strong CBNRM programmes (for example the CBFM programmes in Tanzania).
Conclusion
This chapter examines CBNRM in sub-Saharan Africa as a mechanism for 
delivering the objectives of the three MEAs that relate to climate change 
(UNFCCC), biodiversity (CBD) and desertification (UNCCD). There are common 
objectives, as well as mutually re-enforcing elements, across all three agreements. 
Due to the immediate, widespread and severe consequences of climate change, 
the UNFCCC is becoming the key treaty for countries. 
This chapter argues that CBNRM programmes have made small contributions 
to some of the objectives of the treaties. But in the context of the geographical 
scale of the challenges these gains are relatively minor. A much more significant 
contribution of CBNRM is its ability to demonstrate how sustainable development 
programmes can be implemented, with the inclusion of local government and 
private sector partners, where development goals are of equal importance to 
conservation objectives and opportunities exist for government not to bear the 
whole financial burden. 
For countries in sub-Saharan African, the major issue is how payments for 
REDD will be accommodated in the post-Kyoto Protocol. The experience from 
CBNRM provides many valuable lessons for imminent pilot REDD programmes 
and projects particularly around the role of financial incentives for landuse. In 
addition, existing CBNRM programmes provide ready opportunities on to which 
REDD pilots could be added.
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Marshall Murphree and Russell Taylor
CBNRM in Africa: Current constraints and 
opportunities
Introduction
Murphree’s (2008b) three pillars of empowerment, benefits and conservation 
underpinning CBNRM are evident, conceptually and in practice, as a guide to 
understanding and implementation in most formal CBNRM programmes in Africa. 
Nevertheless, as this review shows, across the Continent CBNRM is defined and 
understood somewhat differently from region to region and indeed within regions. 
Consequently it is shaped and perceived in various ways. This is not surprising. 
CBNRM exists in a variety of ecological, economic, social and policy contexts which 
inevitably shape the profile of its specific manifestations. Each CBNRM enterprise is 
context and content specific; no two are identical.
As a consequence it is dangerous to over-generalize about CBNRM and its 
components. This is not to say that CBNRM is completely amorphous in form or 
content. From the many examples given in this book we would, for instance, suggest 
that generally most formal CBNRM projects are dynamic and fluid, evolutionary and 
with a trajectory of ‘failure’ or ‘success’ which is not uniform but rather variable. 
They are endeavours in which the processes involved are usually more important 
than structure, and in which the agency of individuals is critical. Importantly, 
although generally considered conservation projects, they are almost without 
exception politically embedded, although this is often not recognized. Beyond these 
generalizations it is rash to venture. The implementation of CBNRM projects aiming 
to yield environmental health, empowerment and general benefits to rural peoples is 
carried out in a myriad number of contexts involving a myriad number of challenges.
One response to these challenges at the policy level has been to list and categorize 
them, with corresponding prescriptions being listed. The resultant compilation is 
frequently referred to as a ‘tool box’, to then be propagated and applied across 
a range of situations. While there may be certain benefits to this approach, this 
prescriptive approach is unlikely to have widespread positive results since its ‘fit’ 
with on-the-ground reality is inevitably imperfect. In this chapter we have taken 
a different approach, choosing rather to aggregate what we consider to be 
the greatest contemporary challenges to CBNRM under five generic headings. 
These constitute five areas of challenge where CBNRM has demonstrated its 
problems, resulting in the failure, inertia or perverted results of specific projects. 
While discussing these areas as challenges or constraints, we also see them as 
opportunities since it is at these very loci of constraint that the potential for change 
in CBNRM from its current status as a disputed conservation and development 
technique to a major force for African agrarian change lies.
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The first two of our headings deal with conceptual issues, the visions we 
hold of CBNRM, and its socio-ecological and socio-political location. This is a 
fundamental ‘mind-set’ collection of perceptual assumptions and imperatives 
which influence analysis and action. We contrast two prevailing paradigms and 
suggest that the techno-interventionist model which has dominated modern 
formal CBNRM needs to be revisited and modified to fit African rural ecological 
and aspirational realities. Our last three headings deal with implemental 
constraints and opportunities in the arenas of communal capacity, scale and the 
alignment of local and external facilitiation.
Re-affirming the community and commonage
The review equates CBNRM with “the promotion of local participatory and 
accountable institutions with authority over land and resources” but we need 
to explicitely recognise this as nothing new. The review points to numerous 
examples of informal CBNRM, much of which however, has been in place as 
local indigenous versions for centuries at least, be it good, bad or otherwise. 
Importantly though, CBNRM practice was reflected through the behavioural 
norms of customary authority and sanctions. Thus we need to move away from 
the notion that CBNRM, the new formal version, has been sprung on the rural 
African landscape in just the past 20 years or so. 
The older traditional CBNRM began to collapse under colonialism when the 
State appropriated land and other resources for its own designs. The removal of 
rights to land and resources was accompanied by an upward accountability from 
the residents of what became essentially centrally administered but communally 
occupied land. In the former Southern Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, implementation 
of the Land Apportionment Act during the 1930s saw large scale displacements 
and relocation of people to what became ‘over-crowded’ communal areas 
where any meaningful implementation of traditional CBNRM on a large scale 
was rendered largely ineffective. Twenty years on in attempts to ‘modernise’ 
communal agricultural practice and limit perceived land degradation, the Native 
Land Husbandry Act of 1951 (Scoones 1996, Alexander 2006), while arguably 
technically sound, not only failed dismally as such but also politicised the issue 
of land well beyond the intended techno-scientific remedies it proposed. Even 
so, informal CBNRM continued, and still continues in many communal lands and 
their equivalents elsewhere across the Continent, along well established lines 
of traditional understanding of NRM (Scoones 1989), often flying in the face of 
conventional wisdom (Scoones 1996). 
In Francophone West Africa large-scale pastoralism accords with a strong 
attachment to land, both spatially and temporally, emphasising the importance of 
place as opposed to resource as reflected in the concept and practice of ‘Gestion 
les Terroirs’ (this volume), despite competing modern state-imposed and traditional 
management systems (D. Dulieu pers.comm.). Nevertheless, post-independence 
states continue to reject traditional management regimes in favour of the dictates 
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of conventional science, for example as regards controlled grazing management. 
Despite this wisdom coming under increasing attack as empirical evidence for non-
equilibrium ecosystem dynamics in dryland savannas across the world becomes 
increasingly strong (Walker and Abel, 2002), it remains embedded in centralised 
technocratic thinking. Traditional management systems however, understand non-
equilibrial systems well, as evidenced by the ground-breaking work of Ellis and 
colleagues amongst Turkana pastoralists in Kenya (Ellis and Swift 1988).
Hence this review’s assertion that an essential component of the new formal 
CBNRM needs to be underpinned by institutional, legislative and/or political 
reforms that return real decision making authority to the local level, but 
equally that these are not forthcoming. This may be so but what we find in 
numerous instances is de facto or ‘informal’ CBNRM in practice, and not always 
fundamentally different from ‘formal’ programmes but perhaps more strongly 
embedded in local norms and practices. Perhaps the underlying difference 
between these two operational modes is that formal CBNRM still demands 
‘upward accountability’, reflective of decentralisation approaches. Hence the 
preoccupation of proponents and practitioners to date with the needed policy and 
legal reforms towards devolution, which informal CBNRM already practices, i.e. 
‘accountability downwards’ to a local constituency, and to meeting local livelihood 
and survival needs. 
So even in post-colonial African states, communities still continue to endure, 
and aspects of customary systems of governance and environmental stewardship 
persist even if limited in authority. Under state tenure, communities still divide land 
and resources into what is private (household) and common, i.e. the commonage, 
and manage these accordingly. Moreover, customary CBNRM has evolved to 
manage the commons, all of it all of the time. In this traditional context we do 
not have to expand either the scope of the resources being managed or the 
management structures themselves that are involved.
To what extent need distinction be drawn between ‘formal’, i.e. a state-supported, 
structured and funded programme, and ‘informal’ CBNRM, including ‘everyday 
use’? Whereas a legal framework may well be absent or only partially complete 
in the case of the former, local sanctions and traditional authority may well frame 
and bound CBNRM in the latter. Moreover, informal CBNRM may be functioning 
as well (or as badly) as any formal CBNRM. Thus CBNRM can be viewed as a 
continuum of management regimes from traditional to modern, informal through 
to formal and not as any form of dichotomy. This should not preclude traditional 
management in a modern economy, nor formal CBNRM programmes as apart 
from or different to traditional management regimes. Indeed, one or more forms 
may function together or separately in space and time. Consequently we have 
two CBNRMs. One customary, and generally high in internal legitimacy but low on 
external legitimacy. The other formal with high external legitimacy but low internal 
legitimacy. They co-exist but the new forms need the internal legitimacy of the 
old, and the old needs external legitimacy, particularly in the eyes of the state. 
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An explicit recognition of the reality of this co-existence will permit a mixing of 
the two forms of CBNRM in order to form a single condition with internal and 
external components. This should lead to a collective communal governance of 
the commons, with various and varying inputs of the traditional and the modern, 
grafting recent imported innovation onto deep historical roots. All of this though, 
depends on security of tenure over land and resources, and access rights to these, 
all of which are or have been, part of traditional African tenure systems (Rukuni 
2009). Land tenure security is defined as the certainty of continuous use with 
which Rukuni associates four sets of rights:
n Use rights – rights to grow crops, trees, graze livestock, make permanent 
improvements, harvest natural resources etc
n Transfer rights – rights to sell, give, mortgage, lease, rent or bequeath
n Exclusion rights – rights to exclude others from using or transferring
n Enforcement rights – refer to the legal, institutional and administrative 
provisions to guarantee use, transfer and exclusion rights 
Community enablement
One of the few generalisations which can be made about rural sub-Saharan 
Africa is that after the onset of colonial occupation most non-urban land and 
the resources associated with it were legally appropriated by the state. Notable 
exceptions included Ghana and the private alienation of land in countries with 
significant white settler populations. Rural land was legally turned into state 
land as protected areas (primarily under state wildlife and forestry agencies, 
typically 5-20% of total land area, cf Annex 3) and the balance (usually more 
than 60%) under a range of designations such as ‘communal land’, ‘tribal 
land’, ‘customary land’, ‘trust land’, etc. was left for the indigenous inhabitants 
who, in pre-colonial times, occupied and used it under a variety of land and 
resource use systems. In effect ownership15 of the land and resources of these 
populations were expropriated from them and they became tenants of the 
state, subject to the whims of state planning and regulation. In most cases 
they were granted usufruct rights to subsistence tillage and grazing and limited 
access to forest products for domestic use. Economically valuable resources 
(minerals, timber, wildlife) were expropriated by the state and its private sector 
allies and local exploitation criminalised.
Limited in their ability to administer these communal areas, colonial governments 
generally relied on the traditional authority systems, formerly in place largely for 
civil governance. These systems were essentially communal in nature, combining 
hereditary authority and collective normative consensus. Severely limited by 
the state in authority on issues of land and resource governance, they proved 
to be remarkably durable (cf. Latham 2005, Sithole 1999). This durability and 
effectiveness is influenced by a number of factors, including the cohesiveness 
of the regime concerned, the external environment (cf. Moore 2005) and the 
15. For a extended discussion on the meaning of ownership and tenure see Barrow and Murphree (2001:29-31)
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personal agency of individuals in leadership positions. The internal legitimacy of 
these leaders is highly variable and debates about ‘traditional leadership’ are often 
flawed by unwarranted generalizations. The main point to draw from this discussion 
is, however, the fact that CBNRM had existed in pre-colonial Africa for centuries, 
and has continued, despite the expropriations of colonialism, down to the present. 
This condensed description emphasises the emasculated condition under which 
inhabitants of state lands typically exist. Their tenure rights are weak and they have 
no clear rights to the economically valuable resources which were historically theirs. 
They lack the security required as an inducement for conservation investments in the 
future. Regulations preclude the opportunity for them to experiment with the use 
of their resources. They have no negotiating rights and may at any time be subject 
to the incursions of agreements made between the private sector and the state. 
They have no collective legal persona and are effectively regarded as perpetual 
legal adolescents. Under these conditions it is hardly surprising that efforts at rural 
development in sub-Saharan Africa are largely stagnant. Such conditions remove 
the incentive for the conjunction of human energy and resource richness which 
exists in the vast stretches of state (or communal) land in the African landscape and 
puts in its place short-term survivalist strategies which serve neither the interests of 
populations or the environment. A radical transformation in the tenure conditions 
applying to these lands is required, a transformation which will neither be swift 
nor uniform. To be properly effective such an evolutionary transformation needs 
to match tenure provisions with ecological and social requirements and is likely to 
move in the direction of a mosaic of land use and tenure patterns.
The situation has called for an agrarian revolution in Africa, both in the past and 
in the present. The question has been asked as to the place of CBNRM in such 
a transformation and the suggestion made that modern, formalized CBNRM has 
not adequately addressed this issue. It is interesting to note that in Zimbabwe’s 
CAMPFIRE Programme the issue was specifically addressed in its foundation 
document, where the ultimate objective of the programme was stated to be “the 
realisation of an agrarian system able to optimise land-use patterns and maximise 
group and individual investment and effort” (Martin 1986:19) and where the 
proposal was to devolve full ownership rights over land and resources to legally 
registered natural resource cooperatives corresponding to the common property 
regimes of participating communities. Regretfully this policy objective did not 
survive, with the powerful elite preferring to retain ownership of the assets of 
state land under government control. Devolution was in fact to be decentralization 
of ownership to district councils only and to involve only certain resources. As 
Murombedzi has put it, “The top-down preferences of central government on 
communities [had] merely been replaced by the top-down preferences of local 
governments on communities” (Murombedzi 2001:255). 
 
This example of the centre’s resistance to devolving land and resource ownership 
to the periphery is replicated with a plethora of examples from different countries 
in this review. It is the greatest single reason why the performance of CBNRM 
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falls so short of its promise. As an idea devolution has both technical and 
political appeal, and most African governments proclaim that it is part of their 
policy. What is offered in practice is however something else than ownership: 
decentralisation, revenue-sharing, co-management and other variants summarised 
in Chapter Three. While all of these may have their place in certain contexts and 
situations they are not the devolution of ownership, which is at the heart of 
CBNRM. Genuine devolution involves a real transfer of rights and responsibilities, 
which the state is reluctant to contemplate. As Ake (2000:190) puts it, “Those 
who have the power to effect the changes…have a strong interest in resisting 
these changes and those who have an objective interest in the changes do not 
have the power resources to effect them. Power and desirable change are pulling 
in diametrically opposite directions.”
 
This impasse is thus one of the greatest challenges facing CBNRM. It has been the 
subject of considerable literature, some of which sees it as an intractable problem 
and thus to be avoided by seeking solutions which are less robust than devolution. 
Other literature advocates non-confrontational and evolutionary approaches: the 
use of policy spaces to create de facto devolution; the use of other legislation 
(e.g. trusts) to provide communal regimes with the independence they need; or 
the formation of national associations to promote CBNRM. Another approach is 
through “recourse to the notion of domestic political will, which  holds that where 
political will for reform exists, donors can support government to enact reforms, 
such as CBNRM.” (F. Nelson, pers. comm.) Nelson is sceptical, quoting Chhatre 
(2008:21) “Political commitment from above is considered crucial for the success 
of decentralisation [sic] reforms, but where does this commitment come from?” 
The authors agree with Nelson that unfocussed and poorly articulated ‘political 
will’ is unlikely to be effective. We have however recently witnessed an instance 
where a more confrontational and negotiatory approach has yielded results 
shifting this impasse. Our recent study of Masoka (Taylor and Murphree 2007) 
provided an instance of a community which in fact was providing over 50% of 
district council revenues and threatened to withdraw from CAMPFIRE unless it 
received a more equitable share of the revenues. The RDC had no alternative but 
to enter into negotiations, which resulted in the establishment of a community 
bank account, direct payments to the community and a five-fold increase in 
revenue from the previous year (US$23 000 to US$132 000). As a result of the 
success of these negotiations the direct payment method has now been adopted 
country-wide in Zimbabwe, although still meeting with resistance from some 
district level interests (CAMPFIRE Association, 2009). This is yet not complete 
devolution for Zimbabwe, but it is a significant step towards it and will no doubt 
influence the future land and resource use incentives of those communities in 
CAMPFIRE which are significant wildlife producers. Communities with something 
of value which can collectively organise to create negotiating leverage, can use 
their bargaining strength to create the ‘political will’ for reforms among higher-
scale decision makers which would not be possible in the absence of such 
grassroots pressure. 
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The devolution deadlock is thus perhaps not as intractable as might have been 
thought. It will, however, continue to impact on CBNRM in the foreseeable future 
and it is not amenable to ‘quick-fix’ solutions. A variety of approaches will be 
needed to suit a variety of situations and progress to resolution is likely to be 
intermittent and uneven. It will be an enduring challenge to CBNRM while at the 
same time we see the dynamics involved as a current opportunity, particularly 
if we are willing to reconceptualise our views of devolution as an instrument of 
communal enablement.
 
An analysis by Anstey (2009) queries the epistemological roots that devolution 
is the transfer of authority, responsibility and entitlement from the centre to the 
periphery: “…the words decentralization and devolution inevitably act to privilege 
the centre as a starting point (from, down) creating a mental model around which 
central  power and authority is the starting point of negotiation and is in control 
of both direction and speed of the process. In privileging the centre it reinforces 
a bureaucratic view of the state and a subject rather than a citizen approach to 
democracy. It’s hard to get to the deed (effective local democracy, empowered local 
citizenship, self government) if the word privileges and hands out discretionary 
control to the centre.” (Anstey, 2009:22). 
All of this may seem to be nothing more than a verbal quibble. The main 
objective is to shift power and authority from the centre to the periphery, and the 
terminology used is a subsidiary issue. On reflection however, the import of this 
verbal issue is also for scholars and practitioners to seek a different perspective 
on CBNRM. When this is done, we recognise what has been advocated as 
‘devolution’ in the robust forms of CBNRM is, in fact, restitution, i.e. restitution 
of land, resources and rights of governance over evolved commonages to those 
from whom they have been expropriated. If formal CBNRM can shift its mindset 
to recognise that a key role is to facilitate long-established CBNRM regimes to 
achieve such restitution, a major change in its profile and direction will be effected. 
The starting point for negotiation is no longer the state but rather the communal, 
which sets the direction and pace of the enablements involved (Anstey, 2009).
 
Privileging the local is not however the only change that this challenge and 
opportunity suggests. Communal regimes in state lands are heterogeneous entities 
in heterogeneous contexts. Cohesion and legitimation must not be assumed. 
Some have been eroded by state policies of privatisation (e.g. Kenya) or their 
commonages reduced by enclosures (cf. Woodhouse et al., 2000) to the point 
where their continued existence is questionable. The legitimacy of others has been 
lost through poor leadership, normative breakdown or population movements. 
Other, non-collective forms of land and resource management may now be 
appropriate following ecological, technical or economic changes. A vast task for 
planners and coordinators at the centre is to integrate these factors if a rational and 
productive agrarian reformation of state-owned communal lands is to take place. 
Nevertheless, for the foreseeable future much of the landscape on these state lands 
will continue to be occupied by people living under communal arrangements.
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It is here that formal CBNRM can play a useful part if it is willing to loosen its 
links with the centre, accept the perspective described above and align itself 
more closely with the aspirations of communal people for a restitution of their 
rights and the authority to manage their common resources. This management 
must flow from their own collective institutions and follow their own social 
visions if it is to be effective; if its content and structures are imposed it will 
fail; the local and communal must therefore become privileged. The local must 
evaluate its own future, determine its own plans and assume the responsibility 
for implementation that this authority implies. Technological changes, new 
modes of collaboration and the penetration of national and global markets and 
environmental challenges, notably climate change, will call for new local skills. 
Formal CBNRM initiatives can play a role here, whereby communities can be 
introduced to such changes, allowing for testing, adaptation and incorporation. 
They can also provide linkages between the enabled community and the centre. 
The centre, with its access to technological and organisational knowledge, will 
have enormous extension responsibilities requested of it from communal regimes. 
It should be prepared to respond to these, but in a facilitative rather than a 
directive way, as elaborated further in this chapter. Thus, if privileging the local is 
to be part of CBNRM’s contemporary epistemological shift, reforming the centre 
must be another aspect of that shift. 
Fiscal, ecological and institutional sustainability
Given a collective governance of the commons, with various and varying inputs 
of traditional and modern CBNRM, and a strong alignment with the aspirations 
of communities for a restitution of their rights and the authority to manage their 
common resources, then issues of sustainability become more readily dealt with, 
and less problematic. 
A more holistic and integrated community-driven approach allows both market-
based commoditisation opportunities such as wildlife tourism to be exploited 
as well as sustaining economically important traditional agropastoralism. It also 
allows communities to make choices without over-reliance on one commodity, 
e.g. wildlife tourism and/or hunting which may be prone to declining visitor 
arrivals on account of either internal (political elections) or external conflicts 
(global terrorism). As already recognised above, competing interests over land 
including conversion for different uses (jatropha production in Ethiopia, Dilys Roe, 
pers. comm., sugar in Mozambique, JL Anderson pers. comm., wheat in Kenya 
Masailands, Norton-Griffiths, 2007) can and will lead to different and perhaps 
inappropriate tenure systems (share-cropping, tenant farming, privatisation and 
individual ownership). Such conversions are also aggravated, for example, by 
the persistence of Kenya’s policy ban on trophy hunting and other forms of 
consumptive wildlife use which greatly diminishes the potential economic returns 
for communities and creates disincentives for conservation by reducing wildlife’s 
local economic value (Norton-Griffiths, 2007), apart from existing tourism gate 
revenues failing to reach communities. Thus communities need to be at the 
centre of these decisions and changes, not at the periphery. 
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In Southern African CBNRM, much credence is given to allocating land to its 
highest-valued use. But the highest valued use has been interpreted largely in 
economic and financial terms, using a market based approach. The danger in 
this arguement is that it is largely a short term perspective, almost to the extent 
typical of economic ‘booms and busts’, with little consideration of long term 
economic or financial or indeed environmental sustainability. The real value of 
maintaining and using wildlife, wild lands and other natural resources is that 
these uses also help to avoid option foreclosure and mitigate the likely impacts 
of climate change, predicted to be severe in many parts of Africa (IPCC, 2007). 
So how is that highest valued use arrived at from a community perspective? It 
may range from direct use value, e.g. tourism, to non-use existence value, e.g. 
traditional or cultural heritage (Barbier 1992). Tenure and rights to choice are 
extremely important here, as is the knowledge and information that informs that 
decision, but it should not be assumed this will lead to a ‘conservation’ outcome 
per se. It may, for example, lead to a small-scale irrigation scheme, if this is the 
highest valued use of the land. However, underlying such choice should be some 
measure for institutional, economic and ecological sustainability. 
The question of the private sector involvement in CBNRM is debatable. 
Private sector partners can be extremely important, provided the relationship 
is one reflective of a ‘proprietor-client’ relationship. This is crucially important 
for markets, income generation and fostering both commercial enterprise 
development and environmental stewardship.
A number of analyses of private sector involvement in CBNRM (Child and 
Weaver, 2006; Murphree, 2001; Taylor and Murphree, 2007), outline the multiple 
benefits of entrepreneurship such as the longer term sustainability, as a means of 
empowering communities to select, negotiate and contract private sector partners 
as well as enterprise development. The commitment of private sector partners to 
community aspirations is crucial and partners have to be chosen carefully, but this 
too, is part and parcel of experiential learning by communities. Such partnerships 
also provide important entry points for eventual community self-managed small 
tourism enterprises (Davidson et al., 2006). Creating sustainability here does 
require a fundamental change of both approach and mindset on the part of 
CBNRM facilitators and practitioners, including adoption of a more business-like 
approach, ensuring market demand and strong sector policy support, withdrawal 
of direct NGO inputs, realism about capacity, separation of ownership and 
management, and promotion of a proprietor-client relationship.
Conservation needs also to be more widely interpreted. In an agricultural 
context ‘conservation’ of soil, water and grazing is extremely important from 
the perspective of land degradation in southern Africa, and desertification in the 
Sahelian regions of West Africa where transhumance is an important livelihood 
and coping strategy. The spatial and temporal distribution of key resources 
require careful collective management (Scoones, 1989), but for many common 
property regimes, such management has been eroded away. It is here though 
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where informal CBNRM has played an important role in the past under traditional 
authority and needs to be resuscitated in emerging modern economies but through 
integration rather than abandonment of previously good practices. In the context 
of CBNRM, security of tenure over land and resources (Rukuni 2009), and the 
ability for a community to do what it chooses and not have that choice readily 
taken away or removed, implies assumptions about the nature of the political 
regime under which such decisions are made or allowed. 
In the context of CBNRM not all traditional authorities necessarily have legitimacy. 
Some do, some do not. Modes of legitimacy are shaped in reality in the different 
contexts of time and place which CBNRM throws up, and the judgement should be 
one which people make on the basis of their experience and their estimate of who 
can best represent their collective interests. In this judgement, communities may 
be looking not simply at individuals but for a corporate profile of leadership which 
can deliver effectiveness in management and in guarding collective interest against 
sectional greed, both internal and external. 
In certain cases, such as that of a re-settlement area in the Eastern Highlands of 
Zimbabwe, a residency-based constituency is preferred16. People here opt for a 
project leadership which is legitimated by resident approval rather than one which 
derives from the customary structures of headmen and chiefs, although the debate 
is by no means over. Moore puts it this way: “Contending visions of resource rights 
continue to pit populist visions of localized environmental entitlements against 
‘traditional’ and ethnically-coded ancestral claims to the landscapes” (Moore 
1998:34). At Masoka in the Zambezi Valley however, we see a different pattern of 
preference evolve (Taylor and Murphree, 2007). Leadership of CAMPFIRE in Masoka 
commenced under the aegis of ‘traditional’ authority and then swung to a Wildlife 
Committee in which younger and more educated members predominated. Over 
time the actions of both ‘authorities’ in the eyes of the community were seen as 
‘good’ and ‘bad’. Subsequently a pattern of ‘balance’ emerged, with youth and 
experience, education and wisdom, becoming combined. 
A major deficiency of formal CBNRM projects is the absence or paucity of 
quantitative and/or qualitative data on their social, economic and environmental 
impacts. There is real need for good monitoring protocols to be in place and 
measurements against baselines established at the outset of the project or 
programme. Contributions to conservation of biodiversity and environmental 
protection are not easy to measure and impact assessments, including attributions 
of causality, are methodologically difficult. 
Part of the problem lies with poor or incomplete design and a lack of 
understanding by project implementers of what it is that really should be 
measured. Most projects are good at reporting on activities and to an extent the 
project deliverables, i.e. the outputs or results the project itself is responsible for. 
Lacking are the outcomes, i.e. what the community might be doing with the 
16. For a more detailed account of commons governance, see Ribot (2006)
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project deliverables, i.e. their use and application, such as a land use plan, and it 
is this which should provide the measure of impact, i.e. the effect of the project 
after it has gone. Most projects have a set of outputs leading to achievement of 
the immediate goal or project purpose but thereafter focus is lost on the sum of 
the outcomes leading to impact and the long term project goal or development 
objective. This arises out of incorrect and inflexible adherence to and application of 
project ‘log frames’ by both project implementers and donors. Log frames should 
be used as a tool which can be changed and used adaptively as circumstances 
dictate. There is also failure to recognise the long term, process oriented nature of 
CBNRM projects with too much emphasis on the achievement of short-term results 
in the life of the typical project cycle. 
Part of the solution lies with community engagement in monitoring project 
successes (and failures). Imparting skills and knowledge in establishing baselines 
and subsequent monitoring is empowering for communities and instructive for 
project implementers. Examples include the Management Oriented Monitoring 
System – MOMS  (Stuart-Hill et al., 2006) and participatory mapping (Tagg and 
Taylor, 2006) developed for the Namibian Conservancies and Participatory Quota 
Setting amongst CAMPFIRE communities in Zimbabwe (Taylor, 2001; Rigava et al., 
2006). Properly designed and structured projects will provide for quantitative and 
qualitative self-assessments of project impacts by communities themselves long 
after the project has departed. But social, economic and environmental benefits are 
unlikely without community empowerment and appropriate governance structures 
for environmental stewardship which such monitoring requires. 
CBNRM and Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs)
Support for regional approaches to ecosystem management which crosses national 
boundaries is evident throughout the areas covered by this survey. Four examples 
from Central Africa are mentioned on p. 25 and examples are also to be found in 
Eastern Africa and West Africa, including Parc W, possibly the oldest trans-national 
conservation area in Africa. For southern Africa “…at least 13 potential and 
existing terrestrial transfrontier parks and transfrontier conservation areas – also 
know as transboundary conservation areas – have been identified in the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) region. These areas include many 
national parks, neighbouring game reserves, hunting areas and conservancies, 
mostly occurring within a matrix of land under traditional communal tenure. 
Altogether the existing and proposed transfrontier parks and TFCAs cover more 
than 1,200,000 square kilometres (460,000square miles).” (AHEAD, 2008:1).
 
A good example is the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Area (GLTFCA) 
which covers an area of approximately 100,000 square kilometres of land on 
both sides of the Limpopo in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. The 
conservation core of this scheme is the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park, signed 
into existence in 2002 by the three governments concerned and consisting of the 
Kruger, Gonarezhou and Limpopo National Parks. These three parks exist within 
the larger matrix of the GLTFCA, inhabited by more than 500,000 people living 
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in communal tenure conditions “where the dominant land use is subsistence 
agropastoralism that is heavily subsidized by off-farm income and food aid”. 
(Cumming et al., 2007:3) The GLTFCA has been severely criticised for paying only 
scant lip service to these residents in the interests of large scale ecotourism backed 
by environmentalists and large scale entrepreneurs. It is true that only token 
consultations with local people took place before the project commenced and one 
could see the GLTFCA as yet one more instance of a land grab by professional 
conservationists and tourism capital.
 
Looking however at the record since 2002 one can note that little has been 
accomplished in the GLTFCA aside from sites controlled directly by national park 
authorities, i.e. the dropping of sections of the LNP/KNP fence and subsequent 
wildlife translocations. There is now an awareness that the GLTFCA will only 
succeed if it addresses the interests of the people living within it. An unanticipated 
spin-off of the inauguration of the project was the formation of a coalition 
of veterinarians in 2003 (AHEAD: Animal Health for the Environment and 
Development) concerned that wildlife corridors designed to connect protected 
areas could also serve as biological bridges for vectors and the pathogens they 
carry. This coalition rapidly changed to include human health and development 
in its concerns and incorporated a large number of social, ecological, economic 
and human health professionals in its research programme. Its annual meeting 
has now become a forum for the multidisciplinary examination of the GLTFCA. 
Aside from this benefit the project can be said to have a) raised the awareness 
at bureaucratic levels of the need to incorporate local perspectives in planning 
processes; b) enhanced CBNRM perspectives and approaches at local levels and c) 
pushed localities and state agencies into more proactive scenario planning modes 
when faced with the need to reach consensus on specific issues (e.g. the siting 
of a proposed new bridge across the Limpopo river). In this manner a large-scale 
transboundary project which might be considered inimical to CBNRM approaches 
can become an arena in which local CBNRM regimes are strengthened and cross-
scale linkages are enhanced (Murphree, MJ et al., 2008). 
This scaling up becomes all the more important when climate change predictions 
for Africa are taken into account (IPCC, 2007). CBNRM is one of the few realistic 
opportunities for ensuring adaptation and mitigating strategies for a warmer and 
drier continent. We already have examples of traditional coping strategies for 
dealing with the vagaries of the environment, especially amongst pastoralists in 
west and eastern Africa, and more recently a growing understanding of livelihood 
vulnerability amongst ago-pastoralists in the Limpopo basin (Gibson, 2007). Here 
communities are relying increasingly on markets for natural resource products 
in the face of climatic perturbations. Combinations of traditional resource use 
patterns and scenario planning amongst communities in relation to ecological scale 
and functioning will make far more useful contributions to real implementation 
of MEAs than the continuing proliferation of technocratic workshops and the 
development of a myriad top-down action plans. 
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Changing modes of facilitation and donor support
A final challenge facing contemporary formal CBNRM is a re-orientation in the way 
that  natural resource governance regimes are promoted and supported by the 
development and extension community. If privileging the local rather than the centre 
requires an epistemological mind-shift, implementing this kind of reorientation also 
requires a change in the roles and self-images of those who implement the shift. 
This applies both to those who constitute the external facilitators and those who are 
the central actors themselves, the members of the local.
 
The external component is comprised of an epistemic community of professional 
scientists, planners and bureaucrats who conventionally set the agenda, conduct 
the research, and analyse the results. If local ‘participation’ is included this remains 
ancillary, part of the data on which analysis draws. Privileging the local seeks to 
turn this relationship between professional ‘externals’ and local ‘internals’ on 
its head. Responsibility for initiation and implementation must stem from and is 
the responsibility of the local; professional involvement becomes invited rather 
than imposed, directed rather than directive, facilitative rather than manipulative. 
It should represent professional science and technology in the service of local 
civil science. To quote Emery Roe: “The obvious challenge is to come up with 
varieties of inside-out planning for ecosystem management, where local leaders 
and residents are themselves the experts and where the planning process is itself 
initiated and guided from within the local ecosystem” (Roe, 1998:138).
 
This is easy to say but difficult to put into practice. It can however be done 
provided that there is local social capital on which to build, ‘light touch’ insightful 
facilitation, and time sufficient for this relationship to grow at its own organic pace. 
Take, for example, the first stage involving invitation rather than imposition. It is no 
accident that the two cases of what are arguably the most successful communities 
in CAMPFIRE (Masoka and Mahenye) were both started on a formal CBNRM course 
only after lengthy debates and negotiation of over two years in each instance led 
to voluntary entries into the programme. This was at a time in the late 1980s when 
the Programme was still embryonic and had not as yet been formalised into a 
system dominated by district councils which coerced constituent communities into 
membership (Murombedzi, 1992; Peterson, 1991). Another example is provided by 
Namibia, generally considered to have the most successful CBNRM programme in 
Southern Africa. This programme, designed to provide to communities the same 
rights of use and benefit from wildlife as commercial farmers and to gain rights 
over tourism concessions, was provided with the enabling legislation in the Nature 
Conservation Amendment Act of 1996 through provision for the formation of a 
collective management institution called a ‘conservancy’. It was not however until 
1998 that the first conservancy had in fact been registered. Unlike other countries 
in the region Namibia insisted that these CBNRM regimes should only come into 
existence through local voluntary initiation and that they subsequently only be 
registered after having met the following criteria:
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n Having a defined membership and a committee representative of members
n Clearly defined boundaries that are not in dispute with their neighbours
n Having a clear plan for the equitable distribution of conservancy benefits  
to neighbours
Given the difficulties of working through these details by people whose residential 
patterns are generally dispersed the time elapsed between the legislation and 
the first conservancy registration is not surprising. However the momentum for 
registration developed with the success of these initial experiments and by 2007, 
50 conservancies had been registered across the Country (cf. Jones, 2001: 55-56; 
NACSO, 2008:10-13). 
 
Starting a formal CBNRM intervention (or grafting it onto an evolved one) by 
establishing at the outset that this is at the request of the local is thus critical. 
This has a powerful influence on the sense of ownership and involvement by the 
local. This cannot be cosmetic only; it must be followed up by local agenda-setting 
if this sense of ownership is to be maintained. This agenda setting is a further 
critical process in local governance building since good planning must involve 
consideration of the future, of alternative choices and relationships within wider 
spheres of governance. It must also consider the costs and implementational 
responsibilities involved. An increasingly widely used approach to local agenda 
setting is an adaptation of scenario planning, first developed for macro analytic 
strategic and economic planning as an alternative to mathematical simulation 
modeling because of its own predictive limitations. This has led to a greater 
emphasis on qualitative, non-predictive scenario exploration, often in the mode of 
examining sets of plausible alternative scenarios. This shift has been accompanied 
by greater attention to cultural and institutional variables, “internalizing human 
choice into sustainability science” (Swart et al., 2004:137).
Communal planning and implementation also require evaluation and adaptation. 
The authority to plan and responsibility to implement are among the most valuable 
aspects of communal enablement. When linked to evaluation and adaptation they 
become experimentation and civil science is given a chance to grow. Evaluation 
must however primarily be self-evaluation by the community if this is to happen. 
Taken together the implementational challenge to contemporary CBNRM is to 
ensure that the participation of communities is voluntary, and that the planning, 
implementation, evaluation and adaptation of the process reflect a sense of 
localised authority and responsibility. This stands in contrast to the ‘project’ mode 
which characterises so much of what is termed CBNRM today, where the objectives 
are set by the bureaucracy or a donor, where ‘participation’ is coerced or cajoled, 
the content is predetermined and evaluation of action and results is ‘upward’ to a 
bureaucratic hierarchy or donor. Where such a model is imposed local ‘participation’ 
usually turns out to be a manipulative response to access funding rather than 
collaboration in a larger enterprise enhancing local development efforts. This 
syndrome has led to failure in a vast number of conservation and development 
projects. With a perversity that is astonishing CBNRM ‘projects’ continue to be 
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in this mould. With a shift away from privileging the centre and a methodological 
approach which lays emphasis on local authority, responsibility and experimentation, 
contemporary CBNRM is presented with one of its greatest opportunities.
 
The community-centric approach that we have outlined above does have the potential 
for disjunction between local and larger bureaucratic contexts in two dimensions:
n Local agendas and performance criteria may well present a different profile to 
those set by some larger planning horizon, which will understandably wish to 
have its concerns addressed.
 
n Local scenario planning may well be excessively parochial, concentrating on the 
‘local’ ecosystem and ignoring the cross-scale linkages to larger bio-social systems.
 
These potential disjunctions represent challenges and opportunities afforded by the 
methodology. We highlight the following:
n Differences between local and larger scale agendas and criteria are themselves 
important data which should inform the evolution of planning at all levels. In 
revealing these differences the methodology can constitute an adaptive mechanism.
n Experience suggests that technical inputs are more likely to be accepted when 
they are seen as invited contributions to local planning rather than external 
impositions. Provided that ‘ownership’ of the process is perceived to be local, 
technical inputs are welcomed. Participatory quota-setting methodologies and 
management oriented monitoring systems (MOMS) supporting communal 
and now park wildlife management in southern Africa are good examples. 
Implemented properly, the CBNRM methodology outlined here should have little 
difficulty in accommodating sound technical advice. 
n The key to this conjunction of the local and the professional is effective, ‘light 
touch’ facilitation in the planning and evaluation exercises, which introduces 
technical perspectives without violating local senses of ownership. This requires a 
breed of scholar-practitioner who is versatile and more interested in knowledge 
production through an experimental interdependent science than the purely 
abstracted results of armchair arrogance.
 
The question has been asked, “Can a project for conservation, externally defined 
and executed in a project mode, be married to a communal approach?”(Murphree, 
2004:204). If the mental map and methodology advocated in this section are right, 
the answer is ‘No!’ Formal CBNRM approaches, which have been surveyed in this 
volume, have largely been grounded in the international project mode, which is 
generally short-term, time-bound and reductionist, assuming that the end can be 
defined and provided for at the beginning. A different stance has been advocated 
in this section, one which starts with the perspectives and concerns of the local. The 
reformulated CBNRM that is put forward starts from local collective and common 
0
Natural Resource Issues No. 18
interests, which are likely to contain a variety of agrarian interests. Unless these 
interests are prioritised and carried forward by a vehicle of internally legitimate local 
governance no CBNRM ‘project’ will succeed. And if management of the commons 
at local levels fails management of the commons at other levels – regional, national 
and global – will also fail17.
If the local is therefore so fundamental and the ‘project’ mode has such a 
depressing record of failure, why do donors persist in replicating these failures?  
The answer largely lies in the fact that the alternative mode of intervention 
proposed here is not particularly donor-friendly. As Nelson comments, “We have to 
recognize the way that donors tend to support CBNRM, which is primarily through 
large-scale, highly centralized projects negotiated between central government 
agencies and the donors, sometimes with a third-party NGO (usually a large 
international NGO) serving as the implementing go-between. Suffice to say there 
is an inherent problem with routing support for CBNRM through the hands of 
those actors most likely to resist reform (central governments) rather than through 
those most likely to demand and benefit from it (communities and allied civic 
organizations).” (Nelson, pers. comm.; see Nelson and Agrawal, 2008).
This said, we note also in certain cases such as Namibia, a donor/government profile 
very similar to that described by Nelson, has led for over 20 years, a community-
driven CBNRM national programme which to a large extent parallels that advocated 
here. Factors involved in Namibia included a well developed national policy 
maintained by a determined professional bureaucracy and a range of different 
donor options. We should note also that much donor-sourced CBNRM funding may 
not be critical. What is critical is the creation of a strong cadre of skilled facilitators, 
high-quality research and analysis to back up the implementation-evaluation-
adaptation cycles. The incentive systems in the universities and training institutes 
which produce aid establishment personnel could well be altered to give more 
weight to participatory scholarship and publication (cf. Fortmann, 2008). 
 
It would also be useful if donors ceased to pigeon-hole CBNRM as a programme 
directed at environmental issues. It is as much a programme of local governance. At 
one time environmentalists supported CBNRM as a useful adjunct to environmental 
stewardship. Now it is time to recognize that the governance of the commons is a 
critical proving ground for the experiments that need to be made to bring about the 
agrarian changes that rural sub-Saharan Africa desperately needs. CBNRM remains 
the most, if not the only viable entry point for dealing with land and natural resource 
issues and the uncertain future these face. There is no other realistic alternative.
17. Berkes reminds us that we are dealing with a multi-level commons problem involving commonages at 
various scales. “…the challenge is to build a fully communicative deliberative, multi-level system that deals with 
tradeoffs between social and ecological objectives in an optimal fashion without being skewed by disciplinary 
biases or the political economy of power relations…” (Berkes 2007:15191). We agree that CBNRM is no 
panacea and must be integrated with other levels. The problem is so often that while the local is rhetorically 
acknowledged as part of this multi-level system, it is in practice marginalised and the global edifice is built 
without the proper foundation. 
Community management of natural resources in Africa


Where next? A policy road map for CBNRM 
across Africa
The sub-Saharan context
To understand the achievements and performance of CBNRM across sub-Saharan 
Africa, it is important to briefly reflect on the wider geo-political context in which 
it is being implemented. Many of the poorest countries in the world are in the 
region. Up until recently, the economies of many countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
had either not grown or had shrunk (Collier, 2008). This trend may have ended 
however and there are several economies in the region that are showing good 
macro-economic growth, although this is not necessarily shared evenly across 
society (World Bank, 2008a). In addition, many countries on the continent have 
been directly or indirectly affected by conflict and severe governance challenges 
(Collier, 2008). It is not a coincidence therefore that one of the biggest and 
most successful contemporary CBNRM programmes in sub Saharan Africa is 
being implemented in Namibia, a country which is characterised as having many 
elements of good governance (as well as relative abundance of wild land). 
Accountable and decentralized governance is generally conducive to more 
effective CBNRM processes.
Key findings of the review
This review considers the impact of CBNRM in sub-Saharan Africa under three 
categories, namely the empowerment of rural communities, its economic impact 
and the effect on the environment. All assessments, both of traditional and 
contemporary CBNRM processes, are limited by the paucity of data. In particular, 
robust ecological assessments of CBNRM initiatives are extremely limited. 
Consequently, analyses and reviews have to rely on case-study analyses and 
anecdotal information that cannot be easily extrapolated.
The review affirms the position that the empowerment of previously alienated 
individuals and communities is possibly the most important and substantial impact 
of many of the contemporary CBNRM initiatives to date. The review notes that:
 
n the transfer of authority from central government to a diverse range of  
co-management arrangements has had both successes and has faced  
many challenges. 
n developing strong and resilient community organisations for the management 
of land and natural resources will take generations to accomplish. 
n the challenges to successful devolution include elite capture of opportunities 
and benefits, corruption and mismanagement. In some cases these problems 
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have been used by central governments as a reason to abort devolution and 
reclaim rights over land and resource management. 
Many contemporary CBNRM initiatives are actually examples of co-management 
in which the stakeholders derive different benefits and bear different and often 
unequal costs. Additional complexity is created by the different types of benefits 
that are derived from both traditional and contemporary CBNRM processes. This 
review shows that:
n from an individual household livelihood perspective it is now accepted that 
contemporary CBNRM initiatives can provide limited and supplementary 
sources of income. There are a few, often well documented, exceptions,  
where the benefits per household can be very high.
n In many areas, local livelihoods continue to rely extensively on communal 
natural resource management regimes, for example pastoralists in East Africa 
and many forest-resident communities. 
n the cost of developing CBNRM programmes has been significant and has in 
many cases been subsidized by international donors.
n in contrast, existing examples of traditional CBNRM that are found in many 
places in sub-Saharan Africa have evolved with low costs institutions and 
organisations for land and resource management.
The absence of quantified data is particularly acute in terms of the impact of 
CBNRM on land and natural resource management, forcing broad reviews to rely 
on proxy indicators, perceptions and anecdotes. The review shows that:
n there are several contemporary CBNRM programmes that are beginning 
to result in improved management of land and resources over substantial 
geographic scales such as Namibia (largely wildlife) and PFM in Tanzania. 
n there is evidence that management by communities on land outside of 
protected areas might be better than in adjacent state protected areas. 
n there is evidence of improved wildlife numbers in specific locations that can 
be attributed to contemporary CBNRM processes, but that conflicts between 
people and wildlife have not been adequately resolved.
Irrespective of these impacts, the rates of deforestation, woodland degradation 
and changes to savannahs across Africa are significant although extremely variable. 
It is therefore fair to argue that success stories are generally taking place within a 
larger context of major and often irreversible land use change. The impact, scale 
and severity of these changes is however often extremely contentious.
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Broadening CBNRM
This review shows clearly that CBNRM across the continent has developed 
following different rationales and pathways depending on local contexts and 
is therefore understood and defined differently between and within regions as 
well as by aid agencies, donors, practitioners and scholars. For many of these 
actors, CBNRM has been bound too narrowly, with a focus on “conservation” 
and a rather simplistic and generic understanding of integrated conservation and 
development programmes and projects (ICDPs). 
It is insufficient to just accept that “conservation and development go together”. 
Conservation needs to be addressed in the context of agrarian reform and should 
not be viewed simply as an issue for conservation agencies alone. Conservation 
efforts in rural Africa require a much deeper appreciation of the importance of 
conservation to people’s livelihoods, and the types of devolved institutions such 
as collective property rights that provide the foundation of local investments in 
conservation. Looking forward, it is important to deepen our understanding of 
CBNRM as a broad church that embraces wildlife conservation and protected 
area management, together with the broader land management and resource 
use issues related to agriculture, forestry and pastoralism. CBNRM is a response 
to how best to harness local resource exploitation to privilege local economic and 
social development. Indeed it is part of a much needed agrarian revolution without 
which sub-Saharan Africa will not achieve broad-based growth and prosperity.
Empowering local communities
Much, if perhaps not most of CBNRM occurring in Africa is not ‘new’ but rather 
based on extant customary rules and governance institutions, including local 
norms, cultures and beliefs. Such locally adaptive systems should be supported 
by formalizing them within the legal constructs of the State, when this will serve 
to support local rights over land and natural resources. Many communities with 
traditional CBNRM regimes, such as pastoralists in eastern Africa, need assistance 
to adapt to increasing pressures from global political and economic forces with 
interests in expropriating local lands and resources, and defend their claims 
through a range of formal and informal means. Formalizing customary systems of 
land and resource management by legally documenting and securing land rights 
over a defined area can be a key to CBNRM, and to safeguarding the livelihoods 
of millions of rural people in African countries.
CBNRM is at root a local governance reform process, and is best formally and 
strategically treated this way. CBNRM, like local governance reforms, should be 
addressed as a ‘cross-cutting’ issue, given the way that resource governance, local 
government reform, and land tenure issues all interact and reinforce one another, 
within the context of macro-political processes.
Achieving significant reform is a challenge when there are strong disincentives 
for central agencies to devolve control over resources or democratize land and 
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resource governance. As Chapter 6 and elsewhere in the review points out, 
CBNRM often has effectively relied on central bureaucrats to act against their own 
personal and institutional interests. Thus relying on ‘political will’ from the centre is 
likely to be productive only where such decentralising trends are already strong.
CBNRM efforts need therefore to fundamentally shift towards a demand-
driven, decentralised model of reform that builds the capacity of citizens 
and civic coalitions to assemble and use the political capital that is required 
to change governance institutions in democratic ways. This is how ‘political 
will’ for reform comes about: through the development of accountability between 
rulers and the ruled.
Distributing costs and benefits of resource use
Incentives play a critical role in many of the CBNRM programmes examined as part 
of this review. Common property theory places these incentives in context arguing 
that institutional change for the management of land and natural resources will 
only be achieved if the net benefits of the new management system substantially 
outweigh the net benefits of how resources were managed (or not managed) 
previously (Ostrom, 1990). 
Although seemingly simplistic in its formulation, this condition serves to remind 
us that institutional change is not costless. Further, where co-management 
arrangements are being discussed the distribution of benefits and costs between 
the stakeholders has a strong bearing on their behaviour within the arrangement. 
Governments, and in particular central treasuries, have been very reluctant to 
relinquish control over valuable natural resources, such as wildlife and timber, 
because of the negative financial implications of these decisions. The decision by 
the Government of Botswana to increase the proportion of tourism and hunting 
revenue that it manages on behalf of communities can be construed as an effort by 
central government to recover greater control over wildlife-based finances. Similarly, 
where units of local government have benefited from devolutionary policies, they 
too have often been reluctant to fully reward the land managers for responsible 
management and custodianship over natural resources (see Bond, 2001).
PES initiatives are emerging as a way of financing natural resource management 
and conservation where there are persistent market failures (Wunder et al, 2008). 
In most of Africa, PES initiatives are addressing the same basic challenge as 
CBNRM- namely, the collective or collaborative management of land and natural 
resources. Most, if not all proposals for REDD are based on payments from rich 
industrialised countries to countries where deforestation is a major cause of 
greenhouse gas emissions. There is a strong probability that countries in Africa 
with tropical forests and woodlands will benefit from both grant-supported REDD 
activities and in the longer term, direct links with carbon markets. Existing CBNRM 
programmes and architecture provides two opportunities for REDD. The first is that 
existing organisations provide short and medium term opportunities for bundling 
carbon payments with existing benefit streams from wildlife and/or timber. 
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The second opportunity is that the development and implementation of REDD 
programmes needs to draw on the extensive lessons learned from CBNRM with 
regards to institutional design, local economic incentives and resource governance. 
Knowledge and learning
CBNRM has witnessed the growth of inter-disciplinary science, notably 
between social and ecological science, but gaps remain. The research base 
needs to broaden to encompass broader issues of agrarian reform, economics, 
democratisation, commoditisation, sustainable use and climate change, together 
with associated MEAs (UNCCD, UNFCCC, CITES, CBD) in the context of CBNRM.
This review arose from a Pan African Conference held in 2008 in West Africa 
which revealed not only differences but generic similarities in CBNRM across the 
continent. The exchanges contributed significantly to the evolution of this review. 
Thus continued interchange of experience and scholarship between West, Central, 
East and Southern Africa will cumulatively be very constructive.
Our evolving understanding of CBNRM has been highly dependent on field 
practitioners and facilitators informing scholarship and vice-versa. This relationship 
must continue, but equally it must also change. As Chapter 6 points out, if we 
are to privilege the local, “…then professional involvement becomes invited rather 
than imposed, directed rather than directive, facilitative rather than manipulative. 
It should represent professional science and technology in the service of local civil 
science.” Looking forward, international and national policies should be informed 
by improved evidence-based reviews of development outcomes that support 
national and regional learning processes and give voice to local experiences. One 
such example is the Regional CBNRM Forum in southern Africa. It has a number 
of working groups, including one on governance. The Forum itself is made up of 
individual country associations. 
Roles of key actors
The previous sections of this chapter remind us of the wider context in which 
CBNRM processes are being implemented and supported; highlight the key 
findings of the evidence reviewed by this report and consider the major issues, 
such as climate change in the future. This section provides recommendations 
for future action, broken down by major stakeholder groups. In compiling these 
recommendations we recognise two important issues:
1. Breaking down the recommendations by stakeholder may be somewhat 
artificial as CBNRM processes are by their very nature multi-disciplinary and 
involve coordinated and mutually respected action by all the stakeholders.
2. We have assumed that communities of land and natural resource managers 
are the intended beneficiaries of these proposals. Our review notes that 
CBNRM processes around sub Saharan Africa are heterogeneous, and there 
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are risks in over-simplifying and suggesting that collective management by 
communities be seen as a universal panacea to all land and natural resource 
management problems.
Multi-national and bi-lateral donors: CBNRM has received often large scale 
support from multi-lateral and bi-lateral donors, both nationally and regionally, 
over the last two decades. This review has shown that CBNRM can indeed provide 
benefits to local communities in their path to improved economic development 
and is therefore one tool in the armory of rural development programmes.
In future, donor support of CBNRM processes should focus on building public 
accountability and local political capital at the level of the resource manager. 
To be successful, this support will often need to be small-scale, and long-
term, with high investments in learning and skills development in recognition 
of the complexity of the problem of promoting empowerment within existing 
political systems. This suggests that the standard donor model of centralised 
support will need to be changed over time to one in which there is greater 
flexibility, opportunities for innovation and emphasis on the goals of local 
resource managers. This model does not exclude higher levels of national or 
regional government, but places the focus on local managers and civil society 
organisations. Where they are proposed, very large scale opportunities such as 
trans-frontier conservation will need to be carefully assessed to ensure that they 
are providing people-centered interventions that do not systematically privilege 
the center over communities. 
The mode, as well as the scale and timing, of donor support are important. 
Support should not be intrusive but rather responsive to local need. Facilitation 
techniques such as scenario planning, the promotion of shared learning and 
technical workshops are critical aid components and deserve strong financial 
backing. So too are processes that develop new tools and management 
approaches for use by community-based organisations. The support of learning 
groups at local and national levels that are able to set their own agendas and 
have the flexibility to respond to current priorities are another approach that is 
proving effective in addressing complex governance challenges (Blomley, 2009). 
Direct financial backing to local groups should be approached with caution, 
but can be effective as an interim financing measure before the sustained flow 
of locally generated benefits. As shown by this review, there is still a dearth of 
relevant monitoring and evaluation data from many CBNRM programmes. This is 
an issue that future CBNRM funding must address. 
The critical questions of how donors should support CBNRM processes, the 
scale of funding and the activities that might be supported is currently extremely 
relevant. Climate change will have huge impact on sub-Saharan Africa (IPCC, 
2007). Donors will be funding climate adaptation processes at local, national and 
regional levels. For example, the eight countries that form the Congo Basin will 
be major beneficiaries of financial flows from REDD, and thus developing locally-
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based forest conservation incentives and institutions will inevitably become a local, 
national, and global priority in such regions. The opportunities to learn from and 
link with existing CBNRM processes should be maximized if such efforts are to 
achieve their aims. Further opportunities may arise from direct links with carbon 
markets but these are only likely to develop in 5 – 10 years. Donors can assist in 
ensuring effective exchange of experience between the wildlife conservation and 
community forestry communities and in supporting the harmonization of sectoral 
policy frameworks towards a common approach.
Civil society: In the context of CBNRM there are a wide range of civil society 
organisations, from community-based organisations, through to small local 
NGOs and large multi-national (or big) conservation and development NGOs – or 
BINGOs. Civil society organisations have a difficult balancing act to fulfill. They 
ultimately need to be recognized by national governments as legitimate and by 
communities as supportive in their development ambitions. Such balancing acts are 
filled with tension in the context of sub-Saharan Africa’s highly contested terrain 
of contested rights to land, resources, and citizenship. Civil society organizations, 
and their various local, national, and global supporters and constituents, need to 
acknowledge the inevitable conflicts that will arise over efforts to democratize 
resource governance regimes; conflict is an inherent part of institutional change, 
and should be strategically embraced and anticipated, rather than avoided.
CBNRM has often been advocated and implemented by international and 
national NGOs that see their primary vocation as wildlife conservation rather than 
economic development. A real danger of the BINGOs is that these organisations 
are seldom accountable to local African constituencies, and are often much 
more reliant on and tied to national-level governance institutions. As a result, 
the interests of BINGOs and those of local communities can quickly diverge. 
Even more so than local NGOs, international NGOs face a highly tenuous 
complex balancing act between soliciting government legitimacy and supporting 
community rights that has proven very difficult to achieve. However, BINGOs 
have a real role in promoting the skills, management experience, and convening 
power, of local NGOs and being a conduit or coordinator for financial support. At 
the community level they can assist with promoting accountable local structures 
for transparent financial management, the sharing of benefits and technological 
innovation. Wherever possible they should avoid becoming a local, “hands-on” 
implementing agency but rather support grassroots capacity.
In an ideal world, the facilitation of CBNRM should be the preserve of local 
NGOs as they are grounded in the social, economic and ecological reality of their 
environments. However, their roles are often limited by their size and difficulty 
in retaining skilled staff. Notwithstanding these challenges, we see national and 
local NGOs as having the key role in the facilitation of CBNRM in the future 
because they are more accountable to their constituents and should be much 
more cost effective than either government agencies or BINGOs. The participation 
of local NGOs in national learning groups (learning fora) should be promoted 
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while also supporting communities in pursuit of their rights and promote 
transparent governance within their communities and local government. The role 
of local NGOs in building networks of political capital and constituency demand 
for resource governance reforms is fundamental to the future of CBNRM in sub-
Saharan Africa, and needs to be placed front and centre in strategies to support 
CBNRM across all contexts. 
African Governments: With a few notable exceptions, governments in sub-
Saharan Africa have often failed to fully restore rights and access to land and 
natural resources that were appropriated by colonial powers (see Chapter 6). 
Consequently, central government agencies still control access to land and natural 
resources, have the power to impede local adaptive measures and tend to revert 
to outdated technocratic solutions for resource management problems (for 
example pastoralist/farmer conflicts during transhumance).
The political economy of CBNRM needs to be better documented. For 
example stronger analysis of the flow of rents and benefits from natural 
resource exploitation, and how the revenues can be equitably shared between 
government, local authorities and villagers will help guide policy development. 
However, documenting the distribution of incentives among stakeholder and 
within communities in relation to resource use and access is often difficult and 
politically sensitive due to prevalent informal/illegal patterns of use.18 
A policy road map or a set of recommendations for sub-Saharan African 
Governments needs to recognise that many of the functions expected from 
African governments are constrained by existing patterns of patrimonial 
governance and weaknesses in government capacity and the rule of law. Within 
this context we recommend that governments need to:
 Implement existing laws and policies: too often even existing legal 
and policy frameworks, as flawed as they might be, are simply ignored 
by government officials or in cases used by officials for their own benefit. 
Implementation of existing legislation would benefit many contemporary as 
well as traditional CBNRM processes.
 Align funding with mandates: many countries across Africa have developed 
new legislation and policy for the management of land and natural resources, 
often with a strong devolutionary theme that would support CBNRM. However 
the shift of legal authority to local government is not accompanied by the 
financial and staff resources required to deliver effective implementation.
18. Importantly, there is a recent shift on the part of donors towards trying to understand these informal 
patterns of resource use, at least in some places. A much-cited TRAFFIC report on illegal logging in Tanzania 
(Milledge et al., 2007) documents staggering levels of illegal use with major impacts on CBNRM and forest 
governance outcomes. A recent report by the World Bank on Tanzania’s ‘hidden economy’ focuses entirely on 
the value of informal natural resource uses, with its focus on the lost value to the Tanzanian economy, although 
it largely fails to diagnose the political/institutional factors that underlie this widespread informality (see World 
Bank. 2008. Putting Tanzania’s hidden economy to work. Washington, D.C.: World Bank).
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 Work on harmonising policy and legislation: although not unique to Africa, 
policy and legislation is still largely sector specific (eg wildlife conservation, 
forestry, water, agriculture etc). This report recognises that CBNRM supports 
the development of ‘participatory and accountable institutions with authority 
over lands and resources’. Community organisations and institutions can only 
operate within the existing policy framework – these are seldom harmonized 
and often contradictory.
Finally, African governments need to recognise the importance of national and 
local creativity and create an enabling environment in which communities, civil 
society and the private sector can experiment with new models of land and 
natural resource management. 
The private sector: This review shows that commoditisation of natural resources 
more generally, can both support and undermine local rights and CBNRM 
processes. Many of the contemporary, wildlife based CBNRM processes of 
southern Africa depend on private sector partners to generate market value from 
wildlife. Facilitators of CBNRM processes, should regard the private sector as an 
ally of great potential but one that should be engaged with some caution. Where 
a CBNRM strategy depends on the market and commoditisation of resources, 
then simply ‘protecting’ local interests is not good enough. Local interests must 
privileged to acquire the skills and tools, needed to ensure sustained harvests and 
to protect themselves from short term exploitation. 
CBNRM’s core concern is to develop locally accountable resource governance 
institutions. The way that private sector ventures are structured, designed, and 
facilitated can in turn have a major impact on those local governance institutions. 
Too often, the private sector is assumed to be individuals and organisations that 
are different and therefore external to communities. At the moment, this may 
well be the status quo in most communities for historical reasons, but should not 
be regarded as an immutable principle for perpetuity. Entrepreneurs will emerge 
from within communities and they need to be given the same opportunities and 
access as other private sector partners. 
Voluntary codes of conduct have been developed for many areas of human 
endeavour over the last fifty years. Their success builds on the fact that so many 
relationships cannot be regulated by law but behavior can be modified by peer 
pressure (Collier, 2008). Recent examples of codes are the Kimberly Process 
(Diamonds) and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (oil and minerals). 
In the forestry sector the Forestry Certification Standards (FSC) stands out. Private 
sector enterprises working with communities in the fields of hunting, tourism and 
forestry should consider developing, endorsing and applying codes of conduct 
that facilitate, rather than constrain, long-term local rights and incentives.
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Privileging the community: This review recognises the immense challenges and 
complexity that are required to facilitate CBNRM processes, often in remote areas 
with limited resources. These are challenges that require patience, insight and 
strong leadership. One of the major challenges is that communities are seldom, if 
ever, homogenous harmonious entities. They are best portrayed as ‘communities 
of communities’ where complexity and competing interests are standard and 
trade-offs are necessary. Thus many of the recommendations formulated for other 
stakeholders above apply equally to communities, albeit at a different scale. 
The central thesis of these recommendations is based on the principle that 
the restitution of rights over land and natural resources is necessary for 
effective and durable CBNRM. This can only be achieved when the support 
for CBNRM starts by privileging the communities rather than strengthening 
organisations that maintain the status quo, or which are interested in drawing 
resource rights away from local communities. However, in privileging previously 
dispossessed and often marginalized resource managers, CBNRM facilitators 
cannot guarantee goals, purposes and outputs as in the conventional, largely 
linear and often deeply flawed approaches to development planning and 
environmental management. CBNRM is about enhancing local capacity to 
adaptive capacity and agency in shaping local communities’ shared futures, 
including both their own collective governance institutions and their placement 
within larger political entities that shape local rights and authority. These local 
rights are inevitably contested, and will depend on the ability of local groups 
and their allies within civil society, higher levels of government including elected 
representatives, private sector joint venture partners, and foreign development 
partners, to collectively work together towards empowering reforms. In many 
respects, CBNRM efforts across Africa to date have mainly served to highlight 
the importance of, and the fundamental challenges to, such institutional change. 
Developing the collaborative strategies grounded in local interests required to 
attain such change is the task facing CBNRM in sub-Saharan Africa going forward 
in a period of increasing environmental, economic, and political change.
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Annex 1: The policy and legal 
framework for CBNRM in Africa1 
1. The coverage in this annex is incomplete – both in terms of countries and sectors – but reflects the 
information it was possible to obtain within the time available. Updates are welcomed.
A. Central Africa
Central African Republic
Land: Land policy varies according to the type of land. The finage is constituted 
of land reserve, carrying wood or pastoral areas, where land use rights (for 
hunting, gathering, pasturing and cropping) of several communities can be 
applied, with various intensity according to the distance to the different “central 
places” (settlements or villages) of the concerned communities. The “terroir” 
is a group of crop land (including fields, fallows and forest tillers); it is a part 
of the finage where land use rights are dominant for one defined community 
(Vermeulen and Carriere, 2001).
Wildlife/protected areas: Conservation in CAR historically government-
owned and run, with little community involvement (Mbitikon, 2005). However, 
three recent, large projects in CAR have changed this; Dzanga-Sanga Special 
Reserve, the Forest d’Ngotto and the ZCV – community co-managed hunting 
reserves which buffer two National Parks in the North of CAR – all have levels of 
community involvement. 
Forests: Under the current forest policy, logging permits are provided to mainly 
international timber companies, which are valid for indefinite periods, and in 2004 
86% of forest in CAR was under concession. However, there is a growing shift 
in CAR from centralised management of timber to multi-use, co-management of 
natural resources and the country is considered one of the most innovative of the 
sub-region in the field of forest management (Roulet and Binot, 2008). The 1994 
Forest, Wildlife & Fishing law allows for forest co-management with local people 
(Sunderlin et al., 2008), but this is thought to be weakly enforced.
Chad
CBNRM: Since June 2008, Environmental protection legislation foresees in 
theory the application of “NRM customary rights” or “CBNRM rights” through 
decentralisation mechanisms. The transfer of power to the CBOs is supposed 
to be recorded in a contract between the communities and the concerned 
decentralised administrative territorial authority (e.g. in the case of community 
forests). This represents a great progress in Chadian environmental legislation, 
given that CBOs’ rights in natural resources management had never been 
legalised before that.
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Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
Land: Since the 1967 Bakajika law, which gave the government ‘full ownership 
over its domain and full sovereignty to grant rights on land, forests and 
mines throughout the entire country’, land has been government owned, 
and management highly centralised (Debroux et al., 2007). However a new 
decentralised land policy is currently being debated (IUCN, 2007).
Wildlife/protected areas: Only two of DRC’s 74 PAs are designated as 
community reserves but there are examples of efforts by international 
conservation organisations to include community participation in PA 
management, and a number of CCAs have been created. WWF-DRC has recently 
written a strategy document for the development of a co-management plan for 
the Luilaka river “CBNRM zone” in Salonga National Park. Other CBNRM zones 
are proposed at Monkoto and Lotoi-Lokoro. 
Forests: The new 2002 forestry code classifies the forests into three types, 
depending on use: ‘gazetted forests’, which are mainly PAs, ‘permanent 
production forests’, and ‘protected forests’, which are primarily for local 
development. The code recognises the rights of local communities to manage 
their traditional forests, on application to the relevant authorities. It also stipulates 
that 40% of logging fees must be used for basic community infrastructure 
(Debroux et al., 2007). 
Equatorial Guinea
Wildlife/Protected areas: There is currently no legal framework covering 
the interests of people living around PAs. However, the new law on PAs (Law 
n°4/2000 of 22 May 2000) does recognise areas of importance for traditional 
activities, and village councils and NGOs are now represented within the PAs 
advisory committees (FAO, 2006).  
Forests: Community customary rights recognised by forest legislation. Concept 
of community forest reserves (reservas de poblado) was written into the 1948 
forest law (FAO, 2006), with their primary aim being to provide land security and 
access to resources for forest dwellers. In these areas a form of co-management 
between the community and the logging company in the area ensues with 70% 
of the taxes from forest production going towards community projects (FAO, 
2006). In April 2006, President Obiang signed an agreement with Conservation 
International, committing to the establishment of a “CBNRM National Forest”, 
joining the existing PAs of Monte Alen, Estuario Rio Muni, Altos de Nsork and 
Piedra Nzas. The new CBNRM forest will cover 500,000 ha, cancelling the timber 
concessions that currently exist there (CI, 2006).
Gabon
Wildlife/protected areas: 13 National Parks created in 2002 and designed 
to fit within a ‘multiple-use’ landscape of different levels of protection and 
management, including a surrounding buffer zone for the sustainable use of 
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natural resources by local communities. There are currently no CCAs in Gabon. 
Because the Parks system is still relatively new, many of these buffer zones are not 
yet under active management, although many of the Parks have begun to plan 
and fundraise for buffer zone management and community involvement. 
Forests: All forests in Gabon are owned by the state, although rural communities 
have usufruct rights to forest use, and state laws are seldom enforced. The forest 
code in Gabon has recently been revised and divides the forests into two subsets: 
the permanent sector, which comprises productive forests (for timber exploitation), 
and the state-owned rural forest areas, where use is limited to local communities 
(within 5km of each village), and this includes the potential for community forestry. 
However, to date no community forests have been established.
Republic of Congo
Wildlife: In four of RoC’s 14 PAs there are established community projects: Lac 
Tele community reserve, Lossi Sanctuary (which was set up at the request of local 
communities), and Odzala and Nouabale Ndoki National Parks, both of which 
have community programmes. These are enabled by the new forestry laws which 
promote participatory management and provide rights over wildlife resources 
within the forest as well as the forest itself. 
Forests: New forest laws in 2000 aim for sustainable, Participation in Forest 
Management (PFM), with the joint involvement of the public service agencies, 
the rural public, the private sector and NGOs. The laws recognise usufruct rights 
of local communities and also have provision for community forestry. Communal 
forests are classified by government decree, and then become the private domain 
of the community group (FAO, 2006). Forest products of any kind resulting from 
the exploitation of local community forests are the exclusive property of the 
community (Bahuchet et al., 2001; Joiris, 1996).
B. East Africa
Kenya
CBNRM: There is no unifying CBNRM policy – different resources (land, wildlife, 
forests) are dealt with separately in different policies and laws which include 
varying provisions for devolved management.
Land: The 1968 Group (Land Representatives) Act gave formal land title to 
groups of pastoralists who elected ranch management committees to oversee 
livestock herding within their specified ranch area. However, subsequently many 
committees subdivided these ranches into smaller plots awarded to shareholding 
members, undermining the communal nature of resource management 
(BurnSilver and Mwangi, 2007). New mechanisms are now emerging to re-
establish collective land management units through trusts and associations but 
the reality is one of limited land security for those residents. Trust lands are 
subject to periodic threat of recentralisation. 
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Wildlife: Strict state regulations on wildlife utilisation – especially trophy hunting, 
which greatly reduces the available economic benefits communities may capture 
from wildlife and creates disincentives to conserving wildlife on private and 
communal lands (Norton-Griffiths, 2007). Various reform efforts since the 1980s 
have not been successful (Norton-Griffiths, 2007), highlighting the prominent role 
played by international animal welfare organizations active in Kenya in lobbying 
against reforms that would localize control over wildlife.
Forests: Kenya recently passed a new Forest Act (2005) which provides a greater 
emphasis on local participation in forest management (PFM), mainly through the  
co-management of forest reserves by local forest users and government agencies. 
Tanzania
CBNRM: There is no unifying CBNRM policy as such, but under the Local Government 
Act of 1982 villages are entitled to make their own by-laws, which are legally binding 
as long as they do not violate any state laws. This provides communities with a 
powerful tool for creating statutory land and NRM rules and procedures at the local 
level. By-laws passed by communities commonly address issues such as use of natural 
resources (trees, hunting, grazing), as well as sanctions and fines for those who 
infringe local rules (Nelson and Ole Makko, 2005).
Land: Villages are the basic unit for making local land use and management 
decisions in Tanzania according to the Land Act of 1999 and Village Land Act of 
1999. However, the letter of the law is often disregarded, under the pressure of 
external interests, and the need for expediency. Formal policies promoting external 
investment, and continued perception that pastoralist lands are ‘empty’ or ‘unused’, 
result in continued land tenure insecurity for rural communities with a high 
dependence on natural resources (Mattee and Shem, 2006).  
Fisheries: The Fisheries Act (2003) allows for the establishment of Beach 
Management Units along fresh water coastlines. 
Wildlife: In the wildlife and tourism sector, the 1990s were a period of tentatively 
embracing reforms calling for devolution of greater rights and responsibilities to the 
local level through the establishment of WMAs. However, since 2000 a range of new 
regulatory measures have been passed which increase central control over communities’ 
ability to benefit from tourism ventures on village lands (Nelson et al., 2007).
 
Forests: Despite a history of centralised forest management, since the mid 1990s 
Tanzania has experimented with community-based forest management, and in 1998 
adopted a National Forestry Policy which aims to strengthen the “legal framework 
for the promotion of private and community-based ownership of forests and trees” 
(MNRT, 1998). The subsequent Forest Act of 2002 calls for PFM at the lowest 
possible level of government and provides flexible institutional arrangements for local 
forest management and ownership including Village Land Forest Reserves (VLFRs), 
which are managed by villages, as well as Community Forest Reserves (CFRs), which 
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may be managed by a sub-group of people within the village. This legal and 
policy framework is very supportive of community management and ownership 
of forests and has led to the rapid expansion of statutorily recognized local forest 
reserves (mainly VLFRs).  
Uganda
CBNRM: There is no over-arching CBNRM policy – different resources are dealt 
with in sectoral policies. However, the overall thrust of community involvement in 
these policies is commonly towards co-management of natural resources (Blomley 
and Namara, 2003).
Forests: The National Forestry and Tree Planting Act (2001) provided the legal 
basis for what is termed Collaborative Forest Management (CFM) as well as 
CBFM (in forest lands outside forest reserves). However, establishing CFM has 
proven difficult in practice, and has only happened so far in Masindi district. 
In some cases those applying for CFM want to carry out activities which will 
always be illegal in state reserves, such as charcoal burning. In this sense there is 
clearly no transfer of tenure or decision making to the holders of the agreements 
(EMPAFORM, 2006). 
Wildlife: The Wildlife Statute, passed in 1996, provides for collaborative 
management of natural resources within state PAs such as national parks. 
Regulated harvesting of NTFPs has been agreed and is active in Bwindi, Queen 
Elizabeth, Mount Elgon and Kibale National Parks (see Chhetri et al., 2004). 
Fisheries: The National Fisheries Policy, 2004, provides for the establishment of 
fisheries co-management and the formation of Beach Management Units (BMUs) – 
inclusive local institutions, which strengthen the influence of fisheries communities 
in development planning at the local level. The Fisheries Bill (2004) has yet to be 
approved by Parliament, however, which means that much of the current co-
management is of a somewhat questionable legal basis (see Nunan, 2006). 
C. Southern Africa
Angola
Little information available on the legal and policy framework for resource 
management – community-based or otherwise.
Land: The 2004 Land Law recognizes the rights of communities to land acquired 
according to customary law. Community titling is underway, and several thousand 
hectares of land have been titled to San communities (Sunderlin et al., 2008)
Botswana
CBNRM: Unified CBNRM policy recognises the need to develop conservation 
incentives – particularly for rural communities – in order to obtain increased 
benefits from natural resources and to improve and diversify community livelihoods. 
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It provides for revenue from the sale and use of hunting quotas to be used to set up a 
National Environment Fund (65%) with the 35% balance remaining at the community 
level. The Fund is intended to ensure a more equitable distribution of wildlife revenues 
over Botswana, particularly to wildlife poor communities; payment of compensation 
to persons who suffer loss from wildlife; and to support community investment in 
ecotourism projects (Schuster, 2007). 
Land: Tribal Grazing Land Policy (1975) zoned tribal land into Commercial Land, 
Communal Land, Reserved Areas, and later, Wildlife Management Areas. The TGLP 
was further reinforced by the National Policy on Agricultural Development in 1991. 
These policies have been questioned during the last two decades as it has been 
recognised that equilibrium dynamics and carrying capacities may not apply on semi-
arid rangelands (Cullis and Watson, 2004).
Wildlife: 24% of the area of Botswana is designated as WMAs, which are further 
subdivided into Controlled Hunting Areas (CHAs; Musumali et al., 2007). A WMA 
is an area where wildlife utilisation and management is the recognised form of land 
use. In most WMAs, the government has granted local communities the right to 
use wildlife resources subject to government regulations, such as the requirement 
to form a trust, to prepare and adhere to a management plan for the area, and the 
need to apply for a hunting quota (Arntzen et al., 2003). 
Madagascar 
CBNRM: Madagascar’s Gestion Locale Sécurisée (GELOSE) programme provides 
the overarching policy framework for CBNRM. This provides for the devolution of 
management of a number of renewable resources to rural communities via a series of 
contracts involving local communities (Communautés de Bases; ‘COBA’), decentralised 
local authorities (communes), and the State department of Water and Forests (‘EEF’). 
However, Kull (2002) notes that Law 96-025 (on local resource management) requires 
that GELOSE contracts and resource management conform with existing legislation 
and rules. As a result, resource rights are not always transferred.
Land: The local resource management law of 1996 has reinvigorated customary 
law, which is now codified in the new tenure legislation enacted in 2005 
(Muttenzer, 2006).
Forests: A 2001 decree on contractual forestry management (Gestion 
Contractualisée des Forêts; ‘GCF’) provides for co-management agreements between 
local communities and the state forest department and is applicable to forest areas 
within village territories.
Wildlife/protected areas: At the 2003 World Parks Congress the President of 
Madagascar pledged to extend the total hectarage of PAs from 1.7 million to 6 
million hectares through the use of CCAs (Toillier et al., 2008). It is unclear how 
these new PAs will affect existing COBA areas under the GELOSE system, many of 
which have struggled to be viable (Hockley and Andriamarovololona, 2007). 
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Malawi
CBNRM: There is no overarching CBNRM policy – although there is a donor 
funded national CBNRM programme called COMPASS, which has created 
a National CBNRM strategic plan (Watson, 2003). In addition, there is a 
decentralization policy, which is implemented through the Local Government Act, 
as well as Department of Environmental Affairs guidelines for the Decentralization 
of Environmental Management (Watson, 2003).
Forests: A 2003 supplement to the 1997 Forestry Act provides guidance on 
developing co-management agreements between communities and government 
(Watson, 2003).
Wildlife/protected areas: Policy relating to national parks and wildlife was 
approved in June 2001, and actions are already being taken in and around several 
national parks that will provide unprecedented access to natural resources by 
neighbouring communities (Watson, 2003).
Fisheries: The National Fisheries and Aquaculture Policy has received government 
approval, and the legislative underpinnings of CBNRM in the fisheries sector have 
been established (Watson, 2003).
Mozambique
CBNRM: There is no overarching policy for CBNRM.
Land: The 1997 Land law provides self identified ‘local communities’ with land 
use rights in perpetuity. These rights have the equivalent legal status to private 
land rights – unlike the differential system that is employed in most countries 
(Nhantumbo and Anstey, 2007).
Wildlife/Forestry: The 1997 Wildlife and Forestry Policy (implemented through 
legislation in 1999 and regulations in 2001) provides for communities to receive 
user rights and management authority over wildlife (Anstey, 2001; Nhantumbo 
et al., 2003). Anstey (2005) notes, however, that these rights are not as clearly 
articulated as they are for land. 
Namibia
CBNRM: The 1995 policy and 1996 Nature Conservation Amendment Act 
provide overarching policy framework for CBNRM facilitating the establishment of 
communal area conservancies (NACSO, 2006). The Ministry of Environment and 
Tourism’s strategic plan to 2011/12 includes a specific objective to develop and 
support CBNRM.
Land: The end of the colonial era left a complex mosaic of different land tenure 
arrangements in Namibia. Various land rights initiatives have subsequently been 
implanted in an effort to resolve disputes and redistribute land to indigenous 
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Namibians. These include Affirmative Action Loan Schemes (AALS; began in 
1991), Resettlement (began with Resettlement Act, 1995), Conservancies (see 
above), and Communal Registration (began with Agricultural (Communal) Land 
Reform Act, 2002). 
Forestry: Forest Act (Act no 12 of 2001) makes provision for community forestry. 
Wildlife: 1996 Nature Conservation Amendment Act provides for communities to 
acquire rights over wildlife and tourism once constituted as a conservancy. 
South Africa
CBNRM: In South Africa “land restitution has been the major driving force 
for more equitable and participatory forms of natural resource management” 
(Campbell and Shackleton, 2001). The Communal Property Association Act of 
1996 provides the overarching framework for CBNRM, allowing communities 
to establish legal common property institutions (Collins and Snel, 2008). One 
unusual mechanism used in South Africa has been contractual parks, whereby 
community owned land is added to the national PA estate. This can occur 
through land restitution (e.g. Makuleke land claim), creation of new PAs (e.g. 
Richtersveld NP) or addition of community land to existing PAs (e.g. Addo 
Elephant National Park; Child et al., 2004; Reid and Turner, 2004).
Wildlife: 1996 White Paper on the Development and Promotion of Tourism 
promotes the development of private sector, government and community 
partnership in tourism (Spenceley, 2003).
Zambia
CBNRM: Government documents such as the National Conservation Strategy of 
1985, the National Environmental Action Plan of 1994 and the National Parks 
and Wildlife Policy of 1998 have articulated the need for the involvement of 
local communities in Natural Resources Management. The Zambian Government 
has prepared and is now in the process of implementing a decentralisation 
policy. CBNRM strategies were formulated and implemented in 1988 under the 
ADMADE programme. The Wildlife Conservation Revolving Fund (WCRF) was 
created by the Zambian Government to provide a mechanism for ploughing back 
in GMAs some of the revenues earned from wildlife utilisation by the Department 
of National Parks and Wildlife Service (NPWS), now Zambia Wildlife Authority 
(ZAWA). Under the ADMADE, the producer local communities in GMAs retained 
35% of the funds generated. The experiences earned during ADMADE led to 
the enactment of the 1998 Zambia Wildlife Act that makes specific provisions 
for the participation of local communities in wildlife management through local 
institutional structures known as Community Resources Boards (CRBs). These 
receive 45% of hunting fees. Local Communities are expected to utilise these 
public funds on local community agreed socio-economic development projects 
such as schools, health centres and feeder roads. Guidelines on the utilisation of 
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community funds are in place. It was agreed with CRB representatives in 2004 
that 45% of their revenues would be spent on wildlife protection, 35% on 
community projects, and 20% on administration of CRB (ZAWA, 2009).
Zimbabwe
Land: Most good quality farmland is privately owned since colonial era by 
white farmers. The government launched a Land Reform Process in 2000 to 
redress perceived inequalities, which is considered to have caused, in part, 
the subsequent collapse of the economy of Zimbabwe (Child, 2009). CBNRM 
programmes have focused on the lower-altitude, poor-rainfall areas at the 
periphery of the country, where 40,000-50,000km2 of communally occupied land 
is adjacent or near to PAs with abundant wildlife (Child, 2009).
Wildlife: The 1975 Parks and Wildlife Act devolved authority for wildlife to 
private landholders, and in 1982, following amendment, to communal areas. 
This “sowed the seed for private and community conservation in the region” 
(Child, 2009). However, appropriate authority was only delegated to the level 
of RDCs rather than producer wards, with important implications for campfire 
(Murombedzi, 2001; Murphree, 2005). 
D. West Africa
Benin
CBNRM: Benin has the NRMP which makes some provision for CBNRM – 
including community involvement in forest, watershed and wildlife management. 
However, it has not been possible to find any updates on the outcomes of these 
initiatives and whether these provisions remain in the NRMP. 
Land: The state has weak authority over land tenure systems in rural Benin, 
due to limited resources and poor decentralised infrastructure. As a result, 
traditional community tenure systems are still strong (Edja, 2001). However, as 
a result of population pressures and land degradation, community land use in 
Benin is moving from a collective system toward an individual system, where 
private ownership is the norm (Edja, 2001; Mongbo, 2008). In a bid to deal 
with the current unsustainable land use practices, the Government is working 
to strengthen formal community tenure of state lands. The Rural Land Use Plan 
(2007) is intended to legalise customary land rights in law (Le Meur, 2008).
Forests: Decentralisation of forestry resources was decreed in 1994. Village 
communities participate in forest management through committees created at 
various levels, with two representative from the village committees represented 
at the Management Committee, and two representatives from this committee 
represented at the Coordination Council. Committees collect fees for the 
collection of forest products (including timber) and 20% of these fees go back 
to the village committees and communities. In addition, the committees receive 
funds to produce and plant tree seedlings each year, creating a buffer zone 
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between forest and farmland of fast-growing tree species, which are used for 
timber (Mongbo, 2008). 
Wildlife: In two of Benin’s national parks, ‘W’ and the Penjari Biosphere Reserve, 
communities participate in park management through AVIGREF. This is in no way 
community-based management of the park’s resources, but does allow the village 
to have their say on park management, and the use of park incomes. 
Burkina Faso
Land: The Programme National de Gestion des Terroirs (PNGT) first established in 
1986 provides the overarching framework for land management. Reorganisation 
Agraire et Fonciere (RAF; 1991) re-established collective ownership and gives 
legitimacy to customary institutions over the ruling of land access and use.
Forests: Under the 1997 code forestier (Burkina Faso, 1997) forests belong to 
the state and are divided in ‘forets classees’ and ‘forets protegees’. The former 
are forests that have been granted a specific status (because they are degraded 
or subject to particular regeneration initiative) and use is limited to collection 
of dead firewood and NTFPs; the latter constitute most of the forested cover 
where agriculture and pastoralism are permitted. It is the state that manages the 
forests (in accordance with the code) either through forest agents, or through 
decentralised institutions (province, commune or terroir) that have elaborated a 
management plan of general interest.
Wildlife: Burkina Faso is the only country in West Africa where legislations 
permits communities to benefit from wildlife hunting (Vermeulen, 2004).  In two 
wildlife reserves in Burkina Faso, Zones Villageoise d’Intérêt Cynégétique (ZOVIC), 
multi-use zones have been implemented since 2000. In the same way that village 
forest management associations can be created, wildlife management association 
have been created in the south of the country (Burkina Faso, 2008; Yeye, 2000).
Cote d’Ivoire
Land: Rural Land Tenure Law (1998) defines ownership rights, regulations for 
the use of rural land, and mechanisms for the issuing of ‘land tenure certificates’ 
(Stamm, 2000). However, less than 2% of the land is formally registered (Stamm, 
2000; World Bank, 1997). 
Forests: The SODEFOR embarked on a ‘forest co-management’ strategy in 
1994. This set up ‘Farmer Forest Committees’ within state owned forests. 
Implementation has been limited (Kesse, 2002).
Wildlife: In 1996, a World Bank funded pilot project, in partnership with the 
national government, began in North Cote d’Ivoire on community-based resource 
management (World Bank, 2005). 
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Ghana
Land: As with many countries in West Africa, Ghana has a pluralistic land tenure 
system, with local customary systems operating in conjunction with national 
statutory systems. In 2005 the state owned 22% of the land area in Ghana, with 
over 70% (mainly rural areas) under allodial (traditional) management (Alhassan 
and Manuh, 2005). The 1993 Local Government Act provides a framework 
for decentralisation but many district authorities do not have the funding and 
logistic support to take on responsibility for land management (Kassanga and 
Kotey, 2001).
Forestry: As with general land tenure in Ghana, there is a history of government 
control and regulation of the forest sector, including in the collection and 
distribution of timber revenues (Ayine, 2008). However, reforms introduced with 
the 1994 Forest and Wildlife policy provide for co-management agreements 
between timber companies and communities (Amanor, 2002), while mandatory 
Social Responsibility Agreements that were introduced by the Government 
in 1997 entitle communities within and around timber concessions to 5% of 
the value of the stumpage fee, and other forms of compensation from timber 
companies (Ayine, 2008).
Wildlife: The Wildlife Division, with UNDP GEF funding has established a CREMA 
initiative which gives communities authority to control access and harvesting 
within community forest areas.
Mali
CBNRM: A programme of decentralisation initiated in 1991 provides an 
overarching framework for CBNRM, with local communities invited to participate 
in reviewing the legislation on land and water management in Mali in 1995  
(Ogier et al., 2001). A 1999 government decree makes decentralisation 
operational. 
Land: Land remains legally the property of the state, but the 1999 decree 
devolves responsibility for land management to local governments who may in 
turn delegate power to village authorities, interest groups and neighbourhoods 
that have an established rural management structure (Ogier et al., 2001). 
Forestry: Under the decentralisation policy, forests are managed by the local 
Natural Resource Management Committees, although the state remains the 
owner of the forest. Regarding timber production, the state works with village 
communities on state-managed timber contracts, and the village and state share 
the revenues. 
Wildlife: Mali’s action towards the CBD’s PoW on Protected Areas includes 
reference to researching the possibility of co-managed or community managed 
PAs (UNDP, 2008a).  
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Fisheries: Despite state ownership of fisheries resources, the management of 
fishing in the Niger Delta still follows the Dina, which is a management system 
created in the 19th century by the Fulani ethnic group, integrating the traditional 
systems of existing ethnic groups (Beeler and Frei, 2005). Under the 1991 
decentralisation decrees, fishing councils have been set up at regional levels, 
and management committees set up in villages – but fishermen are under-
represented, and have little decision-making power (Kassibo, 2002). 
Niger
Land: All land is owned by the state. Niger’s Rural Code (1993) recognises 
customary rights as a legitimate source of land claims through the concept of 
Terroir d’attache, including land and water rights. It also states that herders have 
a right to use rangelands in common and that herders can obtain recognition 
of priority rights on their home areas (“terroir d’attache”; Cotula, 2007). This 
includes both land and water rights.
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